Hammett v. Sherman
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- On appeal
- Hammett v. Stern (2026-05-27) — affirmed — the Ninth Circuit's later ruling on this docket
- Panel
- Todd W. Robinson (author)
Analysis
Plaintiff Laura Lynn Hammett moved for reconsideration of an order denying her motion to disqualify a judge as moot, and for an expedited hearing on that motion. The court denied the motion for reconsideration and denied the expedited hearing motion as moot.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Motion for Reconsideration (ECF No. 154) is denied.“The Court therefore DENIES Plaintiffs Reconsideration Motion” | agree with court The court correctly applied the Ninth Circuit standard for reconsideration, which requires newly discovered evidence, clear error, or an intervening change in controlling law. The plaintiff's argument that the defendants' motions to dismiss raised 'law of the case' issues regarding the prior judge's rulings does not constitute newly discovered evidence or a change in law. Furthermore, the court correctly noted that these legal arguments should be raised in the opposition to the motions to dismiss rather than through a motion for reconsideration of a mootness ruling. |
Ex Parte Motion for Order Shortening Time (ECF No. 185) is denied as moot.“and DENIES AS MOOT Plaintiff’s Ex Parte Motion.” | agree with court The ex parte motion sought expedited consideration of the reconsideration motion. Because the underlying motion for reconsideration was denied, the request for expedited consideration of that motion became moot. |
The order itself: sound — The order correctly identifies the high standard for reconsideration in the Ninth Circuit and applies it to the plaintiff's arguments. It correctly distinguishes between legal arguments (which belong in the opposition to the motion to dismiss) and the specific grounds required for reconsideration (new evidence, clear error, or change in law). The mootness of the ex parte motion follows logically from the denial of the underlying reconsideration motion.
Opinion
7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9
10 LAURA LYNN HAMMETT, Case No.: 19-CV-605 TWR (LL) 11 Plaintiff, 12 ORDER (1) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S v. MOTION FOR 13 RECONSIDERATION, AND MARY E. SHERMAN, et al., 14 (2) DENYING AS MOOT Defendants. PLAINTIFF’S EX PARTE MOTION 15 FOR ORDER SHORTENING TIME 16 (ECF Nos. 184, 185) 17 18 Presently before the Court are Plaintiff Laura Lynn Hammett’s Motion for 19 Reconsideration of Order Denying as Moot Plaintiff’s Motion for Disqualification of the 20 Honorable Janis L. Sammartino (“Reconsideration Mot.,” ECF No. 154) and Ex Parte 21 Motion for Order Shortening Time (“Ex Parte Mot.,” ECF No. 185). Because Plaintiff had 22 sought the disqualification of Judge Sammartino, (see ECF No. 153), her request was 23 mooted by the transfer of this action to the undersigned. See, e.g., Shahin v. Darling, 606 24 F. Supp. 2d 525, 545 (D. Del.) (denying as moot motion for recusal when case was 25 subsequently reassigned to another judge), aff’d, 350 F. App’x 605 (3d Cir. 2009). The 26 Court therefore denied as moot her disqualification motion. (See ECF No. 174.) Plaintiff 27 now seeks reconsideration of that Order based on the “new circumstance” that Defendants’ 28 motions to dismiss contend that certain of Judge Sammartino’s prior legal conclusions are 1 || “the law of the case.” (See Reconsideration Mot. at 2-3.) Plaintiff additionally requests 2 her Reconsideration Motion be heard on an expedited basis so that she may receive a 3 || decision “ahead of the due date for response to the MTD.” (See Ex Parte Mot. at 2.) 4 Reconsideration is an “extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the interests of 5 || finality and conservation of judicial resources.” Kona Enters., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 6 || F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000). Consequently, reconsideration is appropriate in only limited 7 || circumstances, such as where “the district court (1) is presented with newly discovered 8 ||evidence, (2) committed clear error or the initial decision was manifestly unjust, or (3) if 9 || there is an intervening change in controlling law.” Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty. v. 10 ||AC&S, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993); see also S.D. Cal. CivLR □□□□□□□□□ 11 (requiring any party moving for reconsideration “to present to the judge . . . an affidavit 12 ||... setting forth . . . what new or different facts and circumstances are claimed to exist 13 || [that] did not exist, or were not shown, upon such prior application’). 14 Defendants’ legal arguments are not “newly discovered evidence” or “an intervening 15 ||change in controlling law” that would permit reconsideration of the Court’s Order. See, 16 Nash v. Hepp, No. 08-CV-202, 2010 WL 1221739, at *1 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 22, 2010) 17 (denying motion for reconsideration because, among other things, a “legal citation [wa]s 18 “evidence’” and, “even if it w[ere] evidence, it [wa]s not ‘newly-discovered’”), aff’d, 19 || 740 F.3d 1075 (7th Cir. 2014). Consequently, any arguments concerning “the law of the 20 case” are appropriately addressed in Plaintiff’s opposition to the motions to dismiss. The 21 ||Court therefore DENIES Plaintiffs Reconsideration Motion and DENIES AS MOOT 22 || Plaintiff’s Ex Parte Motion. 23 IT IS SO ORDERED. 24 ||Dated: October 16, 2020 Tan (obn— Honorable Todd W. Robinson 26 United States District Court 27 28