Watkins v. Kijakazi
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Barbara Lynn Major (author)
Analysis
The court reviewed a pro se plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) and a complaint seeking review of a Social Security disability denial. The court denied the IFP application and dismissed the complaint with leave to amend for failing to state a claim.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Denial of Plaintiff's Application to Proceed in District Court without Prepaying Fees or Costs“Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs.” | agree with court The court found that the plaintiff failed to complete the application, provided unclear financial information regarding dependents and expenses, and owned a valuable asset (a $18,000 vehicle) while receiving $4,000/month in disability payments. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), a plaintiff must demonstrate an inability to pay fees without impairing the ability to provide for necessities. The court's determination that the plaintiff did not meet this burden based on the specific financial facts recited is consistent with the statute and case law cited. |
Dismissal of Complaint with Leave to Amend“Accordingly, Plaintiff's complaint is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.” | agree with court The court applied the screening requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and the plausibility standard of Rule 8. It found the complaint failed to state a claim because it did not specify the nature of the plaintiff's disability or the onset date, relying on a conclusory statement that the plaintiff was 'disabled as that term is defined in the Social Security Act.' This aligns with Ninth Circuit precedent requiring specific factual allegations in IFP social security appeals to survive screening. |
The order itself: sound — The order correctly applies the statutory standards for IFP status and the screening requirements for pro se complaints. It cites appropriate Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit authorities for the plausibility standard and the specific requirements for social security complaints. The factual findings regarding the plaintiff's financial status and the deficiencies in the complaint are clearly stated and support the rulings.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
record incompleteOpinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 Case No.: 21cv101-BLM 11 GERMANY TERRELL WATKINS, 12 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN 13 v. DISTRICT COURT WITHOUT PREPAYING OF FEES OR COSTS AND 14 ANDREW SAUL, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE SECURITY, 15 TO AMEND Defendant. 16 [ECF NO. 2] 17 18 The instant matter was initiated on January 19, 2021 when Plaintiff filed a complaint “to 19 seek judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision and [to] request[] that this court reverse 20 that decision, or in the alternative, to remand this matter for a new hearing on the following 21 grounds.” ECF No. 1 at 2. That same day, Plaintiff filed an Application to Proceed in District 22 Court without Prepaying Fees or Costs. ECF No. 2. Having reviewed the complaint and 23 application, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint does not sufficiently state a claim for relief 24 and Plaintiff’s application does not establish indigency. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Application to 25 Proceed in District Court without Prepaying Fees or Costs is DENIED, and the complaint is 26 DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. 27 Application to Proceed in District Court without Prepaying Fees or Costs 1 States, except an application for a writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee. 28 U.S.C. 2 § 1915(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff's failure to prepay the entire fee only if 3 she is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), which states: 4 [A]ny court of the United States may authorize the commencement, prosecution 5 or defense of any suit, action or proceeding ... without prepayment of fees or security therefor, by a person who submits an affidavit that includes a statement 6 of all assets such [person] possesses that the person is unable to pay such fees or give security therefor. 7 8 The determination of indigency falls within the district court's discretion. California Men's 9 Colony v. Rowland, 939 F.2d 854, 858 (9th Cir. 1991), reversed on other grounds by, 506 U.S. 10 194 (1993) (“Section 1915 typically requires the reviewing court to exercise its sound discretion 11 in determining whether the affiant has satisfied the statute's requirement of indigency.”). It is 12 well-settled that a party need not be completely destitute to proceed IFP. Adkins v. E.I. DuPont 13 de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339-40 (1948). To satisfy the requirements of 28 U.S.C. 14 § 1915(a), “an affidavit [of poverty] is sufficient which states that one cannot because of his 15 poverty pay or give security for costs ... and still be able to provide for himself and dependents 16 with the necessities of life.” Id. at 339. At the same time, “the same even-handed care must 17 be employed to assure that federal funds are not squandered to underwrite, at public expense, 18 ... the remonstrances of a suitor who is financially able, in whole or in material part, to pull his 19 own oar.” Temple v. Ellerthorpe, 586 F. Supp. 848, 850 (D.R.I. 1984). District courts tend to 20 reject IFP applications where the applicant can pay the filing fee with acceptable sacrifice to 21 other expenses. See, e.g., Allen v. Kelley, 1995 WL 396860, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (Plaintiff 22 initially permitted to proceed IFP, later required to pay $ 120 filing fee out of $ 900 settlement 23 proceeds); Ali v. Cuyler, 547 F. Supp. 129, 130 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (IFP application denied because 24 the plaintiff possessed savings of $ 450 and that was more than sufficient to pay the filing fee). 25 Moreover, the facts as to the affiant's poverty must be stated “with some particularity, 26 definiteness, and certainty.” United States v. McQuade, 647 F.2d 938, 940 (9th Cir. 1981). 