Grizzle v. San Diego, County of
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Ruth Bermudez Montenegro (author)
Analysis
Defendants moved to bifurcate the trial for an expedited evidentiary hearing on the affirmative defense of exhaustion and to vacate pretrial deadlines pending that hearing. The court denied the motion for bifurcation, noting that the proper procedural vehicle is a motion for summary judgment which Defendants had recently filed, and denied the motion to vacate as moot.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Defendants' Motion for Bifurcation, Expedited Evidentiary Hearing, and Entry of Judgment is DENIED.“For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ request for bifurcation, expedited evidentiary hearing, and entry of judgment on the affirmative defense of exhaustion is DENIED.” | agree with court The court correctly identified that the Ninth Circuit has designated a motion for summary judgment as the appropriate procedural device for determining exhaustion under the PLRA. Because Defendants had already filed a motion for summary judgment (albeit without addressing exhaustion), the court's decision to deny the request for a separate bifurcated hearing in favor of allowing supplemental briefing on the existing MSJ is a sound exercise of discretion to manage the case efficiently. |
Defendants' Motion to Vacate or Continue the Pretrial Deadlines is DENIED AS MOOT.“As to the request to vacate or otherwise continue the remaining pretrial dates pending outcome of Defendants’ request for bifurcation of trial, evidentiary hearing, and entry of judgment, the Motion to Vacate is DENIED AS MOOT.” | agree with court The motion to vacate was explicitly filed to stay deadlines pending the outcome of the Motion for Bifurcation. Since the Motion for Bifurcation was denied, the condition for the stay no longer exists, rendering the motion moot. This is a logical and correct procedural outcome. |
The order itself: sound — The order is concise and directly addresses the motions. It correctly applies the controlling Ninth Circuit precedent (Albino) to determine that summary judgment is the proper vehicle for exhaustion claims, thereby justifying the denial of the request for a bifurcated hearing. The denial of the motion to vacate as moot is a standard procedural consequence of the denial of the underlying motion. The court also appropriately granted leave to supplement the existing summary judgment motion to address the exhaustion issue, ensuring the issue is resolved through the correct procedural channel.
Opinion
1 | 3 4 . □ 5 6 7 . 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 . SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA _ 10 11 |} ELLIOT SCOTT GRIZZLE, Case No.: 17-cv-00813-JLS-RBM 42 Plaintiff, ORDER: 13 || V. . (1) DENYING DEFENDANTS’ 14 || COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, et al., MOTION FOR BIFURCATION, 15 _ Defendants.|_ EXPEDITED EVIDENTIARY 16 HEARING, AND ENTRY OF . JUDGMENT; AND □ 17 Ig (2) DENYING AS MOOT DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO 19 || . . VACATE OR CONTINUE THE 0 -| PRETRIAL DEADLINES 21 . | [Does. 144, 145] 23 24 On December 13, 2021, Defendants, County of San Diego, William Gore, Lena 25 || Lovelace, and Aaron Boorman (collectively, “Defendants”) filed a motion for bifurcation, 26 || expedited evidentiary hearing, and entry of judgment on the affirmative defense of failure 27 ||to exhaust (“Motion for Bifurcation”). (Doc. 144.) Defendants seek to bifurcate trial by 28 || holding an early evidentiary hearing on the issue of exhaustion claiming bifurcation “is 1 || appropriate to expedite and economize trial.” (Doc. 144-1 at 2.) Additionally, Defendants 2 |\|request the Court to enter judgment in their favor at the conclusion of the requested 3 || expedited evidentiary hearing. (/d. at 7.) 4 Following Defendants’ Motion for Bifurcation, Defendants filed an ex parte motion 5 ||to vacate or continue the pretrial deadlines (“Motion to Vacate”) pending the outcome of 6 || Defendants’ Motion for Bifurcation. (Doc. 145.) Defendants request the Court to vacate 7 all remaining pretrial dates in the fourth amended scheduling order (Doc. 142) or in the 8 |lalternative, continue all dates and deadlines by 90 to 120 days. (Doc. 145 at 2.) Defendants 9 || claim “it would be a waste of resources for the parties to complete the pretrial work . . . if 10 || the case is disposed of at the preliminary hearing requested in the Defendants’ Motion for 11 Bifurcation ....” (Ud. at 2.) 12 For the reasons discussed below, Defendants’ Motion for Bifurcation is DENIED 13 Defendants? Motion to Vacate is DENIED AS MOOT. 14 A. Motion for Bifurcation 15 “Exhaustion should be decided, if feasible, before reaching the merits of a prisoner’s 16 |}claim.” Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1170 (9th Cir. 2014). The Ninth Circuit has held 17 || that “the appropriate procedural device for pretrial determination of whether administrative 18 ||remedies have been exhausted under the PLRA . . . is a motion for summary judgment 19 ||under Rule 56.” Jd. at 1168. 20 Defendants claim a preliminary evidentiary hearing is appropriate in the instant case 21 |las “Plaintiff intentionally created factual issues to avoid summary judgment” and □□□□□□□□□□ 22 \}in a manner designed to avoid summary judgment.” (Doc. 144-1 at 5.) However, 23 || Defendants recently filed a motion for summary judgment (“MSJ”) (Doc. 148) on January 24 ||5, 2022, but they did not address exhaustion in their MSJ briefing. Therefore, the Court 25 ||sua sponte grants Defendants fourteen (14) calendar days to file supplemental briefing, 26 any, should Defendants wish to address exhaustion. An order setting a briefing schedule 27 the supplemental briefing, if any, response to the MSJ, and reply is forthcoming. 28 || Because Defendants may raise the issue of exhaustion in their summary judgment motion, 1 || bifurcation of trial and an expedited evidentiary hearing are unnecessary. For the || foregoing reasons, Defendants’ request for bifurcation, expedited evidentiary hearing, and 3 ||entry of judgment on the affirmative defense of exhaustion is DENIED. 4 B. Motion to Vacate 5 A scheduling order may be modified only. upon a showing of good cause and with 6 judge’s consent. FED. R. CIv. P. 16(b)(4); see, e.g., Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, 7 |[Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating, “the focus of [the good cause] inquiry is 8 || upon the moving party’s reasons for seeking modification.”). 9 As to the request to vacate or otherwise continue the remaining pretrial dates pending 10 outcome of Defendants’ request for bifurcation of trial, evidentiary hearing, and entry 11 || of judgment, the Motion to Vacate is DENIED AS MOOT. 12 IT IS SO ORDERED. 13 ||Dated: January 10, 2022 . . Stor Woe Hoa ) HON. RUTH BE EZ MONTENEGRO 16 _ UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 17 18 19 . 20 22 23 24 25 . 26 27 28