Vinck v. Berryhill

Opinion

1 2 3 4 .

5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 || ROSEMARY G. V., Case No.: 3:19-cv-00715-RBM 12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING IN PART 13 || V. PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR 14 |) ANDREW M. SAUL, COMMISSIONER ATTORNEY FEES, COSTS, AND OF SOCIAL SECURITY EXPENSES UNDER THE EQUAL 15 , ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT 16 Defendant. [Doc. 23] 17 18 I. INTRODUCTION 19 Presently before the Court is Plaintiff Rosemary Guadalupe V.’s (“Plaintiff’) 20 || petition for attorney fees, costs, and expenses (“Motion”), seeking reimbursement of the 21 ||same from the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“Defendant” or 22 ||“Commissioner”).' (Doc. 23.) Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) of the Equal Access to 23 Justice Act (““EAJA”), Plaintiff requests attorney’s fees and expenses for a total of 24 $4,378.74. (Doc. 25 at 3.) Defendant opposes Plaintiffs Motion claiming the Social 25 || Security Administration’s position was substantially justified, Plaintiff's counsel’s fees are 26 27 28 1 Andrew M. Saul became the Commissioner of Social Security on June 17, 2019 and is therefore substituted for Nancy A. Berryhill as Defendant. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); FED. R. CIv. P. 25(d).

1 |}unreasonable, and any EAJA fee award must be paid to Plaintiff and not her counsel. (Doc. 2 ||24 at 6-17.) Plaintiff filed a reply brief in support of her Motion on April 1, 2020. (Doc. 3 4 The parties consented to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction. (See Gen. Or. 707; Doc. 5.) 5 || After a careful review of the submissions of the parties, the Court. GRANTS IN PART 6 || Plaintiff's Motion as set forth below. 7 il. BACKGROUND 8 On April 18, 2019, Plaintiff filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 9 ||1383(c) appealing the Commissioner’s decision denying her applications for disability 10 ||insurance benefits and supplemental security income. (Doc. 1.) Next, Plaintiff filed a 11 || motion for summary judgment, seeking reversal of the Commissioner’s final decision or 12 |/alternatively, remand for further administrative proceedings. (Doc. 15 at 1.) Plaintiff 13 || sought reversal or remand on two grounds: (1) the ALJ failed to articulate legally sufficient 14 ||reasons for discounting Plaintiffs subjective testimony regarding an alleged disability due 15 ||to carpal tunnel syndrome; and (2) the ALJ failed to properly assess Plaintiff's mental 16 || health impairment at step two of the sequential evaluation process. (/d. at 7-13.) Defendant 17 || filed a cross-motion for summary judgment with two chief arguments: (1) the ALJ 18 ||reasonably provided proper and compelling reasons to discredit Plaintiffs subjective 19 testimony and came to a reasonable conclusion based on substantial evidence; and (2) the 20 || ALJ properly weighed the evidence of record, and the ALJ’s finding of a non-severe mental 21 ||impairment is based on substantial evidence. (Doc. 18 at 10-22.) 22 After considering the cross-motions for summary judgment, the Court issued a 23 decision granting in part and denying in part Plaintiff's motion and granting in part and 24 || denying in part Defendant’s cross-motion. (Doc. 21.) The Court granted Plaintiff's motion 25 || in part on the ground that the Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) findings of a non-severe 26 ||mental impairment at step two of the sequential evaluation process lacked substantial 27 evidence and warranted remand. (/d. at 8-13.) As the Court noted, the step two evaluation 28 ||is a de minimis screening device intended to weed out only the most minor impairments.

