Golden v. Kipperman
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Dana M. Sabraw (author)
Analysis
The court considered Plaintiff Lisa Kaye Golden's motion to recuse Judge Dana M. Kipperman based on alleged bias stemming from a professional relationship, procedural restrictions, and delays in ruling on bankruptcy appeals. The court denied the motion, finding that the first two arguments were previously rejected and the third argument failed because the court had been lenient with the pro se plaintiff and could not rule on appeals due to the plaintiff's failure to file compliant briefs.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Denial of Plaintiff's Motion to Recuse the Undersigned“Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion is denied.” | agree with court The court correctly applied the 'reasonable observer' standard for judicial recusal. It properly dismissed the first two grounds as res judicata or previously decided issues in a prior order. For the third ground (delay), the court provided specific factual reasons (plaintiff's failure to file briefs) and cited precedent showing that leniency toward pro se litigants does not constitute bias. The reasoning is consistent with the law. |
The order itself: sound — The order is concise but legally sufficient. It addresses each specific allegation raised by the plaintiff. It correctly identifies that the first two allegations were previously litigated and denied. For the new allegation regarding delay, it provides factual context (plaintiff's non-compliance with scheduling orders) and cites binding Ninth Circuit authority supporting the conclusion that procedural leniency or delays caused by the plaintiff's own actions do not establish bias. The application of the 'reasonable observer' standard is appropriate.
Opinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 LISA KAYE GOLDEN Case Nos.: 20-cv-855 DMS (NLS)
11 Plaintiff, 12 v. ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO RECUSE THE 13 RICHARD KIPPERMAN, DAVID UNDERSIGNED ORTIZ, TIFFANY CARROLL, 14 Defendants. 15 16 17 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Recuse the undersigned. (ECF No. 18 13.) The matter is fully briefed and submitted. Plaintiff has a number of Bankruptcy 19 Appeals pending in this Court and moves to recuse the undersigned based on alleged 20 actions undertaken in those appeals. The facts of those underlying appeals are set out in 21 the Court’s prior order denying Plaintiff’s Motion to Recuse. See Order Denying Motion 22 to Recuse (hereinafter “Order”), 19-CV-2178-DMS-NLS, ECF No. 15, at 1–3. 23 Plaintiff now moves to recuse the undersigned based on alleged bias arising out of: 24 (1) the undersigned’s professional relationship with the Honorable Margaret Mann, who is 25 overseeing Plaintiff’s bankruptcy case; (2) the undersigned’s refusal to allow Plaintiff to 26 file documents electronically; and (3) the undersigned’s failure to timely rule on 27 bankruptcy appeals and motions filed by Plaintiff. See Mot. to Recuse, ECF No. 13, at 2– 28 5. Plaintiff raised the first two allegations in her previous Motion to Recuse, filed in 19- 1 ||cv-2178. See Order at 7-10. Accordingly, the Court finds those arguments unpersuasive 2 the same reasons set forth in the Court’s earlier Order. See id. 3 Plaintiff raises the third issue for the first time in this motion: that the undersigned 4 ||has failed to timely rule on Bankruptcy appeals and motions by Plaintiff. The Court 5 || declines to find a basis for recusal based on this allegation. Indeed, the Court has granted 6 || Plaintiff wide latitude as a pro se litigant in this case and her other cases pending before 7 Court, accepting documents that do not comply with the local rules and granting 8 Plaintiff's requests for extensions of time. See, e.g., ECF No. 15 (accepting motion 9 ||submitted by Plaintiff that failed to comply with Civil Local Rule 5.1); ECF No. 21 10 || (granting Plaintiff's request for a 45-day extension of time to respond to pending motions 11 dismiss); see also Leslie v. Grupo ICA, 198 F.3d 1152, 1160 (9th Cir. 1999) (affirming 12 || district court’s denial of motion to recuse and noting that “the procedural history of [the] 13 reveals that the district court has been extremely indulgent of [plaintiff], repeatedly 14 || granting extensions of time, accepting late-filed pleadings, granting an untimely motion to 15 amend [plaintiff's] complaint, and reinstating [plaintiffs] action after its initial dismissal’). 16 || Furthermore, the Court has been unable to rule on any of Plaintiff’s bankruptcy appeals 17 || because she has yet to file opening briefs in compliance with the Court’s scheduling orders 18 |/in any case. See, e.g., 18-cv-2089-DMS-NLS; 19-cv-0488-DMS-NLS; 19-cv-836-DMS- 19 || NLS. As such, the Court finds Plaintiff has not come forward with any facts that would 20 || lead a reasonable observer “with knowledge of all the facts [to] conclude that the judge’s 21 |/impartiality might be reasonably questioned.” United States v. McTiernan, 695 F.3d 882, 22 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, 23 || Plaintiff's motion is denied. 24 IT IS SO ORDERED. 25 Dated: September 2, 2020 6 ns my. L4\ Hon. Dana M. Sabraw 27 United States District Judge 28