In re subpoenas to Maxlinear, Inc.

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 IN RE subpoenas to MAXLINEAR, INC., Case No.: 3:21-cv-1556-CAB-AGS 4 ORDER DENYING MOTION TO ENFORCE SUBPOENAS (ECF 1), 5 VACATING HEARING, AND 6 CLOSING THE CASE 7 The party serving a subpoena may move to compel production in the court for the 8 “district where compliance is required.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(2)(B)(i). The question here 9 is: Which federal district is that? 10 Plaintiff TQ Delta, LLC, served a subpoena requiring nonparty MaxLinear, Inc., to 11 produce documents and sit for a deposition in Irvine, California, which is in the Central 12 District of California. (See ECF 1-3, at 2.) But TQ Delta moved to enforce that subpoena 13 here, in the Southern District of California. The district of compliance “is determined by 14 the location or ‘place’ for compliance identified on the subpoena.” CSS, Inc. v. Herrington, 15 354 F. Supp. 3d 702, 709 (N.D. Tex. 2017). Because the subpoena’s listed “place” is in the 16 Central District, this Court seems to lack authority to consider TQ Delta’s motion. 17 Yet TQ Delta rejects this straightforward analysis and argues that the “district where 18 compliance is required” should be in a district within 100 miles of MaxLinear’s 19 headquarters, which would include the Southern District. At least two cases have adopted 20 that approach.1 See Raap v. Brier & Thorn, Inc., No. 17-MC-3001, 2017 WL 2462823, 21 at *3 (C.D. Ill. July 7, 2017); Europlay Cap. Advisors, LLC v. Does, 323 F.R.D. 628, 629 22 (C.D. Cal. 2018). In essence, these courts looked to where the subpoena objectively should 23 24 25 1 TQ Delta also cites In re Outlaw Labs., LP Litig., Case No. 18-CV-840 GPC 26 (BGS), 2020 WL 5709386, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2020), for this proposition. But the 27 In re Outlaw Labs court “decline[d] to make th[at] determination” in its “Order because the briefing d[id] not address this specific issue and the Court d[id] not need to reach it to 28 1 have been ordered complied with and deemed that to be the “district where compliance is 2 required.” See, e.g., Raap, 2017 WL 2462823, at *2-3. 3 This approach has been criticized based on Rule 45’s language and for various 4 practical issues. See, e.g., Herrington, 354 F. Supp. 3d at 709-10 (rejecting that approach 5 because it “requires a district court . . . to first resolve a substantive geographical limits 6 issue under Rules 45(c) simply to decide if it is the court with authority to decide a 7 Rule 45(d)(2) or 45(d)(3) motion—including a Rule 45(d)(3)(ii) motion to quash for 8 violating Rule 45(c)—in the first place.”); Adams v. Symetra Life Ins. Co., 9 No. 19-MC-401-EFM-ADM, 2020 WL 489523, at *2 (D. Kan. Jan. 28, 2020) (reasoning 10 that when “a subpoenaed entity does not appear,” the court “will have no way of 11 dependably making the fact-intensive determination whether the subpoena’s stated place 12 of compliance is within 100 miles of where the subpoenaed person resides, is employed, 13 or regularly transacts business in person without hearing from the subpoenaed person.” 14 (citation and quotation marks omitted)); Merch. Consulting Grp., Inc. v. Beckpat, LLC, 15 No. CV 17-11405-PBS, 2018 WL 4510269, at *3 (D. Mass. July 11, 2018) (considering 16 both approaches and finding “the reasoning of the Herrington court more persuasive”). 17 This case highlights one practical concern in particular: MaxLinear resides within 18 100 miles of two districts. Both would qualify under Raap’s and Europlay’s approach as a 19 district where compliance is required. But what happens if the serving party moves to 20 compel in one district and the responding party moves to quash in the other? To avoid 21 inconsistent rulings, which district should ultimately take up the issue? Happily, we need 22 not wrestle with these thorny questions. Rule 45 makes clear that there can only be one 23 district of compliance: “the serving party may move the court for the district where 24 compliance is required.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(2)(B)(i) (emphasis added). 25 Raap and Europlay are factually distinguishable, as well. In both, the listed place of 26 compliance was more than 100 miles from where the subpoenaed party resided, meaning 27 the subpoena was invalid on its face. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(1)(A), (c)(2)(A) (limiting 28 subpoenas of nonparties for depositions or documents to a place “within 100 miles of 1 || where the person resides, is employed, or regularly transacts business in person’); Raap, 2 ||2017 WL 2462823, at *3 (noting that the subpoenaed party “is not located within and does 3 ||not regularly transact business within 100 miles of Madison, Wisconsin’); Europlay, 4 ||323 F.R.D. at 630 (commenting that “the Subpoena commanded production in Sherman 5 || Oaks,” which was over 100 miles from subpoenaed nonparty Google’s “custodians of 6 records” in “Mountain View, California’). Finally, in both, the responding party objected 7 the listed place of compliance as burdensome. See Raap, 2017 WL 2462823, at *3; 8 || Europlay, 323 F.R.D. at 630. By contrast, the subpoena here is valid on its face, and the 9 || subpoenaed entity prefers to litigate in the district of compliance listed in the subpoena. 10 At any rate, this Court finds that the place of compliance is wherever the 11 “subpoena... command[s],” see Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(1)&(2), not a judge’s best guess at 12 || where to set compliance. See Herrington, 354 F. Supp. 3d at 709. TQ Delta’s subpoena 13 ||specified a location in the Central District, so that is the only court that can compel 14 || compliance. 15 Thus, TQ Delta’s motion to enforce the subpoena is DENIED. The 16 || September 28, 2021 hearing is vacated as moot. The Clerk is directed to close this case. 17 || Dated: September 23, 2021 18 — | 19 Hon. Andrew G. Schopler United States Magistrate Judge 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28