Dioquino v. United of Omaha Life Insurance Company

Opinion

5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 JONI DIOQUINO, Case No. 20-cv-0167-BAS-RBB 11 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 12 SEAL (ECF No. 23)

13 v. 14 UNITED OF OMAHA LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, 15 Defendant. 16 17 18 Defendant is moving for partial summary judgment on Plaintiff’s action under 19 the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”). (ECF No. 22.) 20 In support of its motion, Defendant moves to seal the claim files for Plaintiff’s 21 disability claims. (ECF No. 23.) These files total “937 pages, many of which contain 22 personal and private information relating to Plaintiff, including her Social Security 23 Number, date of birth, medial information, and financial information.” (Id.) Hence, 24 Defendant argues “it would be very burdensome to redact all of that information from 25 the voluminous records.” (Id.) Plaintiff does not oppose the sealing request. (Id.) 26 I. LEGAL STANDARD 27 “[T]he courts of this country recognize a general right to inspect and copy 1 v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978). “Unless a particular court 2 record is one ‘traditionally kept secret,’ a ‘strong presumption in favor of access’ is 3 the starting point.” Kamakana v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 4 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1135 5 (9th Cir. 2003)). “The presumption of access is ‘based on the need for federal 6 courts, although independent—indeed, particularly because they are independent— 7 to have a measure of accountability and for the public to have confidence in the 8 administration of justice.” Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 809 F.3d 9 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044, 1048 10 (2d Cir. 1995)). 11 A party seeking to seal a judicial record bears the burden of overcoming the 12 strong presumption of access. Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1135. The showing required to 13 meet this burden depends upon whether the documents to be sealed relate to a 14 motion that is “more than tangentially related to the merits of the case.” Ctr. for 15 Auto Safety, 809 F.3d at 1102. When the underlying motion is more than 16 tangentially related to the merits, the “compelling reasons” standard applies. Id. at 17 1096–98. When the underlying motion does not surpass the tangential relevance 18 threshold, the “good cause” standard applies. Id. 19 “In general, ‘compelling reasons’ sufficient to outweigh the public’s interest 20 in disclosure and justify sealing court records exists when such ‘court files might 21 have become a vehicle for improper purposes,’ such as the use of records to gratify 22 private spite, promote public scandal, circulate libelous statements, or release trade 23 secrets.” Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179 (quoting Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598). However, 24 “[t]he mere fact that the production of records may lead to a litigant’s 25 embarrassment, incrimination, or exposure to further litigation will not, without 26 more, compel the court to seal its records.” Id. (citing Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1136). 27 The decision to seal documents is “one best left to the sound discretion of the trial 1 court” upon consideration of “the relevant facts and circumstances of the particular 2 case.” Nixon, 435 U.S. at 599. 3 II. ANALYSIS 4 Defendant’s motion to seal is not well taken. The compelling reasons standard 5 applies to its motion for partial summary judgment. And it cannot be the case that 6 there are compelling reasons to seal all of Plaintiff’s claim files, which include 7 routine correspondence and other items. Judge Hays aptly rejected a similar request: 8 In order to seal the administrative record in this case, as opposed to 9 simply redacting the portions which must be redacted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2(a), the parties must satisfy the 10 “compelling reason” standard established by Foltz and Kamakana. See 11 Fotlz, 331 F.3d at 1135; Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1278–79. The parties’ motion is solely based on the difficulty of redacting 4,500 pages of 12 documents, a task which they contend is “impracticable.” The work of 13 redacting these documents is not a “compelling reason” to override the public’s right of access to court records. While it may be burdensome 14 for the parties to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2, the 15 Court finds that any burden to the parties does not overcome the “strong presumption in favor of access to court records.” See Kamakana, 447 16 F.3d at 1278–79. 17 18 Nash v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., No. 08-cv-893 WQH RBB, 2010 WL 2044935, at *1 19 (S.D. Cal. May 18, 2010). 20 Further, although the documents are largely composed of Plaintiff’s medical 21 records, in which Plaintiff has a privacy interest, Plaintiff has placed her “medical 22 condition at issue by filing this ERISA action.” See, e.g., Culver v. NXP USA Inc. 23 Long Term Disability Ins. Plan, No. CV-18-02205-PHX-DWL, 2019 WL 1452992, 24 at *2 (D. Ariz. Apr. 2, 2019) (“Considering the asserted importance of the medical 25 records to the case, Plaintiff’s privacy interest does not outweigh the ‘public interest 26 in understanding the judicial process.’”). 27 Accordingly, the Court DENIES the motion to seal (ECF No. 23). The Court 1 that redacts Plaintiff's Social Security number, birthdate, and any financial account 2 ||numbers. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2(a); see also S.D. Cal. Electronic Case Filing 3 ||Administrative Policies and Procedures Manual § 1.h. (listing the privacy 4 requirements for electronic filings in this district). The Court will then file the claim 5 || files on the docket restricted to case participants and public terminal users in the 6 ||courthouse. Cf Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2(c). Defendant must do so by Friday, April 2, 7 || 2021. 8 IT IS SO ORDERED. 9 f 10 ||DATED: March 9, 2021 (pil g Iyha ars United States District Judge 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28