1 ||Ud. at 10 (citing Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 153-154 (1987); Edlund v. Massanari, 2 F.3d 1152, 1158 (Oth Cir. 2001)). The Court found the ALJ committed error by 3 |/ignoring significantly probative mental health treatment records which undermined the 4 ||ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff lacked a medically severe impairment. (Doc. 21 at 11 _5 {| (citing Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1013 (9th Cir. 2014).) The Court remanded the 6 || ALJ’s decision on this ground only. (/d. at 13.) On remand, the Court instructed the ALJ 7 ||to conduct a supplemental evaluation of the mental impairment evidence and incorporate 8 findings into any future decision. (/d.) 9 Il. DISCUSSION 10 A. Applicable Law 11 The EAJA allows a prevailing party to seek attorney’s fees and other expenses from 12 || the United States unless certain circumstances apply. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d). The EAJA 13 || shifts the burden of attorney’s fees from the private litigant to the government in order to 14 ||“reduce the chance that the expense involved in securing the vindication of rights would 15 || deter defense against unreasonable governmental action.” Wolverton v. Heckler, 726 F.2d 16 582 (9th Cir.1984) (internal quotations and citation omitted), abrogated on other 17 || grounds by Corbin v. Apfel, 149 F.3d 1051, 1053-1054 (9th Cir. 1998). Under the EAJA, 18 litigant is entitled to attorney’s fees and costs if (1) [s]he is the prevailing party; (2) the 19 || government fails to show that its position was substantially justified or that special 20 || circumstances make an award unjust; and (3) the requested attorney’s fees and costs are 21 ||reasonable.” Carbonell v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 429 F.3d 894, 898 (9th Cir. 22 ||2005) (citing Perez—Arellano v. Smith, 279 F.3d 791, 793 (9th Cir. 2002); 28 U.S.C. § 23 2412(d)(1)(A)). 24 i. Plaintiffis the Prevailing Party 25 An applicant for social security benefits who receives a remand under sentence four 26 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) is a prevailing party, regardless of whether benefits are ultimately 27 ||awarded on rehearing. Shalala v. Shaefar, 509 U.S. 292, 302 (1993); Garnica v. Astrue, 28 ||378 F. App’x. 680, 681 (9th Cir. 2010). Here, the Court remanded this matter to the 1 ||Commissioner with instructions for the ALJ to conduct to a supplemental evaluation of the ||mental impairment evidence and incorporate his findings into any future decision. (Doc. 3 at 13.) Because the Court remanded the action pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. 4 405(g), Plaintiff is the prevailing party. (Doc. 21 at 13); see Shalala, 509 U.S. at 297 5 (explaining distinction between sentence four and sentence six remands). 6 ii. Commissioner Failed to Show His Position was Substantially Justified 7 Under the EAJA, the prevailing party is entitled to attorney’s fees “unless the court 8 finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special 9 || circumstances make an award unjust.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). It is the government’s 10 burden to show that its position was substantially justified or that special circumstances 11 ||make an award unjust. Gutierrez v. Barnhart, 274 F.3d 1255, 1258 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal 12 || citation omitted); see also Tobeler v. Colvin, 749 F.3d 830, 832 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing 13 || Gutierrez, 274 F.3d at 1258). Substantial justification means “justified in substance or in 14 main—that is, justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person.” Tobeler, 15 F.3d at 832 (citation omitted). The government’s position must have a reasonable 16 basis in both law and fact. /d. (citation omitted). In analyzing the government’s position, 17 ||the court “must focus on two questions: first, whether the government was substantially 18 |/justified in taking its original action; and, second, whether the government was 19 substantially justified in defending the validity of the action in court.” Gutierrez, 274 F.3d 20 || at 1259 (internal quotations and citations omitted). In the context of sentence four remands, 21 Commissioner must show that his position “with respect to the issue on which the court 22 based its remand was ‘substantially justified.’” Flores v. Shalala, 49 F.3d 562, 569 (9th 23 ||Cir. 1995). 24 Here, the ALJ’s decision with respect to the issue on which the Court based its 25 ||remand was not substantially justified. As stated above, the Court found the ALJ erred in 26 |/ignoring significantly probative mental health treatment records without explanation. 