Pavone & Fonner, LLP v. Willis
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Myron James Lorenz (author)
Analysis
Plaintiffs, a law firm and its principals, filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against state court judges seeking to invalidate an adverse state court judgment in a fee dispute. The court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Dismissal of the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction“Therefore, this action is dismissed without leave for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” | agree with court The court correctly applied the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The plaintiffs are state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced. Their claim seeks to invalidate a specific state court judgment, which is a collateral attack barred from federal district court jurisdiction. The court properly identified that the plaintiffs' arguments regarding judicial error in the specific case do not constitute a 'general constitutional challenge' that would survive Rooker-Feldman. The dismissal without leave to amend is appropriate because the jurisdictional defect cannot be cured by amending the complaint. |
The order itself: sound — The order is sound. It correctly identifies the core jurisdictional bar: the plaintiffs are attempting to use a federal § 1983 claim to collaterally attack a specific state court judgment. The court cites the controlling Supreme Court precedent (Exxon Mobil) and relevant Ninth Circuit case law to establish that such claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The court distinguishes the plaintiffs' claim from a 'general constitutional challenge' by noting the plaintiffs are arguing the judges erred in the specific case. The conclusion that the jurisdictional defect cannot be cured by amendment is legally correct.
Opinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 9 BENJAMIN PAVONE, et al., Case No.: 3:22-cv-137-L-JLB 10 Plaintiffs, 11 v. ORDER DISMISSING ACTION FOR 12 MYZSA WILLIS, et al., LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER 13 Defendants. JURISDICTION 14 15 On February 1, 2022, Plaintiffs Benjamin Pavone, Pavone & Fonner, LLP, and 16 Law Offices of Benjamin Pavone, P.C. (“Plaintiffs”) filed this civil action against 17 Defendants Myzsa Willis, Judge Kenneth Medel, Justice Joan K. Irion, Justice Terry 18 O’Rourke, and Justice Truc Do (“Defendants”). 19 This action relates to a fee dispute between Plaintiffs and Defendant Willis, 20 their former client. Defendant Judge Medel presided over that dispute. Plaintiffs appealed 21 to the California Court of Appeals. The panel—Defendants Justice Irion, Justice 22 O’Rourke, and Justice Do—affirmed the judgment. Plaintiffs then sought review at the 23 California Supreme Court. Plaintiffs assert one claim against Defendants under 42 U.S.C. 24 section 1983.1 Plaintiffs seek to invalidate the adverse state court judgment. 25 26 1 To pursue a section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show the defendant acted under the color of state law. 27 See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Heineke v. Santa Clara Univ., 965 F.3d 1009, 1012 (9th Cir. 2020) (“section 1983 excludes from its reach merely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or 28 1 On February 8, 2022, the Court issued an order to show cause as to why it should 2 not dismiss this action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (ECF 3). Plaintiffs filed a 3 response. (ECF 6). 4 Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, this Court is precluded from exercising 5 subject matter jurisdiction over “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of 6 injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings 7 commenced.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005); 8 Ignacio v. Judges of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 453 F.3d 9 1160, 1165 (9th Cir. 2006) (the “Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes federal adjudication 10 of a claim that amounts to nothing more than an impermissible collateral attack on prior 11 state court decisions.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). That limitation 12 “applies even when the challenge to the state court decision involves federal 13 constitutional issues.” Worldwide Church of God v. McNair, 805 F.2d 888, 891 (9th Cir. 14 1986); Doe & Assocs. Law Offices v. Napolitano, 252 F.3d 1026, 1029 (9th Cir. 15 2001) (“federal district courts do have jurisdiction over a ‘general constitutional 16 challenge,’ i.e., one that does not require review of a final state court decision in a 17 particular case.”); Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2003) (affirming 18 12(b)(1) dismissal under Rooker-Feldman doctrine). 19 Here, Plaintiffs argue the state court judges erred when ruling on their case or 20 failed to consider arguments they raised throughout the proceedings. (ECF 6). Plaintiffs 21 seek a declaration and an injunction related to the adverse fee decision. More specifically, 22 they ask the Court “to invalidate the state court judgment.” (ECF 1, Complaint at ¶ 10); 23 (Id. at p. 3); (Exhibit E). 24 25 26 F.3d 950, 954 (9th Cir. 2008). There are several potential immunities applicable to section 1983 claims. 27 See, e.g., Olsen v. Idaho State Bd. of Med., 363 F.3d 916, 922 (9th Cir. 2004) (“absolute immunity is generally accorded to judges . . . functioning in their official capacities.”) 28 1 Plaintiffs cannot collaterally attack the state court decision through this federal 2 action. The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the matter. Exxon Mobil Corp., 3 ||544 U.S. at 284; Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1157 (9th Cir. 2003); Doe & Assocs. Law 4 || Offices, 252 F.3d at 1030 (“The purpose of the [Rooker-Feldman] doctrine is to protect 5 judgments from collateral federal attack.”); Ignacio, 453 F.3d at 1166 (district court 6 || lacked subject matter jurisdiction where the federal “complaint [was] nothing more than 7 || another attack on the California superior court’s determination in [a] domestic □□□□□□ No 8 |}amendment would cure this deficiency. Therefore, this action is dismissed without leave 9 || for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 10 IT IS SO ORDERED. 11 ||Dated: April 5, 2022 fee Soop 13 H . James Lorenz, 4 United States District Judge 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28