Griffin v. Hodges
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Daniel E. Butcher (author)
Analysis
Plaintiff Harold Griffin, a pro se prisoner, moved for the appointment of counsel in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights action, citing California state court rules and his indigency. The Court denied the request without prejudice, finding that the cited state rule was inapplicable and that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate the 'exceptional circumstances' required for appointment in federal civil rights cases.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Denial of Plaintiff's Request for Appointment of Counsel“For the reasons discussed below, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s request without prejudice.” | agree with court The court correctly applied the Ninth Circuit standard from Terrell v. Brewer, which requires a showing of 'exceptional circumstances' for the appointment of counsel in § 1983 cases. The court properly noted that indigency alone is insufficient under Lassiter and Mallard, and that the plaintiff had not demonstrated a likelihood of success or an inability to articulate his claims, particularly given that his claims had already survived initial screening. The denial without prejudice is appropriate as the record was not fully developed. |
The order itself: sound — The order is legally sound. It correctly identifies the applicable federal standard for appointing counsel in § 1983 cases (Terrell) and distinguishes it from the state rule cited by the plaintiff. It properly applies the Supreme Court precedents (Lassiter, Mallard) to limit the right to appointed counsel in civil cases. The court's factual findings regarding the plaintiff's ability to litigate pro se are supported by the reference to the prior screening order. The denial without prejudice is a standard and appropriate procedural outcome when the record is not fully developed.
Opinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 HAROLD GRIFFIN, Case No.: 21-cv-01474-MMA-DEB 12 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 13 v. REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 14 K. WILLIAMS, et. al., 15 DKT. NO. 15 16 Defendants. 17 18 Before the Court is Plaintiff Harold Griffin’s Request for Appointment of Counsel 19 and Declaration of Indigency (“Motion”). Dkt. No. 15. Plaintiff requests the Court appoint 20 counsel on his behalf “so that [his] interest may be protected by the professional assistance 21 required.” Id. He states he is “indigent and unable to afford counsel” because he has no 22 assets or income. Id. Plaintiff invokes California Rules of Court 4.551(c)(2) in support of 23 his Motion. Id. 24 For the reasons discussed below, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s request without 25 prejudice. 26 Cal. R. Ct. 4.551(c)(2) does not apply to this case, because it is a rule that applies 27 only to habeas corpus proceedings filed in California state courts. 28 1 In 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights cases pending in a District Court such as this one, 2 the court may appoint counsel only in “exceptional circumstances.” Terrell v. Brewer, 935 3 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991). “A finding of exceptional circumstances requires an 4 evaluation of both the likelihood of success on the merits and the ability of the petitioner 5 to articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved. Neither 6 of these factors is dispositive and both must be viewed together before reaching a decision.” 7 Id. (internal quotations omitted). 8 The Court finds no exceptional circumstances here. Plaintiff’s indigency does not 9 constitute an exceptional circumstance. Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of Durham Cty., N. 10 C., 452 U.S. 18, 26–27. (1981) (“[A]n indigent litigant has a right to appointed counsel 11 only when, if he loses, he may be deprived of his physical liberty.”); see also Mallard v. 12 U.S. Dist. Court for S. Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 298–309 (1989) (finding District Courts 13 generally lack authority to require counsel to represent indigent prisoners in § 1983 cases.) 14 Plaintiff has not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits, and, at this stage 15 of the proceedings, the record is not sufficiently developed for the Court to make this 16 finding. 17 Moreover, there is no reason to conclude Plaintiff lacks the ability to articulate and 18 prosecute his claims. Plaintiff has demonstrated the ability to articulate the essential facts 19 supporting his claim, which appear relatively straightforward and uncomplicated. See Dkt. 20 No. 9 at 8 (“Plaintiff’s FAC contains plausible Eighth Amendment inadequate medical care 21 claims as to Defendant Shakiba sufficient to survive . . . sua sponte screening required by 22 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b).”). Plaintiff, therefore, appears capable of 23 articulating and prosecuting his arguments pro se. 24 Lastly, pro se litigants are afforded some leniency to compensate for their lack of 25 legal training. “In civil rights cases where the plaintiff appears pro se, the court must 26 construe the pleadings liberally and must afford plaintiff the benefit of any doubt.” 27 Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 757 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal citation omitted). This also 28 applies to motions. Bernhardt v. Los Angeles Cty., 339 F.3d 920, 925 (9th Cir. 2003). 1 || Accordingly, the Court will take Plaintiff's pro se status into consideration when his filings 2 || are reviewed. 3 For these reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not demonstrated there are 4 ||“‘exceptional circumstances” to warrant appointment of counsel. Plaintiff's Motion 1s, 5 || therefore, DENIED without prejudice. 6 IT IS SO ORDERED. 7 ||Dated: June 3, 2022 — ‘ Daud Teron, 9 Honorable Daniel E. Butcher United States Magistrate Judge 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28