gno.law

Williams v. Ortega

District Court, S.D. California · 3:18-cv-00547 · 2020-10-02 · Unknown

Proceeding
district
Area
civil
Panel
Mitchell D. Dembin (author)

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt own-v1, 2026-10-13T23:28Z · confidence high

Plaintiff, a pro se prisoner, moved to compel discovery, appoint counsel, and extend the discovery deadline. The court denied all three requests, finding the discovery requests vague or unresponsive, the plaintiff did not meet the high bar for court-appointed counsel, and the plaintiff failed to show good cause for extending the deadline.

What the court decidedThe model
Denial of Motion to Compel Discovery (Request 1)
“Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion with respect to request number 1.”
agree with court
The court correctly applied Rule 34, noting that a party cannot be compelled to produce documents that do not exist or are not in their possession, custody, or control. The record indicates Defendants produced the 'Warden's Checkout Orders' which contained the requested parole county information, and stated they did not possess other responsive documents. The court's reliance on the limitation of 'possession, custody, or control' is legally sound.
Denial of Motion to Compel Discovery (Request 2)
“As such, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion with respect to request number 2.”
agree with court
The court sustained the objection because the term 'citizen complaints' was vague and ambiguous, particularly for correctional officers who may have worked in other capacities. It also noted that Defendants Ortega and Bowman stated there were no responsive documents. The court correctly refused to compel the production of non-existent documents. The vagueness objection is a standard and valid basis for sustaining an objection under Rule 34.
Denial of Motion to Appoint Counsel
“Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to appoint counsel.”
agree with court
The court correctly cited *Mallard v. United States Dist. Court* for the proposition that courts lack authority to *require* counsel in § 1983 cases. It then applied the *Terrell*/*Palmer* factors for voluntary appointment, finding the plaintiff did not demonstrate exceptional circumstances, likelihood of success, or inability to articulate claims. The court noted the plaintiff's filings demonstrated a sufficient grasp of the case. This follows Ninth Circuit precedent.
Denial of Motion to Extend Discovery Deadline
“As such, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's request to extend the discovery deadline.”
agree with court
The court applied the 'good cause' standard from *Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations* for modifying a scheduling order. It found the plaintiff was not diligent and did not show good cause. Specifically, the court rejected the argument that Defendants' non-production was good cause (since the court had just denied the motion to compel) and noted the IFP statute does not authorize public funds for subpoena service. This is a correct application of Rule 16(b)(4) and Ninth Circuit law.
Denial of Request for Subpoenas
“In light of this ruling, the Court DENIES AS MOOT Plaintiff's request that the Court issue subpoenas on his behalf.”
agree with court
The court denied the subpoena request as moot because the underlying motion to extend the deadline (which was needed to use the subpoenas) was denied. It also cited *Davis v. Paramo* for the proposition that IFP status does not entitle a plaintiff to public funds for subpoena service. This is consistent with the denial of the extension.

