Imperial Urban Housing, LP. v. Santana
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Gonzalo P. Curiel (author)
Analysis
A pro se defendant removed a state unlawful detainer action to federal court, arguing that his participation in the Section 8 Housing Assistance Payments Program created federal jurisdiction. The court found that the well-pleaded complaint rule barred removal because the plaintiff's claims were purely state-law based, and ordered the case remanded to state court.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Remand of case to state court“Because this Court lacks jurisdiction, it REMANDS the case back to state court and DECLINES to address the two Motions filed by Defendant.” | agree with court The court correctly applied the well-pleaded complaint rule, which requires that a federal question appear on the face of the plaintiff's complaint to support removal jurisdiction. The plaintiff's complaint alleged a state-law unlawful detainer claim. The defendant's status as a Section 8 participant and his assertions of federal defenses or conspiracies do not create federal jurisdiction under the well-pleaded complaint rule. The court's reliance on the strong presumption against removal jurisdiction and the requirement that removal jurisdiction be clear further supports the decision to remand. |
Decline to address Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and Motion to Request Appointment of Counsel“The Court will not decide on the IFP Motion and the Motion to Request Appointment of Counsel, ECF Nos. 2, 3, because the Court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter.” | agree with court Because the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the underlying action, it lacks the authority to rule on ancillary motions such as IFP status or appointment of counsel. This is a standard procedural consequence of a jurisdictional remand. |
The order itself: sound — The order correctly identifies the applicable legal standard for removal jurisdiction (the well-pleaded complaint rule) and applies it to the facts recited in the order. It cites appropriate Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit authorities to support the proposition that federal jurisdiction is limited and that a defendant's federal defenses or status as a Section 8 participant do not create federal jurisdiction for a state-law claim. The reasoning is direct and answers the motion for removal with the right authorities.
Opinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 IMPERIAL URBAN HOUSING, L.P., Case No.: 21-cv-0382-GPC-RBB 12 Plaintiff, ORDER REMANDING CASE 13 v. [ECF Nos. 2, 3] 14 JOSHUA PAUL SANTANA, 15 Defendant. 16 17 Pro Se Defendant removed this “Section 8” housing dispute to federal court and 18 subsequently filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) and Motion to 19 Request Appointment of Counsel. ECF Nos. 1–3. Because this Court lacks jurisdiction, 20 it REMANDS the case back to state court and DECLINES to address the two Motions 21 filed by Defendant. 22 Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. 23 Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374 (1978); Stock West, Inc. v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville 24 Reservation, 873 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989). A defendant may remove a case from 25 state court, but only when the federal court could have exercised original jurisdiction, 26 / / / 27 1 such as when there is an issue “arising under” federal law.1 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1441. 2 Specifically, a claim arises under federal law “only when a federal question is presented 3 on the face of plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” See Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 4 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). A party’s ability to invoke federal law in the dispute is not 5 enough to transform a state claim into a federal claim. See Hunter v. United Van Lines, 6 746 F.2d 635, 646 (9th. Cir. 1984). In addition, “[f]ederal jurisdiction must be rejected if 7 there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 8 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). 9 Here, Defendant does not meet the burden of overcoming the “strong presumption 10 against removal jurisdiction.” See id. (quotations omitted). Plaintiff’s lawsuit concerns 11 unlawful detainer under state law, alleging that Defendant violated his lease agreement. 12 See Compl., ECF No. 1-2. Defendant is a participant of the Section 8 Housing 13 Assistance Payments Program (“Section 8”), a federal subsidy program, but the 14 connection with federal law ends there. Contrary to Defendant’s claims that Plaintiff 15 (along with other non-parties) “conspired against the removal of [Defendant’s] federal 16 civil rights statutes,” see Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1, Courts have routinely found that 17 Defendant’s connection based on Section 8 is insufficient for federal jurisdiction. See, 18 e.g., MHS-Rossmore, LLC v. Lopez, No. CV 08-2001-RGK FMOX, 2008 WL 2397498, 19 at *2 (C.D. Cal. June 5, 2008) (rejecting removal despite defendant’s references to 20 Section 8 lease agreements); cf. California Hous. Fin. Agency v. Zulali, No. 12CV1626- 21 LAB BLM, 2012 WL 3542269, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2012) (remanding a state 22 unlawful detainer action despite defendant’s assertion that he had federal defenses and 23 24 25 1 No part of Defendant’s papers indicates that diversity of citizenship between the 26 litigating parties (and the requisite amount in controversy) exists. Cf. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441 (permitting federal jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship). 27 1 || counterclaims, because “[u|nder the well-pleaded complaint rule, it’s only the plaintiff's 2 || claims that matter’). 3 Therefore, remand is appropriate. The Court will not decide on the IFP Motion 4 || and the Motion to Request Appointment of Counsel, ECF Nos. 2, 3, because the Court 5 || lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter. 6 IT IS SO ORDERED. 7 8 ||Dated: April 2, 2021 72 9 Hon. athe Cee 10 United States District Judge 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 ; 28 21-cv-0382-GPC-RBB