27 ||(Doc. 21 at 8-13.) Due to this error, the Court found that the ALJ improperly assessed 28 || Plaintiffs mental health impairment at step two of the sequential evaluation, given that this 1 is only a de minimis screening device to dispose of groundless claims. (/d. at 8-13 2 ||(citing Bowen, 482 U.S. at 153-154; Edlund, 253 F.3d at 1158).) While the ALJ need not 3 || discuss all evidence presented to him, he must explain “why significant probative evidence 4 || has been rejected.” Vincent v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1393, 1394-1395 (9th Cir. 1984) (internal 5 || quotation and citation omitted). When an ALJ ignores important evidence in making a 6 || disability determination, it is grounds to find the government’s decision is not substantially 7 ||justified with regard to a determination on a plaintiff's motion for attorney’s fees. See 8 |i generally Flores, 49 F.3d at 571 (citing Vincent, 739 F.2d at 1394-1395) (holding 9 || government’s decision to oppose request for remand not substantially justified when ALJ 10 |/ignored a vocational report and failed to state reasons for disregarding important evidence); 11 || see also McLean v. Colvin, 648 F. App’x 621, 622 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding ALJ’s decision 12 ||not substantially justified where the ALJ failed to discuss significant, probative record 13 |}evidence contrary to the ALJ’s findings). Furthermore, where the ALJ’s position is not 14 || substantially justified, the court need not reach the issue of whether the Commissioner’s 15 litigation position was substantially justified. McLean, 648 F. App’x at 622-623 (citing 16 || Tobeler, 749 F.3d at 832). 17 For the reasons set forth in the Court’s January 6, 2020 Order, the ALJ’s decision as 18 the issue on which the Court based its remand was not substantially justified. 19 || Accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled to an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to the EAJA, 20 || provided that such fees are reasonable. . 21 iii. Plaintiff's Requested Fees are Reasonable 22 The Court must now determine whether the fees requested by Plaintiff are 23 ||reasonable, as the Commissioner disputes both the reasonableness of the attorney and 24 || paralegal hours expended in this case. 25 The EAJA directs the court to award “fees and other expenses.” 28 U.S.C. § 26 ||2412(d)(2)(A). “Fees and other expenses” include “reasonable attorney fees.” Jd. In 27 ||determining whether a fee is reasonable, the court considers the hours expended, the 28 ||reasonable hourly rate, and the results obtained. See Comm’r, Immigration & 1 || Naturalization Serv. v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, n. 10 (1990); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 2 ||424, 429-430 (1983), abrogated on other grounds by Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland 3 Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782 (1989); Passantino v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer 4 Prods., Inc., 212 F.3d 493, 517-518 (9th Cir. 2000); Atkins v. Apfel, 154 F.3d 986, 989 (9th 5 1998). 6 In support of the Motion, Plaintiff submits the Declaration of Lawrence D. Rohlfing 7 ||(‘Rohlfing”) outlining the parameters of his fee agreement with Plaintiff and the billing 8 ||invoice at issue. (Doc. 23 at 14.) On April 11, 2018, Plaintiff entered into a Social Security 9 ||Representation Agreement with the Law Offices of Lawrence D. Rohlfing. (Doc. 23-4 at 10 Plaintiff agreed to pay counsel 25 percent of any award for past-due benefits upon 11 |{reversal of an unfavorable ALJ decision based upon work performed before this Court. 12 ||Ud.) This accords with 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), which allows a claimant’s attorney to charge 13 ||a contingent fee if it does not exceed “25 percent of the total of past-due benefits to which 14 || the claimant is entitled by reason of [the favorable] judgment.”” 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A). 15 Initially, Plaintiff requested $3,994.24 in fees and expenses which represents 16 compensation for 16.55 hours of work performed by Plaintiff's counsel at an hourly billing 17 of $205.25,> 4.55 hours of paralegal services at an hourly billing rate of $130, and costs 18 totaling $5.85. (Doc. 23 at 2-3; see also Doc. 23-1 at 1-2; Doc. 23-3 at 1.) In Plaintiffs 19 reply brief, Plaintiff requests an additional $410.50 in fees which represents compensation 20 an additional 2 hours in attorney time to account for reviewing the Commissioner’s 21 || opposition brief to the instant Motion and drafting the reply brief. (Doc. 25 at 1-2.) In the 22 23 24 The 25 percent cap in Section 406(b)(1)(A) “applies only to fees for court representation, and not to the 75 || aggregate fees awarded under §§ 406(a) and (b).” Culbertson v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 517, 523 (2019); accord Clark v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 1211, 1215 (9th Cir. 2008). 26 ||? Plaintiff's Motion references an hourly billable rate of $201.60 for attorney time, but the billing invoice in this matter references an hourly billable rate of $205.25 for attorney time. (Compare Doc. 23 at 2, 7, 27 with Doc. 23-1 at 2.) Given that this case was filed in 2019 and the work at issue appears to be 28 performed in 2019-2020, the Court will only reference the $205.25 attorney billable rate, as it appears reference to the $201.60 rate is in error.

