Ornelas v. Spearman
- Proceeding
- original
- Outcome
- other — § 6
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Gonzalo P. Curiel (author)
Analysis
The court considered a pro se federal inmate's petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging a prison disciplinary finding of battery with a weapon. The court adopted the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation, denied the petition, and declined to issue a certificate of appealability.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Adopted the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation in its entirety.“Accordingly, the Court hereby (1) ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge’s Report in its entirety, and (2) DENIES the Petition.” | agree with court The order states that neither party filed objections to the Report and Recommendation. Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Ninth Circuit precedent (e.g., United States v. Reyna-Tapia), a district judge is not required to conduct a de novo review of a magistrate's findings if no objections are filed, provided the report is not clearly erroneous. The court reviewed the report and found it 'thorough, well-reasoned and contains no clear error.' This procedural posture and the court's stated review standard support the adoption of the report. |
Denied the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.“Accordingly, the Court hereby (1) ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge’s Report in its entirety, and (2) DENIES the Petition.” | agree with court The court applied the 'some evidence' standard from Superintendent v. Hill to the prison disciplinary proceeding. The petitioner argued the evidence was fabricated, insufficient, or improperly based on circumstantial evidence. The court correctly noted that the 'some evidence' standard is minimally stringent and does not require direct evidence. Citing Hill and Ninth Circuit precedent (Castro v. Terhune, Lathan v. Marshall, Embrey v. Menke), the court found that circumstantial evidence is sufficient to meet the standard. The order recites the petitioner's specific arguments and explains why they fail under the applicable legal standard. The denial follows from the law and the record as described in the order. |
Declined to issue a certificate of appealability.“Because reasonable jurists would not find the Court’s assessment of the claims debatable or wrong, the Court DECLINES to issue a certificate of appealability.” | agree with court The court applied the standard from 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) and Slack v. McDaniel, requiring a 'substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.' The court concluded that reasonable jurists would not find its assessment debatable or wrong. Given the court's correct application of the 'some evidence' standard to the facts presented, the conclusion that no substantial showing was made is consistent with the law. |
The order itself: sound — The order correctly identifies the procedural posture (no objections to the R&R) and applies the appropriate standard for review (no de novo review required, but a check for clear error). It correctly applies the 'some evidence' standard from Superintendent v. Hill to the facts of the prison disciplinary case. It addresses the petitioner's specific arguments regarding the reliability and sufficiency of the evidence, including the argument that the evidence was circumstantial, and correctly concludes that circumstantial evidence is sufficient under Hill. It cites relevant Ninth Circuit precedent to support this conclusion. It correctly applies the Slack v. McDaniel standard for a certificate of appealability. The reasoning is complete and supported by the cited authorities.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
unusual dispositionOpinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DAVID MARTINEZ ORNELAS, Case No.: 18-CV-1666-GPC-WVG 12 Petitioner, ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND 13 v. RECOMMENDATION DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS 14 M.E. SPEARMAN, CORPUS 15 Respondent. [ECF No. 14] 16 17 Petitioner David Martinez Ornelas (“Petitioner”), a federal inmate proceeding pro 18 se, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging a 19 determination following a prison disciplinary proceeding finding that Petitioner was 20 guilty of battery on an inmate with a weapon arising from a fight that occurred on August 21 11, 2015. ECF No. 1. Respondents filed an answer on February 19, 2019. ECF No. 11. 22 Petitioner filed a traverse on March 21, 2019. ECF No. 13. Presently before the Court is 23 a Report and Recommendation (“Report”) issued by Magistrate Judge William V. Gallo 24 recommending the Court deny Petitioner’s petition. Doc. No. 14. Neither party has filed 25 objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report. After a thorough review of the issues and 26 for the reasons set forth below, this Court ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 27 DENIES Petitioner’s petition. 