(PC) Turner v. Williams
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Daniel E. Butcher (author)
Analysis
Plaintiff Michael Turner, a pro se litigant, moved for the appointment of counsel citing his ignorance of the law, inability to research legal information, and parole status. The court denied the motion, finding that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate the 'exceptional circumstances' required for such an appointment.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Denial of Plaintiff's Motion for Appointment of Counsel“The Court, therefore, DENIES Plaintiffs Motion for appointment of counsel for the reasons stated in its prior order.” | agree with court The court correctly applied the Ninth Circuit standard that a civil litigant has no constitutional right to appointed counsel and that appointment is only warranted in 'exceptional circumstances.' The plaintiff's arguments (ignorance of law, difficulty with legal jargon, and parole status) are standard pro se difficulties that do not rise to the level of exceptional circumstances. The court's reliance on the fact that the plaintiff is likely released from custody and that a summary judgment motion is pending (a common litigation event) further supports the denial. The order is consistent with the cited authorities. |
The order itself: sound — The order is legally sound. It correctly identifies the high bar for appointing counsel in civil cases ('exceptional circumstances') and applies it to the specific facts presented. The court distinguishes the current situation from the prior one by noting the plaintiff's likely release from custody and the routine nature of the pending summary judgment motion. The citations to Ninth Circuit and district court precedent are appropriate and directly on point.
Opinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MICHAEL TURNER, Case No.: 20-cv-01643-WQH-DEB 12 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 13 v. REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 14 K. WILLIAMS, et al., 15 Defendants. [DKT. NO. 57] 16 17 Before the Court is Petitioner Michael Turner’s second Motion “requesting 18 coun[s]el.” Dkt. No. 57. Plaintiff requests the appointment of counsel due to his 19 (1) “ignorance of the law”; (2) “inability to research legal information to respond to 20 defendants[’] legal jargon”; and (3) parole status, which “limits [his] ability to gather 21 evidence.” Dkt. No. 57. The Court denied Plaintiff’s first request for appointment of 22 counsel (based on “legal ignorance” and missing “legal material”) due to lack of 23 exceptional circumstances. Dkt. No. 21. 24 The Court has carefully reviewed the pleadings and does not find exceptional 25 circumstances support appointment of counsel. See Agyeman v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 390 26 F.3d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Myers v. Basto, No. 18-cv-2239-DMS-BLM, 27 2019 WL 265134, at *1–2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 2019) (finding plaintiff failed to allege the 28 requisite “exceptional circumstances” warranting the appointment of counsel, where the 1 || plaintiff argued he was unable to afford counsel, had “very limited” access to law library, 2 || and “imprisonment [would] greatly limit his ability to litigate properly.”’). 3 The Court deduces from Plaintiff's arguments that since his first request, he has been 4 released from custody (likely making his circumstances less limited than while in custody) 5 ||and Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment (a common filing in litigation). 6 || These changed circumstances do not warrant reconsideration. See Herrera v. Rouch, No. 7 || 13-cv-0289-LJO-MJS, 2014 WL 7004756, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2014) (denying a 8 || prisoner pro se plaintiff's motion for appointment of counsel as not exceptional when the 9 || plaintiff may have not been “well versed in the law,” made “‘serious allegations,” and a 10 || motion for summary judgment was pending: “[t]his court is faced with similar cases almost 11 || daily.”).! The Court, therefore, DENIES Plaintiffs Motion for appointment of counsel for 12 || the reasons stated in its prior order. 13 IT IS SO ORDERED. 14 ||Dated: June 9, 2022 — O,%5 16 Honorable Daniel E. Butcher United States Magistrate Judge 17 18 19 20 21 22 || 24 See also CivLR 7.1) (‘Whenever any motion... has been refused in whole or in part . 25 ||. . and a subsequent motion . . . is made for the same relief in whole or in part upon the 5 same or any alleged different state of facts, ... each party . . . seeking such relief [must] 6 present... an affidavit of a party or witness or certified statement of an attorney setting 27 the material facts and circumstances surrounding each prior application, including . . 38 what new or different facts and circumstances are claimed to exist which did not exist, or were not shown, upon such prior application.”’).