Williams v. Chau

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DAMON WILLIAMS, Case No.: 3:17-cv-00517-CAB-KSC 12 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 13 v. ALTER JUDGMENT [Doc. No. 64] 14 J. CHAU, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion to alter judgment pursuant to Federal 18 Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). [Doc. No. 64.] For the reasons set forth below, the 19 motion is DENIED. 20 BACKGROUND 21 On October 14, 2019, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. [Doc. 22 No. 45.] On January 10, 2020, Plaintiff filed an opposition. [Doc. No. 54.] On February 23 21, 2020, Defendants filed a reply. [Doc. No. 58.] On March 16, 2020, this Court issued 24 an order granting Defendants’ motion for summary judgment [Doc. No. 60], and 25 judgment was entered accordingly. [Doc. No. 61.] 26 On April 7, 2020, Plaintiff filed a motion to alter judgment pursuant to Federal 27 Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). [Doc. No. 64.] On May 7, 2020, Defendant filed an 28 opposition. [Doc. No. 66.] On July 6, 2020, Plaintiff filed a reply. [Doc. No. 69.] 1 DISCUSSION 2 A. Legal Standard. 3 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 provides that after entry of judgment, a party 4 may file a motion to alter or amend the judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e). “Reconsideration 5 is appropriate if the district court (1) is presented with newly discovered evidence, (2) 6 committed clear error or the initial decision was manifestly unjust, or (3) if there is an 7 intervening change in controlling law.” Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or. v. 8 ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993). 9 “Although Rule 59(e) permits a district court to reconsider and amend a previous 10 order, the rule offers an extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the interests of 11 finality and conservation of judicial resources.” Kona Enters., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 12 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A Rule 13 59(e) motion for reconsideration may not be used to raise arguments or present evidence 14 for the first time when they could reasonably have been raised earlier in the litigation. Id. 15 “[A]fter thoughts” or “shifting of ground” do not constitute an appropriate basis for 16 reconsideration. Ausmus v. Lexington Ins. Co., No. 08–CV–2342–L, 2009 WL 2058549, 17 at *2 (S.D. Cal. July 15, 2009) (Lorenz, J.). In other words, a Rule 59(e) motion does not 18 give parties a “second bite at the apple.” See Weeks v. Bayer, 246 F.3d 1231, 1236–37 19 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Keweenaw Bay Indian Cmty. v. State of Mich., 152 F.R.D. 562, 20 563 (W.D. Mich. 1992) (“[W]here the movant is attempting to obtain a complete reversal 21 of the court’s judgment by offering essentially the same arguments presented on the 22 original motion, the proper vehicle for relief is an appeal.”); Bermingham v. Sony Corp. 23 of Am., Inc., 820 F.Supp. 834, 856 (D.N.J. 1992), aff'd 37 F.3d 1485 (3d Cir. 1994) (“A 24 party seeking reconsideration must show more than a disagreement with the Court’s 25 decision, and recapitulation of the cases and arguments considered by the court before 26 rendering its original decision fails to carry the moving party’s burden.”) (citation 27 omitted). Ultimately, “[t]here is no requirement that reasons be stated for the denial of a 28 1 motion for reconsideration under Rule 59(e).” Briddle v. Scott, 63 F.3d 364, 381 (5th Cir. 2 1995). 3 B. Analysis. 4 Here, Plaintiff does not identify any change in controlling authority or new 5 evidence. Rather, he merely rehashes arguments he presented in the underlying motion 6 for summary judgment. Plaintiff asks the Court to reconsider its decision to grant 7 summary judgment to Dr. Chau on Plaintiff’s claim that Dr. Chau violated the Eight 8 Amendment by not prescribing Plaintiff a lower bunk before August 2015. Plaintiff 9 states four grounds for his motion: 10 (1) The Court did not consider prior to August 3, 2015 once def. , was advised 11 “going up or down on His assigned top bunk caused heartpain then dizziness.” 12 At that point Defendant should have knew there was and excessive risk to plaintiff safety if He became dizzy then faint while going up or down on his 13 bunk and suffering a serious injury. Also how defendant disregarded the 14 excessive risk to Plaintiff safety by stating “plaintiff complaint about His serious medical condition “was likely a secondary gain for LT/LB chrono”. [see 15 OPP. PGS. 24:25-25:4, and ATTACHED EXHIBIT:A]. 16 (2) Due to Defenadnt Chau conscsious disregard of the excessive risk to plaintiff’s safety On August 3, 2015 when Plaintiff became dizzy fainted then fail from 17 His topbunk He suffered a serious injury and “unnecessary and wanton 18 infliction of pain”. (3) Plaintiff did not have an opportunity to present Medical Evidence to prove 19 Defendant Chau opinion of plaintiff EKG’s was inaccurate due to defendant 20 Chau opinion of plaintiff EKG’s was inaccurate due to defendant Chau no being a Cardiologist ultimately making Chau a lay witness of the heart. 21 Defendant Chau Stated “Plaintiff’s abnormal EKG as compatible with 22 hypertensive changes”. (4) In light of the specific contours of this case Plaintiff should be given the benefit 23 of being an inmate who proceeds ProSe and the factual allegations “however 24 inartfully pleaded” should be held to less stringent standards than formal pleading drafted by lawyers. 25 26 [Doc. No. 64 at 2.] 27 Grounds 1 – 3 were all presented by Plaintiff in his opposition to the summary 28 1 ||judgment motion. [See Doc. No. 1-2 at 18; Doc. No. 54 at 7, 9, 10, 24-25.]' While 2 || Plaintiff may disagree with this Court’s order granting Defendant’s motion for summary 3 judgment, all of these arguments and evidence were previously considered by the Court 4 || and, therefore, cannot be the basis for relief under Rule 59. ° As for Ground 4, Plaintiff appears to set forth a proposition that, on a motion to ° dismiss, pro se plaintiffs should be held to less stringent pleading standards. See e.g. Hebbe vy. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-342 (9th Cir. 2010). However, that is not the legal 8 standard for a motion for summary judgment; rather, parties opposing summary judgment motions are obligated to set forth all evidence that could present a triable issue of fact. 10 F.R.C.P. Rule 56(c); Waldridge v. American Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 921 (7th Cir. 1994). Plaintiff presented no such evidence and, therefore, summary judgment was I properly granted for Defendant. 8 CONCLUSION 4 For the reasons set forth above, the motion to alter judgment is DENIED. IT IS SO ORDERED. 16 Dated: July 10, 2020 17 ( CGE— 18 Hon. Cathy Ann Bencivengo 19 United States District Judge 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 | In his reply to this motion, Plaintiff acknowledges that he presented all of this evidence previously 27 || when he argues that “this Honorable Court overlooked crucial facts presented as evidence by way of 3g exhibits in his opposition to defendant’s motion for summary judgment . . .” [Doc. No. 69 at 3.] All previously submitted evidence was reviewed and considered.