Hammett v. Sherman
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- On appeal
- Hammett v. Stern (2026-05-27) — affirmed — the Ninth Circuit's later ruling on this docket
- Panel
- Janis L. Sammartino (author)
Analysis
Plaintiff Laura Lynn Hammett moved for leave to retain an attorney for the limited purpose of collecting fees and costs for service of process. The court denied the motion, finding that neither the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure nor the District's Local Rules provide a mechanism for limited scope representation.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Denial of Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Retain Representation on Limited Scope“Because the Court concludes that there is no mechanism for a limited scope representation in this District, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's Motion (ECF No. 146).” | agree with court The court correctly identifies that the specific local rule cited by the plaintiff (L.R. 83.3(f)(4)) governs 'special appearances' (challenging jurisdiction or substitute appearances), not limited scope representation. The court also correctly notes that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not explicitly provide a mechanism for limited scope representation, although such arrangements are generally permitted by contract and do not require specific court approval unless they conflict with local rules or the court's management of the case. The denial is procedurally sound based on the lack of a specific procedural vehicle in the local rules for this specific request, though the court could have noted that parties may generally enter into limited scope agreements without a specific motion if they comply with general rules of professional conduct. |
The order itself: sound — The order is sound. It correctly distinguishes the legal concept of 'special appearance' from 'limited scope representation' and correctly identifies that the local rule cited does not apply. It also correctly cites Ninth Circuit precedent regarding the lack of a right to counsel in civil cases to address the plaintiff's due process argument in the footnote. The reasoning is concise and directly addresses the motion.
Opinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 LAURA LYNN HAMMETT, Case No.: 19-CV-605 JLS (LL)
12 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 13 v. SECOND MOTION FOR LEAVE TO RETAIN REPRESENTATION ON 14 MARY E. SHERMAN, et al., LIMITED SCOPE 15 Defendants. (ECF No. 146) 16 17 Presently before the Court is Plaintiff Laura Lynn Hammett’s Motion for Leave to 18 Retain Representation for Special Appearance for the Purpose of Collection of Fees and 19 Costs for Process of Services and Attorney Fees and Costs for the Collection of Said Fees 20 and Costs Pursuant to L.R. 83.3(f)(4) (“Mot.,” ECF No. 146). Although the Court set this 21 matter for a hearing on September 10, 2020, the Court concludes that this matter is suitable 22 for resolution on the papers pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). 23 Plaintiff explains that she “is a pro se litigant who must spend days of her time 24 learning each specific procedure and substantive law for each subject that is involved in 25 the present litigation.” Mot. at 1. “Collecting fees and costs of service of process is an 26 area of law that is distinct from the issues in the case at bar, but is common to all cases, 27 and therefore a trained attorney can perform the task much more efficiently than a non- 28 attorney pro se litigant.” Id. She therefore “requests the Court grant an order allowing the ] || Plaintiff to hire Counsel for the specific task of requesting and collecting costs including 2 attorney fees of serving process.” Id. 3 The Court previously explained to Plaintiff that, “[a]lthough the California Rules of 4 ||Court provide a mechanism for a limited scope representation, see Cal. R. of Ct. 3.35-37, 5 || neither the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure nor this District’s Civil Local Rules do.” ECF 6 ||No. 22 at 1. Plaintiff cites no authority for the Court to grant her request; rather, the 7 ||provision on which Plaintiff relies, Civil Local Rule 83.3(f)(4), addresses “[s]pecial 8 ||[a]ppearances.” “Technically, ‘special appearance’ means an appearance for the limited 9 ||purpose of challenging an assertion of personal jurisdiction over a party.” Streit v. 10 || Covington & Crowe, 82 Cal. App. 4th 441, 444 n.2 (2000). The term also has a “less 11 ||formal but perhaps more common usage to denote an appearance at a hearing by one 12 || attorney at the request and in the place of the attorney of record, whether with or without 13 |}compensation.” /d. (collecting cases). Plaintiff's Motion seeks neither of these; instead, 14 || Plaintiff requests a limited scope representation. Accordingly, Civil Local Rule 83.3(f)(4) 15 not applicable. 16 Because the Court concludes that there is no mechanism for a limited scope 17 ||representation in this District, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's Motion (ECF No. 146).! 18 IT IS SO ORDERED. 19 20 ||Dated: August 13, 2020 jae L. Lo memeaite- 1 on. Janis L. Sammartino United States District Judge 22 23 24 || ——_______ 26 ||! Plaintiff contends that “[i]ncreasing costs that are available by statute to a litigant who cannot afford 17 representation for all purposes and then not allowing the litigant to hire an attorney to represent her on just that issue denies a pro se litigant due process.” Mot. at 1. But the Ninth Circuit has recognized that 28 “there is no absolute right to counsel in civil proceedings.” Hedges v. Resolution Tr. Corp., 32 F.3d 1360, 1363 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 269 (9th Cir. 1982)).
Cites, in this corpus
- Streit v. Covington & Crowe E023862 · 2000-07-20