(HC) Aguilar v. Cates

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MIGUEL C. AGUILAR, Case No.: 3:21-cv-0909-CAB-AGS 12 Petitioner, ORDER DISMISSING CASE 13 v. WITHOUT PREJUDICE AND WITH LEAVE TO AMEND 14 B. CATES, Warden 15 Respondent. 16 17 18 On May 10, 2021, Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a petition for 19 writ habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the United States District Court for 20 the Eastern District of California. (ECF No. 1.) On May 11, 2021, the Eastern District 21 Court issued an Order authorizing Petitioner to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 3). 22 On May 12, 2021, the case was transferred to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d). 23 (ECF No. 4.) 24 FAILURE TO ALLEGE EXHAUSTION 25 The Petition must be dismissed because Petitioner has failed to allege exhaustion 26 of state court remedies. Habeas petitioners who wish to challenge either their state court 27 conviction or the length of their confinement in state prison, must first exhaust state 28 judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c); Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 133–34 1 (1987). To exhaust state judicial remedies, a California state prisoner must present the 2 California Supreme Court with a fair opportunity to rule on the merits of every issue 3 raised in his or her federal habeas petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c); Granberry, 481 U.S. 4 at 133–34. Moreover, to properly exhaust state court remedies a petitioner must allege, in 5 state court, how one or more of his or her federal rights have been violated. The Supreme 6 Court in Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364 (1995) reasoned: “If state courts are to be given 7 the opportunity to correct alleged violations of prisoners’ federal rights, they must surely 8 be alerted to the fact that the prisoners are asserting claims under the United States 9 Constitution.” Id. at 365–66 (emphasis added). For example, “[i]f a habeas petitioner 10 wishes to claim that an evidentiary ruling at a state court trial denied him [or her] the due 11 process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, he [or she] must say so, not 12 only in federal court, but in state court.” Id. at 366 (emphasis added). 13 Nowhere on the Petition does Petitioner allege that he raised his claims in the 14 California Supreme Court. In fact, he specifically indicates he did not seek such review. 15 (See Pet., ECF No. 1 at 5.) If Petitioner has raised his claims in the California Supreme 16 Court he must so specify. “The burden of proving that a claim has been exhausted lies 17 with the petitioner.” Matthews v. Evatt, 105 F.3d 907, 911 (4th Cir. 1997); see Breard v. 18 Pruett, 134 F.3d 615, 619 (4th Cir. 1998); Lambert v. Blackwell, 134 F.3d 506, 513 (3d 19 Cir. 1997); Oyler v. Allenbrand, 23 F.3d 292, 300 (10th Cir. 1994); Rust v. Zent, 17 F.3d 20 155, 160 (6th Cir. 1994). 21 Further, the Court cautions Petitioner that under the Antiterrorism and Effective 22 Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) a one-year period of limitation shall apply to a 23 petition for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a 24 State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of: 25 (A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; 26 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 (SBta)t eth aec dtiaotne ionn v wiohliacthio tnh eo fi mthpee Cdiomnesntitt utoti ofnil ionrg laanw sa popfl itchaet iUonni cterdea Stetadt ebsy i s 2 removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action; 3 (C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially 4 recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by 5 the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or 6 7 (D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 8 9 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)–(D) (West 2006). 10 The statute of limitations does not run while a properly filed state habeas corpus 11 petition is pending. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); see Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th 12 Cir. 1999). But see Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000) (holding that “an application is 13 ‘properly filed’ when its delivery and acceptance [by the appropriate court officer for 14 placement into the record] are in compliance with the applicable laws and rules 15 governing filings.”). However, absent some other basis for tolling, the statute of 16 limitations does run while a federal habeas petition is pending. Duncan v. Walker, 533 17 U.S. 167, 181–82 (2001). 18 Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases provides for summary dismissal 19 of a habeas petition “[i]f it plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits 20 annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court . . .” Rule 4, 28 21 U.S.C. foll. § 2254. Here, it appears plain from the Petition that Petitioner is not presently 22 entitled to federal habeas relief because he has not alleged exhaustion of state court 23 remedies. 24 CONCLUSION 25 Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES the case without prejudice and with leave to 26 amend. To have the case reopened, Petitioner must, no later than July 13, 2021, provide 27 the Court with file a First Amended Petition which cures the pleading deficiency outlined 28 / / / 1 this Order. For Petitioner’s convenience, the Clerk of Court shall attach to this Order 2 ||a blank amended petition form. 3 || Dated: May 13, 2021 Ky * Hon. Cathy Ann Bencivengo 5 United States District Judge 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28