The order itself: sound — The order is procedurally and substantively sound. It correctly applies the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure regarding discovery scope and objections, cites the correct Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent for the appointment of counsel in § 1983 cases, and applies the correct 'good cause' standard for modifying scheduling orders. The reasoning directly addresses the plaintiff's arguments and the record presented.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 LANCE WILLIAMS, Case No.: 18cv547-LAB-MDD 11 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 12 v. MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY, APPOINT 13 O. ORTEGA, et al., COUNSEL, AND EXTEND 14 Defendants. DISCOVERY DEADLINE 15 [ECF No. 78] 16 17 On September 22, 2020, Plaintiff Lance Williams (“Plaintiff”), a state 18 prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a motion to compel 19 Defendants O. Ortega, R. Valencia, S. Bustos, F. Lewis, A. Bowman, and M. 20 Kimani (collectively, “Defendants”) to respond to Plaintiff’s request for 21 production of documents, set three, numbers 1 and 2. (ECF No. 78). Plaintiff 22 also asks the Court to appoint counsel and to extend the discovery deadline. 23 (Id. at 2). Defendants filed a response in opposition, arguing that they 24 produced the documents in their possession and that their objections are 25 valid. (ECF No. 80). For the reasons stated herein, the Court DENIES 26 Plaintiff’s motion. 1 I. MOTION TO COMPEL 2 Plaintiff moves to compel Defendants to respond to requests for 3 production of documents numbers 1 and 2 of his third set. (ECF No. 78). He 4 also requests the Court impose sanctions for Defendants’ failure to fully 5 respond to his requests. (Id. at 2). Defendants oppose, contending they 6 either properly objected to the request or produced all responsive documents 7 in their custody, possession, or control. (ECF No. 80). Defendants also argue 8 that Plaintiff failed to meet and confer on the matter and did not attach the 9 discovery requests to his motion. (Id.at 1-2). 10 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorize parties to obtain 11 discovery of “any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or 12 defense and proportional to the needs of the case . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 13 26(b)(1). “Information within the scope of discovery need not be admissible to 14 be discoverable.” Id. District courts have broad discretion to limit discovery 15 where the discovery sought is “unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or 16 can be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less 17 burdensome, or less expensive.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C). 18 A party may request the production of any document within the scope of 19 Rule 26(b). Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a). “For each item or category, the response 20 must either state that inspection and related activities will be permitted as 21 requested or state an objection to the request, including the reasons.” Fed. R. 22 Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(B). The responding party is responsible for all items in “the 23 responding party’s possession, custody, or control.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a)(1). 24 Actual possession, custody or control is not required. Rather, “[a] party may 25 be ordered to produce a document in the possession of a non-party entity if 26 that party has a legal right to obtain the document or has control over the 1 F.R.D. 603, 620 (N.D. cal. 1995). A party propounding discovery may seek an 2 order compelling disclosure when the opposing party fails to respond, or 3 contains unfounded objections, to discovery requests. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 37(a)(3)(B). 5 As an initial matter, Plaintiff contends sanctions should be imposed 6 because the Court ordered Defendants to respond to Plaintiff’s request for 7 production of documents, set three. (ECF No. 78 at 1). However, the Court 8 denied Plaintiff’s request to compel Defendants to respond to set three 9 because Defendants had already agreed to produce responsive documents on 10 or before September 7, 2020. (ECF No. 66 at 2-3). For this reason, the Court 11 declines to impose sanctions. (See ECF No. 78 at 1). 12 In request number 1, Plaintiff asks the Court to require Defendants to 13 provide the current location and, if paroled, the parole office, parole officer, 14 and parole county of inmate witnesses Larry Cleveland and Darrell Donalds. 15 (ECF No. 55 at 14). Defendants provided Plaintiff with the “Warden’s 16 Checkout Orders” for Mr. Cleveland and Mr. Donalds, which contain their 17 parole counties. (ECF No. 80 at 4). Defendants further responded that they 18 “do not possess any other responsive documents.” (Id.). Plaintiff argues that 19 Defendants must provide him with the rest of the information he requested. 20 (ECF No. 78 at 2). However, the Court cannot compel Defendants to produce 21 documents that do not exist or are not in their possession, custody, or control. 22 Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion with respect to request 23 number 1. 24 In request number 2, Plaintiff asks the Court to require Defendants to 25 provide citizen complaints in the personnel files of all named defendants for 26 actions that are claimed against them in this action. (ECF No. 55 at 14). 