1 ||reply brief, Plaintiff also concedes to deducting $26 in fees for a duplicate paralegal billing 2 ||entry for 0.2 hours spent drafting an April 23, 2019 letter to the Court. (Doc. 25 at 7; see 3 Doc. 23-1 at 1.) Plaintiffs reply brief clarifies that the final request for fees and 4 || expenses totals $4,378.74. (Doc. 25 at 2-3.) 5 The Commissioner argues that the Court should reduce any fees by $735.18, as it 6 ||comprises of time billed for purely clerical or secretarial work which is not compensable. 7 ||(Doc. 24 at 15-16.) Specifically, the Commissioner contends the entirety of the 4.55 8 || paralegal hours at an hourly rate of $130 should be denied and 0.7 attorney hours‘ at an 9 hourly rate of $205.25 should also be reduced from any award. (/d.) As to the paralegal 10 || hours, 4.35 hours are in dispute given Plaintiffs concession to deduct 0.2 hours in paralegal 11 for a duplicate entry. (Doc. 25 at 7; see also Doc. 23-1 at 1.) 12 1. Reasonableness of Hours Expended by Paralegal 13 As to paralegal time, these are recoverable fees under the EAJA. See Richlin Sec. 14 || Serv. Co. v. Chertoff, 553 U.S. 571, 581 (2008) (stating “we think EAJA ... must be 15 ||interpreted as using the term ‘attorney ... fees’ to reach fees for paralegal services as well 16 compensation for the attorney’s personal labor.”); see also Nadarajah v. Holder, 569 17 || F.3d 906, 918 (9th Cir. 2009) (a prevailing party may recover reasonable paralegal fees). 18 || However, time spent by a paralegal on clerical matters is not recoverable, as this is to be 19 |}/subsumed in law firm overhead rather than billed at paralegal rates. Nadarajah, 569 F.3d 20 921 (internal citations omitted). Tasks such as filing and document organization time 21 |/are clerical in nature. /d. “Receipt” of a court order or case filing is also clerical in nature. 22 ||Douzat v. Saul, 17-cv-1740-NJK, 2020 WL 3408706, at *3 (D. Nev. June 11, 2020) 23 || (excluding 1.1 hours of paralegal time for “receipt” of an order or other court document); 24 ||see also McDade v. Saul, 17-cv-763-JCS, 2019 WL 6251229, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 25 26 J 27 On March 8, 2019, Plaintiff's counsel spent 0.5 hours on a letter to Plaintiff regarding a district court 28 fee waiver. (Doc. 23-1 at 1.) This same day, Plaintiff's counsel spent 0.2 hours on a fee waiver questionnaire. (/d.)

