Shaw v. Sherman
- Proceeding
- original
- Outcome
- other — Nevertheless, by statute, district 6 courts have discretion to appoint counsel in habeas proceedings for “any p
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Daniel E. Butcher (author)
Analysis
The court considered a state prisoner's motion for an extension of time to file a traverse and a motion for appointment of counsel in a habeas corpus petition. The court granted the motion for enlargement of time but denied the motion for appointment of counsel without prejudice.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Motion for Enlargement of Time granted“Good cause appearing, the Court GRANTS in part Petitioner’s Motion for Enlargement of Time to file a traverse. Petitioner may file a traverse on or before March 5, 2021.” | agree with court The order states 'Good cause appearing' and grants the extension. While the specific standard for 'good cause' is not explicitly defined in the text, granting an extension based on a finding of good cause is a standard procedural exercise of discretion. The decision follows from the court's finding of good cause. |
Motion for Appointment of Counsel denied without prejudice“The Court DENIES Petitioner’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel without prejudice.” | agree with court The court applied the correct legal standard for appointment of counsel in habeas cases (discretionary, based on likelihood of success and ability to articulate claims). The court found that the petitioner's indigency and cognitive limitations did not, in the absence of a showing of merit or inability to articulate claims, warrant appointment. The petitioner had successfully filed multiple motions, demonstrating some ability to navigate the process. The denial without prejudice is appropriate given the discretionary nature and the current state of the record. |
The order itself: sound — The order correctly identifies the legal standard for appointment of counsel in habeas cases, citing the relevant statute and Ninth Circuit precedent. It applies this standard to the facts presented, noting the petitioner's indigency and cognitive limitations but also his demonstrated ability to file motions and the lack of a showing of merit. The reasoning is sound and directly addresses the motion.
Opinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 SHAUN REGINALD SHAW, Case No.: 20-cv-1875-GPC (DEB)
12 Petitioner, ORDER: 13 v. (1) GRANTING PETITIONER’S 14 STU SHERMAN, et al., MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF 15 Respondents. TIME; AND (2) DENYING PETITIONER’S 16 MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF 17 COUNSEL 18 [DKT. NOS. 6, 9] 19 20 Before the Court are Petitioner Shaun Reginald Shaw’s Motions for Enlargement of 21 Time and Appointment of Counsel. Dkt. Nos. 6, 9. Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding 22 pro se and in forma pauperis on a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed pursuant to 23 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (“Petition”). 24 Good cause appearing, the Court GRANTS in part Petitioner’s Motion for 25 Enlargement of Time to file a traverse. Petitioner may file a traverse on or before 26 March 5, 2021. The Court DENIES Petitioner’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel 27 without prejudice. 28 1 Petitioner requests appointment of counsel because he: (1) is unable to afford 2 counsel; (2) has limited education and is untrained in the law; (3) is “without funds to hire 3 a private investigator”; and (4) has developmental cognitive disabilities. Dkt. No. 6 at 4, 8. 4 Petitioners do not have an absolute right to counsel in habeas corpus actions. See 5 Knaubert v. Goldsmith, 791 F.2d 722, 728 (9th Cir. 1986). Nevertheless, by statute, district 6 courts have discretion to appoint counsel in habeas proceedings for “any person financially 7 unable to obtain adequate representation” when “the interests of justice so require.” 8 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2). “In deciding whether to appoint counsel in a habeas proceeding, 9 the district court must evaluate the likelihood of success on the merits as well as the ability 10 of the petitioner to articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues 11 involved.” Weygandt v. Look, 718 F.2d 952, 954 (9th Cir. 1983). 12 The Court finds that Petitioner has not demonstrated that appointment of counsel 13 will best serve the interests of justice. First, Petitioner argues the Court should appoint him 14 counsel because he “is indigent and [im]prisoned and without proper funds to employ 15 counsel. . . .” Dkt. No. 6 at 5. Petitioner’s indigent status, however, does not alone entitle 16 him to appointment of counsel. The Court must also consider Petitioner’s likelihood of 17 success on the merits and his ability to articulate his claims. 18 Second, Petitioner contends his low reading skills, education, and cognitive 19 functioning compel the court’s discretionary appointment of counsel. Petitioner included 20 with his Motion an “Adaptive Support Form” signed by a licensed psychologist on 21 September 1, 2020. Dkt. No. 6 at 12. The form indicated that Petitioner requires: 22 (1) assistance with “reading and writing CDCR forms”; (2) “simple language and 1 or 2 23 step instructions. Ask I/M to explain in his own words to ensure he understands. Repeat 24 information if necessary”; (3) “[p]rompt[ing] to complete personal hygiene, brush teeth, 25 cell cleaning, shower and laundry procedure; and (4) “extra time and coaching to 26 learn/adjust to new tasks and routines.” Id. However, these facts do not establish an 27 entitlement to the appointment of counsel in habeas proceedings. See Storey v. Paramo, 28 No. 17-cv-23-LAB (BGS), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132648, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2017) 1 || T]he mere fact that Petitioner commands a seventh grade education does not establish 2 ||an entitlement to the appointment of counsel.”); Marlow v. Frakes, No. 9-cv-5455-RJB- 3 KLS, 2010 WL 3786862, at *14 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 16, 2010) (denying motion for 4 || appointment of counsel where petitioner claimed that he is “uneducated, illiterate and must 5 ||rely on a reader/writer who is not trained in the law” because petitioner was able to file 6 || appropriate papers to articulate his claims), report and recommendation adopted, 2010 WL 7 3786804 (Sept. 23, 2010); Rodriguez v. Tucker, 04-cv-2808, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2976, 8 *4 (D. Ariz. Jan. 25, 2006) (“Petitioner’s low IQ alone, absent a showing of an inability 9 articulate his claims pro se and a showing of a likelihood of success on the merits, does 10 || not warrant appointment of counsel.”). 11 Here, Petitioner has sufficiently represented himself on multiple occasions in this 12 || action—in his Petition, Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis, and the instant 13 || Motions. Dkt. Nos. 1, 2, 6, 9. Furthermore, the Court has reviewed the Petition and cannot 14 ||conclude that Petitioner is likely to succeed on the merits. Therefore, the “interests of 15 justice” do not warrant the appointment of counsel in this case at this time. Accordingly, 16 || the Court DENIES Petitioner’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel without prejudice. 17 IT IS SO ORDERED. 18 Dated: January 6, 2021 — ‘ 9 Dando oa 20 Honorable Daniel E. Butcher United States Magistrate Judge 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28