1 and ambiguous,” and that if Plaintiff is asking for civil lawsuits they are 2 publicly available. (ECF No. 80 at 3). With respect to Defendants Ortega 3 and Bowman, Defendants contend there “are no responsive documents.” 4 (Id.). Plaintiff argues that, as a state prisoner, he is unable to obtain these 5 citizen complaints and that Defendants should be ordered to produce them. 6 (ECF No. 78 at 1). Plaintiff also states that he does not “believe [D]efendants’ 7 claim that [D]efendants Ortega and Bowman had nothing in their files. . . .” 8 (Id. at 3). The term “citizen complaints” is vague and ambiguous, 9 particularly as it relates to correctional officers who may have worked outside 10 of correctional facilities in the past. As a result, the Court SUSTAINS 11 Defendants’ objection. Moreover, Defendants have responded that there are 12 no responsive documents regarding Defendants Ortega and Bowman. The 13 Court cannot compel the production of documents that do not exist. As such, 14 the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion with respect to request number 2. 15 II. MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL 16 Plaintiff next moves the Court to appoint counsel due to the “complexity 17 of the case and large amount of witnesses to be located.” (ECF No. 78 at 2). 18 District courts lack authority to require counsel to represent indigent 19 prisoners in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cases. Mallard v.United States Dist. Court, 490 20 U.S. 296, 298 (1989). In exceptional circumstances, the court may request an 21 attorney to voluntarily represent such a plaintiff. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1); 22 Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991). Courts consider a 23 plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the merits as well as the plaintiff’s ability 24 to articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues 25 involved. Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009). However, a 26 pro se litigant’s difficulty conducting discovery is insufficient to satisfy the 1 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986) (“If all that was required to establish successfully 2 the complexity of relevant issues was a demonstration of the need for 3 development of further facts, practically all cases would involve complex legal 4 issues.”). Similarly, circumstances common to most prisoners, such as lack of 5 legal education, limited library access, or deficient general education, do not 6 amount to exceptional circumstances. See Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 7 1332, 1335-36 (9th Cir. 1990). Moreover, it appears that Plaintiff has a 8 sufficient grasp of his case, the relevant evidence, the legal issues involved, 9 and is able to adequately articulate the basis of his claims as demonstrated 10 by Plaintiff’s filings on the docket. The Court notes that Plaintiff’s claims are 11 not particularly complex, and although sufficient to survive screening, 12 Plaintiff has not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits. 13 Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to appoint counsel. 14 III. EXTEND DISCOVERY DEADLINE 15 Plaintiff also requests the Court extend the discovery deadline to permit 16 Plaintiff to subpoena Mr. Donalds’ and Mr. Cleveland’s parole office to locate 17 them, to authenticate various documents, and to “investigate” why 18 Defendants Ortega and Bowman did not have responsive documents to 19 request number 2. (ECF No. 78 at 2-3). The Court ordered that all discovery 20 be completed on or before September 7, 2020. (ECF No. 44 at 2). 21 A scheduling order “may be modified only for good cause and with the 22 judge’s consent.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4); Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, 23 Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 1992). “[T]he focus of the inquiry is upon the 24 moving party’s reasons for seeking modification . . . . If that party was not 25 diligent, the inquiry should end.” Id. (citation omitted). In addition to being 26 required to establish good cause, a party moving to extend time after a 1 || LaNier v. United States, No. 15cv0360-BAS-BLM, 2017 WL 951040, at *2 2 ||(S.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2017). 3 Plaintiff has not demonstrated diligence, good cause, or excusable 4 ||neglect. First, Plaintiffs belief that Defendants have responsive documents 5 || when they have stated otherwise is not good cause. Second, Plaintiff does not 6 ||explain why he needs additional time to authenticate various documents. □ 7 || Finally, as indicated in a prior court order, the in forma pauperis statute does g ||{not authorize nor entitle the expenditure or waiver of public funds for service 9 ||of subpoenas. Davis v. Paramo, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21255, at *8 □□□□□ 10 || Cal. 2017). As such, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's request to extend the 11 ||discovery deadline. In light of this ruling, the Court DENIES AS MOOT 12 || Plaintiff's request that the Court issue subpoenas on his behalf. 13 IV. CONCLUSION 14 For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs motion. 15 IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: October 2, 2020 Mitel by. [ Hon. Mitchell D. Dembin 18 United States Magistrate Judge 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 || 26 Plaintiff asks the Court whether he has to authenticate any documents he plans to use at 97 trial. (ECF No. 78 at 2). The Court advises Plaintiff that the Federal Rules of Evidence govern whether authentication of evidence is required.