gno.law

Perez v. Royal Property Management

District Court, S.D. California · 3:21-cv-01844 · 2021-11-01 · Unknown

Proceeding
district
Area
civil
Panel
Cathy Ann Bencivengo (author)

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt own-v1, 2026-10-13T22:47Z · confidence high

The court screened a pro se civil complaint filed in forma pauperis and found it failed to comply with Rule 8 and state a claim. The court dismissed the action as frivolous without leave to amend and denied the IFP motion as moot.

What the court decidedThe model
Complaint dismissed as frivolous and for failure to state a claim
“The complaint is DISMISSED without leave to amend;”
agree with court
The court correctly applied the screening requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and Rule 8. The order recites that the complaint was incoherent, failed to identify the legal basis for the claims, did not connect the named defendant to the alleged facts, and did not specify the relief sought. Under Ninth Circuit precedent, such deficiencies justify dismissal for failure to state a claim or as frivolous. The decision to deny leave to amend is supported by the cited authority (Lopez v. Smith) regarding frivolous cases.
Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis denied as moot
“Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP [Doc. No. 2] is DENIED AS MOOT;”
agree with court
Because the underlying action was dismissed, the motion to proceed without prepaying fees is no longer relevant. Denying it as moot is the standard procedural consequence of dismissing the complaint.
Certification that an IFP appeal would be frivolous
“The Court CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal from this order would be frivolous and therefore would not be taken in good faith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3);”
agree with court
The court is authorized to certify that an appeal is not taken in good faith if the appeal is frivolous. Given the court's finding that the complaint was frivolous and failed to state a claim, this certification is consistent with the dismissal.

The order itself: sound — The order correctly identifies the statutory and rule-based grounds for dismissal. It cites the appropriate Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court authorities regarding the mandatory nature of screening under § 1915(e)(2)(B) and the requirements of Rule 8. The factual findings regarding the incoherence of the complaint and the lack of connection to the named defendant support the conclusion that the complaint fails to state a claim and is frivolous. The denial of leave to amend is consistent with the cited precedent regarding frivolous actions.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 AGUSTIN MUÑOZ PEREZ, Case No.: 21-cv-1844-CAB-WVG 12 Plaintiff, ORDER: 13 v. 1) DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION AS FRIVOLOUS AND FOR FAILING 14 ROYAL PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, TO STATE A CLAIM PURSUANT 15 Defendant. TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (ii);

16 AND 17 2) DENYING MOTION TO 18 PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 19 AS MOOT [Doc. No. 2]

21 Plaintiff Agustin Muñoz Perez filed this civil action against Royal Property 22 Management on October 29, 2021. [Doc. No. 1.] Plaintiff did not prepay the civil filing 23 fees required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) at the time of filing; instead, he has filed a Motion to 24 Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). [Doc. No. 2.] 25 I. Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 26 A complaint filed by any person seeking to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 27 1915(a) is subject to sua sponte dismissal if it is “frivolous, malicious, fail[s] to state a 28 1 claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek[s] monetary relief from a defendant 2 immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 3 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to 4 prisoners.”); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“[S]ection 5 1915(e) not only permits, but requires a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis 6 complaint that fails to state a claim.”); see also Chavez v. Robinson, 817 F.3d 1162, 1167- 7 68 (9th Cir. 2016) (noting that § 1915(e)(2)(B) “mandates dismissal—even if dismissal 8 comes before the defendants are served”). Congress enacted this safeguard because “a 9 litigant whose filing fees and court costs are assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, 10 lacks an economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive 11 lawsuits.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 12 U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). 13 Complaints must also comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, which requires 14 that each pleading include a “short and plain statement of the claim,” FED. R. CIV. P. 15 8(a)(2), and that each allegation “be simple, concise, and direct.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(d)(1). 16 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009). In addition to the grounds for sua 17 sponte dismissal set out in § 1915(e)(2)(B), the district court may also dismiss a complaint 18 for failure to comply with Rule 8 if it fails to provide the defendant fair notice of the wrongs 19 allegedly committed. See Cafasso, United States ex rel. v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 20 637 F.3d 1047, 1059 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing cases upholding Rule 8 dismissals where 21 pleadings were “verbose,” “confusing,” “distracting, ambiguous, and unintelligible,” 22 “highly repetitious,” and comprised of “incomprehensible rambling”). 23 Here, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to comply with Rule 8 and fails to state a claim upon 24 which relief can be granted. The complaint incoherently alleges that three individuals (not 25 named as defendants) sprayed “chemical exposure” in Plaintiff’s apartment unit, but it is 26 unclear what laws or rights Plaintiff claims were violated or infringed. Plaintiff also does 27 not specify what the named defendant is allegedly responsible for or how it is involved 28 with the facts alleged. Plaintiff attaches a Notice of Entry of Judgment in a small claims 1 || case he appears to have brought against the named defendant (Royal Property Management 2 Group) and another defendant (East Village West LP) reflecting judgment in favor of the 3 defendants, but does not explain the significance of the judgment to this case. Moreover, 4 Plaintiff does not state what relief he seeks from the Court. The complaint is therefore 5 || frivolous and fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 6 Accordingly, even if Plaintiff is entitled to proceed IFP, the complaint must be 7 ||dismissed. See Anderson v. Sy, 486 Fed. Appx. 644 (9th Cir. 2012) (“The district court 8 ||properly dismissed [the lawsuit] as frivolous because the complaint contains 9 ||indecipherable facts and unsupported legal assertions.”); Adams v. FBI San Francisco 10 || Field Office Supervisor & Agents, No. 19-CV-02977-YGR (PR), 2019 WL 5626261, at *1 11 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2019) (“A claim that is totally incomprehensible may be dismissed as 12 || frivolous as it is without an arguable basis in law.’”). Moreover, “[w]hen a case may be 13 classified as frivolous or malicious, there is, by definition, no merit to the underlying action 14 || and so no reason to grant leave to amend.” Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1128, n.8. 15 II. Conclusion 16 For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED as follows: 17 1. The complaint is DISMISSED without leave to amend; 18 2. Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP [Doc. No. 2] is DENIED AS MOOT; 19 3. The Court CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal from this order would be frivolous 20 and therefore would not be taken in good faith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 21 1915(a)(3); and 22 4. The Clerk of Court shall CLOSE this case. 23 It is SO ORDERED. 24 ||Dated: November 1, 2021 € Z 25 Hon. Cathy Ann Bencivengo 26 United States District Judge 27 28