1 2019) (excluding 1.67 hours of paralegal time billed for receipt of documents, status reports 2 ||to the client, and similar tasks, and also excluding 0.2 hours of attorney time for “receipt” 3 || of a motion and an email); Garcia v. Colvin, 11-cv-1965-SKO, 2013 WL 5347494, at **7- 4 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2013) (deducting entirety of 3.9 hours of paralegal time including 5 || for entries such as receipt and review of court orders and downloading opposition papers); 6 Santos v. Astrue, CV 07-178-PLA, 2008 WL 2571855, at *3 (C.D. Cal. June 26, 2008) 7 \|(reducing 0.5 hours of paralegal time for entries such as receipt of review of the scheduling 8 ||order). Here, the billing invoice includes 9 entries of a paralegal’s “receipt” of an order or 9 || other document including: 10 04/17/2019 Receipt and review of IFP from client 0.2 hours 11 05/08/2019 Receipt of order re: IFP 0.05 hours 06/03/2019 Receipt of notice of appearance 0.05 hours 12 08/02/2019 Receipt of administrative record 0.1 hours 3 08/05/2019 Receipt of scheduling order 0.1 hours 10/02/2019 Receipt of motion for extension 0.05 hours 14 10/03/2019 Receipt of order for extension 0.1 hours 15 11/12/2019 Receipt of cross motion 0.1 hours 01/06/2020 Receipt of order and judgment 0.1 hours 16 17 ||(Doc. 23-1 at 1.) The 0.85 hours for such clerical work will be excluded from the EAJA 18 || fee award, leaving 3.5 hours of paralegal time at issue. 19 The remaining paralegal entries challenged by the Commissioner, though perhaps 20 j|routine, involve legal-related tasks. These include communicating with the client, the 21 |/Court, and the Appeals Council (1.9 hours), preparation of the complaint (1 hour), and 22 ||keeping reasonably informed as to the status of litigation (0.6 hours). (/d. at 1.) The 23 ||remaining 3.5 hours in paralegal time appears reasonable and appropriate. 24 2. Reasonableness of Hours Expended by Attorney 25 Considering the amount of time that social security cases generally take, the Court 26 || finds the number of hours claimed by Plaintiff's counsel are reasonable. 28 U.S.C. § 27 ||2412(d); see also Costa v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 690 F.3d at 1136 (9th Cir. 2012) 28 (noting “many district courts have noted that twenty to forty hours is the range most often 1 ||requested and granted in social security cases”); Krebs v. Berryhill, No. 16-cv-3096-JLS- 2 BGS, 2018 WL 3064346, at *2 (S.D. Cal. June 21, 2018) (finding that 21.7 hours billed by 3 || plaintiff's counsel and 3.5 hours billed by a paralegal a reasonable number of hours in a 4 |!social security matter). This includes the additional time Plaintiff’s attorney spent on the 5 |linstant EAJA fee application. See Kuharski v. Colvin, No. 12-cv-1055-AC, 2015 WL 6 || 1530507, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2015). While the Commissioner claims that the attorney 7 ||hours should be reduced by 0.7 hours because it involved purely clerical functions, courts 8 ||“generally defer to the winning lawyer’s professional judgment as to how much time he 9 required to spend on the case.” Costa, 690 F.3d at 1136 (internal citations and 10 quotations omitted). This is because “lawyers are not likely to spend unnecessary time on 11 || contingency fee cases in the hope of inflating their fees because the payoff is too uncertain.” 