Domingo v. Saul

Opinion

l 3 □ 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 |} DESIREE D., Case No.: 3:19-cv-01522-RBM Platt | ORDER GRANTING JOINT 13 || Vv. MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES 14 |} ANDREW SAUL, Commissioner of AND EXPENSES 15 Social Security, 16 Defendant. [Doc. 21] 17 18 On August 13, 2019, Plaintiff Desiree D. (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against the 19 Commissioner of Social Security, seeking judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision 20 ||denying her application for disability benefits. (Doc. 1.) The parties jointly moved to 21 ||remand the action to the Social Security Administration for further proceedings pursuant 22 ||to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (Doc. 19.) On April 17, 2020, the Court granted 23 motion and remanded the action to the Social Security Administration for further 24 || administrative proceedings consistent with the terms sets forth in the parties’ joint motion. 25 ||(Doc. 20.) 26 The parties now stipulate to and jointly move for an award to Plaintiff of attorney’s 27 || fees and expenses in the amount of two thousand and six hundred dollars ($2,600) under 28 1 ||the Equal Access to Justice Act (““EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d), and no costs under 28 2 ||U.S.C. § 1920. (Doc. 21.) 3 The EAJA allows a prevailing party to seek attorney’s fees from the United States 4 || within thirty days of final judgment. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d). “A plaintiff who obtains a 5 ||sentence four remand is considered a prevailing party for purposes of attorneys’ fees.” 6 || Akopyan v. Barnhart, 296 F.3d 852, 854 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal citation omitted). 7 || Therefore, Plaintiff is the prevailing party in this action for purposes of awarding attorney’s 8 “A sentence four remand becomes a final judgment, for purposes of attorneys’ fees 9 claims brought pursuant to the EAJA, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d), upon expiration of the time for 10 ||appeal.” Jd. (internal citation omitted). Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1)(B) 11 || provides for a sixty-day appeal period in cases in which the United States is a party or a 12 || United States officer or employee is sued in an official capacity. Here, the sixty-day appeal 13 period for the Court’s April 17, 2020 order and judgment expired on or about June 16, 14 ||2020. As such, the sentence four remand is now a “final judgment” for purposes of the 15 ||EAJA and the parties’ joint motion for attorney’s fees was filed within thirty days of this 16 ||“final judgment.” See Hoa Hong Van v. Barnhart, 483 F.3d 600, 608 (9th Cir. 2007) 17 (holding that a successful disability applicant may file an application for attorneys’ fees 18 under EAJA within thirty days after the sixty—day appeal period in Rule 4(a) has expired, 19 “regardless of the specific form of the court’s judgment, or the particular nature of the 20 || government’s non-opposition to or acquiescence in an award of benefits.”). 21 Pursuant to the EAJA, the amount of fees awarded are “based upon prevailing 22 ||market rates for the kind and quality of the services furnished .. .” See 28 □□□□□□ § 23 2412(d)(2)(A). “[A]ttorney fees shall not be awarded in excess of $125 her hour unless 24 court determines that an increase in the cost of living or a special factor, such as the 25 limited availability of qualified attorneys for the proceedings involved, justifies a higher 26 || fee.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A)(ii). The Ninth Circuit’s 2019 statutory maximum hourly 27 |\rates under the EAJA, adjusted for increases in the cost of living, was $205.25. See 28 ||“Statutory Maximum Rates Under the Equal Access to Justice Act,”

1 https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/content/view.php?pk_id=0000000039 (last visited Sept. 25, 2 || 2020) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (d)(2)(A); Thangaraja v. Gonzales, 428 F.3d 870, 876-77 3 Cir. 2005); Ninth Circuit Rule 39-1.6). 4 At an hourly rate of $202.25, the requested fee award represents compensation for 5 ||approximately 10.95 hours of work performed by Plaintiff's counsel. (Doc. 21-1 at 1.) It 6 includes 3.5 hours of paralegal services at the rate of $130, which are allowable fees 7 |\|under the EAJA. See Richlin Sec. Service Co. v. Chertoff, 553 U.S. 571, 581 (stating “we 8 ||think EAJA ... must be interpreted as using the term ‘attorney . . . fees’ to reach fees for 9 || paralegal services as well as compensation for the attorney’s personal labor.”) The Court 10 || finds the fee request reasonable, particularly in light of the fact that counsel prepared and 11 || filed a merits brief prior to the parties’ joint motion to remand. (Docs. 18-19.) 12 For good cause shown, the joint motion is GRANTED, subject to the terms of the 13 || parties’ joint motion. Accordingly, the Court AWARDS Plaintiff attorney’s fees and 14 || expenses in the amount of two thousand and six hundred dollars ($2,600). 15 IT ISSO ORDERED. 16 ||DATE: September 25, 2020 17 18 (ON. RUTH BERMUDEZ MONTENEGRO UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28