27 Plaintiff has not satisfied Plaintiff’s burden of demonstrating that Plaintiff is entitled to IFP 1 status. Plaintiff is not employed; however, Plaintiff receives $4,000 per month in disability 2 payments. ECF No. 2 at 1-2. Plaintiff owns outright a 2016 Mercedez Benz E350 valued at 3 $18,000. Id. at 2. Plaintiff is not married and has three minor children for whom Plaintiff pays 4 $900 per month in child support. Id. at 4-5. Plaintiff claims monthly expenses of $4,901 5 including: $2,374 in rent or home-mortgage payments, $427 in utilities, $700 in food purchases, 6 $200 in transportation expenses, $168 for vehicle insurance, and $132 for credit card installment 7 payments. Id. at 3-5. Finally, Plaintiff states that Plaintiff’s “income isn’t enough to take care 8 of monthly bills” and that Plaintiff doesn’t “pay everything each month.” Id. at 5. 9 The Court finds that based on the current record, Plaintiff has not established that Plaintiff 10 meets the requirements for IFP status. Initially, Plaintiff failed to complete the application. Id. 11 at 2. Specifically, Plaintiff responded “none” to whether Plaintiff had money in a financial 12 institution but did not answer whether Plaintiff had any cash. Id. Secondly, Plaintiff’s financial 13 situation is unclear. Plaintiff claims three dependents but also states that Plaintiff pays monthly 14 child support. If the minor children are not residing full-time or significant amounts of time with 15 Plaintiff, then Plaintiff’s housing, utility and food bills are excessive. Finally, Plaintiff owns 16 outright an expensive vehicle. Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not 17 established that Plaintiff is unable to pay the $402 filing fee without impairing Plaintiff’s ability 18 to pay for life’s necessities. See Adkins, 335 U.S. at 339-40. Accordingly, the Court DENIES 19 Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs. 20 SUA SPONTE SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915(a) 21 Complaints filed by any person proceeding IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) are 22 subject to a mandatory screening by the Court. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 23 1127 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Alamar v. Social Security, 2019 WL1258846, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 24 19, 2019). A complaint should be dismissed if it is (1) “frivolous or malicious;” (2) 25 “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted;” or (3) “seeks monetary relief against a 26 defendant who is immune from such relief.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); Lopez, 203 F.3d at 27 1126–27. 1 that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 2 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an 3 unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me-accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 4 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Furthermore, 5 “recitals of elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements do not 6 suffice.” Id. Instead, the plaintiff must state a claim that is plausible on its face, meaning “the 7 pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is 8 liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. 9 at 556, 570)). “When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their 10 veracity, and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Iqbal, 11 556 U.S. at 679. Social security appeals are not exempt from the general screening requirements 12 for IFP cases proceeding under § 1915(e). Montoya v. Colvin, 2016 WL 890922, at *2 (D. Nev. 13 Mar. 8, 2016) (citing Hoagland v. Astrue, 2012 WL 2521753, *1 (E.D. Cal. June 28, 2012)). 14 In the context of a social security appeal, courts within the Ninth District have established 15 four elements necessary for a complaint to survive a screening: 16 First, the plaintiff must establish that she has exhausted her administrative 17 remedies pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and that the civil action was commenced within sixty days after notice of a final decision. Second, the complaint must 18 indicate the judicial district in which the plaintiff resides. Third, the complaint must state the nature of the plaintiff's disability and when the plaintiff claims she became 19 disabled. Fourth, the complaint must contain a plain, short, and concise statement 20 identifying the nature of the plaintiff's disagreement with the determination made by the Social Security Administration and show that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. 21 22 Skylar v. Saul, 2019 WL 4039650, *1 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2019) (quoting Montoya, 2016 WL 23 890922 at *2). With regard to element four, a complaint is insufficient if it merely states that 24 the Commissioner was wrong in denying a plaintiff benefits. See id.; see also Hoagland, 2012 25 WL 2521753 at *3 (“Every plaintiff appealing an adverse decision of the Commissioner believes 26 that the Commissioner was wrong. The purpose of the complaint is to briefly and plainly allege 27 facts supporting the legal conclusion that the Commissioner’s decision was wrong.”). Instead, the “complaint . . . must set forth a brief statement of facts setting forth the reasons why the 1 || Commissioner's decision was wrong.” Id. at *2. 2 After reviewing the complaint, the Court finds that Plaintiff failed to state facts sufficient 3 || to state a claim for relief. The complaint does not “state the nature of the plaintiff's disability 4 || and when the plaintiff claims [the plaintiff] became disabled.” Skylar v. Saul, 2019 WL 4039650. 5 || Instead, Plaintiff states that Plaintiff “is, and at all times relevant to this action, disabled as that 6 || term is defined in the Social Security Act." ECF No. 1 at 2. Accordingly, Plaintiff's complaint is 7 || DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. □□ 8 IT IS SO ORDERED.
10 Hon. Barbara L. Major United States Magistrate Judge 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 ||' The Court notes that Plaintiff's counsel’s firm has received several dismissals in other cases for the same issue and has been “strongly urged” numerous times “to reconsider using form 25 complaints, which fail to comply with Rule 8 and the IFP statute and waste the Court's 26 resources.” Castro v. Saul, S.D. Ca. No. 20cv54-BEN(BLM); Irizarry v. Berryhill, S.D. Cal. No. 19cv476-AJB(NLS); see also Williams v. Berryhill, S.D. Cal. No. 18cv2678-AJB(BLM); Maye v. 27 || Berryhill, S.D. Cal. No. 19cv110-AJB(WVG); and Copenhaver v. Berryhill, S.D. Cal. No. 18cv790- AJB(MDD). 28