12 As to the March 8, 2019 billing entries by counsel, it appears these entries related to 13 initiating this action in federal court as the complaint and an application for leave to 14 || proceed in forma pauperis where filed April 18, 2019. (Compare Docs. 1, 3 with Doc. 23- 15 || 1 at 1.) Communicating with the client is part of an attorney’s professional responsibility, 16 || and it appears reasonable and appropriate to spend .5 hours drafting correspondence to the 17 client. (See Doc. 23-1 at 1.) Moreover, it is reasonable and appropriate for an attorney to 18 ||/spend .2 hours drafting papers relating to a fee waiver. (/d.) As such, the Court finds no 19 || basis to reduce the attorney hours in this case. 20 3. Cost of Living Adjustment 21 Pursuant to the EAJA, the amount of fees awarded are “based upon prevailing 22 ||market rates for the kind and quality of the services furnished...” See 28 U.S.C. § 23 2412(d)(2)(A). “[A]ttorney fees shall not be awarded in excess of $125 per hour unless 24 || the court determines that an increase in the cost of living or a special factor, such as the 25 || limited availability of qualified attorneys for the proceedings involved, justifies a higher 26 || fee.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A)Tii). The Ninth Circuit’s 2019 statutory maximum hourly 27 ||rates under the EAJA, adjusted for increases in the cost of living, was $205.25. See 28 ||“Statutory Maximum Rates Under the Equal Access to Justice Act,”

1 || https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/content/view.php?pk_id=0000000039 (last visited Nov. 3, 2 |}2020) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (d)(2)(A); Thangaraja v. Gonzales, 428 F.3d 870, 876-77 3 Cir. 2005); Ninth Circuit Rule 39-1.6). 4 Rohlfing relies upon the Ninth Circuit’s maximum hourly rates, and he charges 5 $205.25 for attorney billing. (Doc. 23 at 14; Doc. 23-1 at 1-2.) Plaintiff is entitled to the 6 || cost-of-living adjustment to the statutory hourly rate pursuant to the EAJA and Thangarja. 7 F.3d at 876-877. As such, the Court finds the attorney hourly rate billed by counsel is 8 |} reasonable. 9 4. Paralegal Fees 10 Plaintiff seeks paralegal fees at a rate of $130 per hour. (Doc. 23 at 2-3; see also 11 ||Doc. 23-1 at 1-2.) The Court may approve paralegal rates at prevailing market rates. 12 || Nadarajah, 569 F.3d at 918. In determining the market rate for paralegals, courts may look 13 || to the United States Consumer Law Attorney Fee Survey Report. Ulugalu v. Berryhill, No. 14 || 17-cv-1087-GPC-JLB, 2018 WL 2012330, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2018) (using the 15 || figures in U.S. Consumer Law Attorney F. ee Survey Report to assess whether the requested 16 || paralegal hourly rate was reasonable); Schneider v. Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 12-cv-1375-JAD- 17 ||GFW, 2014 WL 4251590, at *3 (D. Nev. Aug. 27, 2014) (finding an award reasonable 18 || based on figures provided in U.S. Consumer Law Attorney Fee Survey Report). Here, the 19 ||2017-2018 United States Consumer Law Attorney Fee Survey Report provides that the 20 median hourly rate for paralegals in San Diego is $147, which is higher than the $130 rate 21 ||requested. (Doc. 23-2 at 34.) Notably, courts within this District have approved the $130 22 |ihourly paralegal rate. See, e.g., Toni Lynn B. v. Saul, No. 19-cv-925-AHG, 2020 WL 23 |/4001981, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Jul. 15, 2020) (approving paralegal’s hourly rate of $130 for 24 ||EAJA award, for work performed in 2019 and 2020); Black v. Berryhill, 18-cv-1673-JM- 25 2019 WL 2436393, at *1 (S.D. Cal. June 11, 2019) (approving paralegal’s hourly rate 26 || of $130 for EAJA award); Smith v. Berryhill, 17-cv-2108-CAB-RNB, 2019 WL 2234068, 27 |jat *2 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2019) (approving paralegal’s hourly rate of $130 for EAJA 28 10 1 |}award). In light of the foregoing, the Court finds the $130 hourly rate billed by the 2 || paralegals is reasonable. 3 iv. Costs 4 Rohlfing’s Declaration attaches a receipt of the $5.85 in costs incurred in connection 5 || with serving a copy of the complaint by certified mail. (Doc. 23 at 15; Doc. 23-3 at 1.) 