De Souza v. Dawson Technical, Inc.
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Janis L. Sammartino (author)
Analysis
The court considered Plaintiff's ex parte application for leave to file a supplemental brief regarding a newly discovered tolling rule and Defendant's opposition thereto. The court granted the application, ordering Plaintiff to file a surreply within three days and permitting Defendant to file a brief opposition within seven days.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Plaintiff's Ex Parte Application for Leave to File Supplemental Brief is granted.“Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs Ex Parte Application (ECF No. 15).” | agree with court The court applied the standard that granting leave to file a surreply is committed to the court's sound discretion. The court reasoned that resolving the issue of the tolling rule in the context of the pending motion to dismiss was a better use of resources than denying the brief and potentially requiring a separate motion or appeal later. This is a defensible exercise of discretion to ensure the court has a complete record for the pending dispositive motion. |
Defendant is permitted to file an opposition to the supplemental brief.“Defendant MAY FILE an opposition to the surreply, not to exceed three (3) pages in length, within seven (7) days of the date on which Plaintiff files and serves its surreply.” | agree with court Allowing the opposing party to respond to new arguments is consistent with due process and the court's discretion to manage briefing. The court set reasonable page and time limits. |
The order itself: sound — The order correctly identifies the standard of review (sound discretion) and cites relevant district court cases supporting the grant of leave to file a surreply for the sake of completeness and efficiency. The reasoning directly addresses the defendant's argument that the issue should have been raised earlier by acknowledging it but prioritizing the efficient resolution of the pending motion to dismiss. The order is procedurally sound and logically consistent.
Opinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 LYAN FRANCIS DE SOUZA, Case No.: 21-CV-1103 JLS (MSB) an individual, 12 ORDER (1) GRANTING Plaintiff, 13 PLAINTIFF’S EX PARTE v. APPLICATION FOR LEAVE 14 TO FILE SUPPLEMENTAL DAWSON TECHNICAL, INC.; 15 BRIEF AND (2) PERMITTING a Hawaiian Corporation; and DOES 1–50, DEFENDANT TO FILE AN 16 inclusive, OPPOSITION TO THE SAME 17 Defendants. (ECF No. 15) 18 19 Presently before the Court are Plaintiff Lyan Francis de Souza’s Ex Parte 20 Application for Leave to File Supplemental Brief re Additional Authority in Support of 21 Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (“Ex Parte Appl.,” ECF No. 15) and 22 Defendant Dawson Technical, Inc.’s Opposition thereto (“Opp’n,” ECF No. 16). 23 The Ex Parte Application indicates that Plaintiff’s counsel, while researching an 24 issue for another case, recently learned about the Judicial Council of California’s 25 Emergency Rule 9, which allegedly tolls one of the statutes of limitations at issue in this 26 case. Declaration of Joshua Shin (ECF No. 15-1) ¶ 2. Plaintiff seeks permission to file a 27 less-than-three-page supplemental brief addressing this issue. See id. Ex. 1. Plaintiff 28 requests that Defendant be granted leave to file a response to the supplemental brief. Ex 1 ||Parte Appl. at 4. Defendant opposes, arguing that Plaintiff's Ex Parte Application is 2 || procedurally improper and that Plaintiff fails to explain why this issue could not have been 3 raised earlier in Plaintiff's opposition to Defendant’s pending and fully briefed motion to 4 ||dismiss. See generally Opp’n. 5 While the Court agrees that a rule enacted more than a year ago is an issue Plaintiff 6 ||could and should have raised in its opposition brief, the fact remains that “[a] decision to 7 || grant or deny leave to file a surreply is generally committed to the ‘sound discretion’ of the 8 || court,” Brady v. Grendene USA, Inc., No. 3:12-CV-0604-GPC-KSC, 2015 WL 6828400, 9 *3 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2015) (citing Mitchell v. Donahoe, No. CV 11-02244—PHX-JAT, 10 WL 4478892, at *10 (D. Ariz. Aug. 21, 2013)), “and some courts have granted leave 11 ||to file a sur-reply in order to consider evidence or arguments that give a more complete 12 || picture of the issues in need of resolution,” Tounget v. Valley-Wide Recreation & Park 13 || Dist., No. EDCV 16-88 JGB (KKX), 2020 WL 8410456, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2020) 14 || (citations omitted), including “in the interests of completeness and judicial efficiency,” Jn 15 Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) Antitrust Litig., No. 3:14-CV-02510, 2014 WL 7206620, at 16 |} *1 n.2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2014). In the Court’s view, it is a better use of the Court’s and 17 || the Parties’ time and resources to have this issue resolved as part of Defendant’s pending 18 |} motion to dismiss. 19 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs Ex Parte Application (ECF No. 15). 20 || Plaintiff SHALL FILE its surreply within three (3) days of the date on which this Order 21 electronically docketed. Defendant MAY FILE an opposition to the surreply, not to 22 || exceed three (3) pages in length, within seven (7) days of the date on which Plaintiff files 23 || and serves its surreply. 24 IT IS SO ORDERED. 25 ||Dated: July 21, 2021 (een %6 on. Janis L. Sammartino United States District Judge 27 28