6 || The Commissioner does not dispute the reasonableness of this cost. 7 After reviewing the supporting evidence, the Court finds the requested cost is 8 ||reasonable and recoverable. (See Doc. 23-3 at 1); see also Int’l Woodworkers of Am. v. 9 || Donovan, 792 F.2d 762, 767 (9th Cir. 1985) (affirming district court’s award of costs under 10 EAJA, including postage expenses). 11 v. Payment of EAJA Fees 12 Plaintiff assigned her right to receive EAJA fees, costs, and expenses to her attorney. 13 (Doc. 23 at 10-11; see also Doc. 23-4 at 1,94.) She requests any recovery of the same be 14 || paid to the Law Offices of Lawrence D. Rohlfing, subject to any offset rights of the 15 || Treasury. (Doc. 23 at 11.) Defendant asserts that any EAJA fees awarded must be made 16 || payable to Plaintiff, not to her attorney, to comply with the United States Department of 17 Treasury’s Offset Program. (Doc. 24 at 16 (citing Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586, 590 18 (2010).) 19 According to the EAJA, fees and other expenses shall be assigned to the prevailing 20 ||/party. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). The Supreme Court has considered whether this 21 || provision of the EAJA makes a fee payable to the prevailing party or the attorney. Ratliff, 22 ||560 USS. at 588-59. In Railiff; the government sought an offset from an attorney’s fee 23 || award under the EAJA when it discovered plaintiff owed the United States a debt that pre- 24 || dated the fee award. /d. Plaintiff's counsel argued that no offset applied, contending the 25 ||fee award belonged to the attorney. Jd. The Supreme Court disagreed, finding that 26 ||“Congress knows how to make fee awards payable directly to attorneys where it desires to 27 so” and because the fee was payable to the “prevailing party,” Congress intended the 28 || fee to go to the litigant, not the attorney. Id. at 595-97. The Supreme Court held that “a § 11 1 2412(d) fees award is payable to the litigant and is therefore subject to a Government offset 2 ||to satisfy a pre-existing debt that the litigant owes the United States.” Jd. at 589. 3 || Nonetheless, district courts have recognized that Ratliff does not prevent payment of a fee 4 ||award directly to the attorney where there was been a valid assignment and the plaintiff 5 ||does not owe a debt to the government. See Bell v. Berryhill, No. 16-cv-00809-MMC, 6 ||2018 WL 452110, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2018); Ulugalu, 2018 WL 2012330 at *5. 7 Rohlfing’s Declaration attaches the April 11, 2018 executed contingency fee 8 ||agreement, wherein Plaintiff agreed as follows, “[c]lient shall endorse such documents as 9 needed to pay Attorney for any amounts under the EAJA and assigns such fee awards 10 |/to Attorney.” (Doc. 23-4 at 1.) Pursuant to Ratliff, 560 U.S. at 590, if the government 11 ||determines Plaintiff does not owe a federal debt, then the government shall cause the 12 || payment of the award to be made directly to the Law Offices of Lawrence D. Rohlfing. 13 IV. CONCLUSION 14 For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that a reduction of 0.85 hours of work 15 |)performed by a paralegal is warranted. The remainder of Plaintiff's fee request is 16 || reasonable and shall be awarded, including 3.5 hours of paralegal time at an hourly billing 17 ||rate of $130, 18.55 hours of attorney time at an hourly billing rate $202.25, and $5.85 in 18 ||/costs. Accordingly, the Motion for Attorney Fees, Costs, and Expenses is GRANTED IN 19 || PART in the amount of $4,212.59. If the government determines Plaintiff does not owe a 20 || federal debt, then the government shall cause the payment of the award to be made directly 21 the Law Offices of Lawrence D. Rohlfing. 22 IT ISSO ORDERED. 23 || DATE: November 12, 2020 24 25 (feb borrasd pebilessgas Uomlt dng, 36 HON. RUTH BERMUDEZ MONTENEGRO UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 27 28 12