28 1 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 72(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) set forth a 2 district judge’s duties in connection with a magistrate judge’s report and 3 recommendation. The district judge must “make a de novo determination of those 4 portions of the report to which objection is made,” and “may accept, reject, or modify, in 5 whole or in part, the finding or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 6 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see also United States v. Remsing, 874 F.2d 614, 617 (9th Cir. 1989). 7 But “[t]he statute makes it clear that the district judge must review the magistrate judge’s 8 findings and recommendations de novo if objection is made, but not otherwise.” United 9 States v. Reyna–Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (emphasis in 10 original); see also Schmidt v. Johnstone, 263 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1226 (D. Ariz. 2003) 11 (concluding that where no objections were filed, the district court had no obligation to 12 review the magistrate judge’s report). “Neither the Constitution nor the statute requires a 13 district judge to review, de novo, findings and recommendations that the parties 14 themselves accept as correct.” Id. “When no objections are filed, the de novo review 15 is waived.” Marshall v. Astrue, No. 08cv1735-MJL, 2010 WL 841252, at *1 (S.D. Cal. 16 Mar. 10, 2010) (adopting report in its entirety without review because neither party filed 17 objections to the report despite the opportunity to do so). 18 In this case, neither party has timely filed objections to the Magistrate Judge’s 19 Report. Consequently, the Court may adopt the Report on the basis that it is unopposed. 20 See Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d at 1121. Having reviewed the Report, the Court finds that the 21 Report is thorough, well–reasoned and contains no clear error. In Superintendent v. Hill, 22 472 U.S. 445 (1985), the Supreme Court considered the deference courts must afford a 23 prison disciplinary board's finding that a prisoner committed an infraction where the 24 punishment was the loss of good time credits. In Hill, the Court held that if there is even 25 “some evidence” to support the prison's disciplinary decision, the requirements of due 26 process are satisfied. Id. at 455. The Hill standard is minimally stringent. The Court 27 stated that “the relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could 28 support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.” Id. at 455–56 (emphasis 1 added). Here, petitioner contests the reliability of the evidence, arguing that the medical 2 report that noted puncture and slash wounds on the victim is fabricated evidence. Pet. at 3 15, 18. Moreover, Petitioner argues the evidence is insufficient because (1) there were no 4 weapons found; (2) all officers reported seeing Petitioner fight with fists; (3) the victim 5 said no weapon was used; and (4) a fence caused the victim’s injuries. See id. at 18-24. 6 Construing the Petition liberally, another possible interpretation of Petitioner’s claim is 7 that he believes the disciplinary committee improperly based its decision on 8 circumstantial evidence. See Lopez v. Uribe, No. 11cv00216, 2012 WL 2367554, at *6 9 n.1 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2012) (noting that a claim that a prison Disciplinary Committee 10 based their decision on “unreliable evidence” would “essentially be duplicative” of a 11 claim that they improperly based their decision on circumstantial evidence). The Hill 12 standard, however, does not require the Disciplinary Committee to base its findings on 13 direct evidence. See Hill, 472 U.S. at 456–57 (upholding a finding that three inmates 14 committed assault even though “no direct evidence identifying any one of the three 15 inmates as the assailant” was presented). Moreover, this interpretation of Hill as finding 16 circumstantial evidence sufficient to meet the “some evidence” standard is supported by 17 Ninth Circuit precedent. See Castro v. Terhune, 712 F.3d 1304, 1315 (9th Cir. 2013) 18 (finding that evidence was circumstantial and “could support competing inferences” did 19 not preclude the “some evidence” [Hill] standard from being met); Lathan v. Marshall, 20 977 F.2d 589 at *1 (9th Cir. 1992) (unpublished) (“Hill indicates that the requisite 21 quantum of evidence can be circumstantial.”); Embrey v. Menke, 881 F.2d 1083 at *2 22 (9th Cir. 1989) (unpublished) (finding that circumstantial evidence linking petitioner to 23 the alleged infraction was sufficient evidence upon which to base the decision of the 24 disciplinary committee). Accordingly, the Court hereby (1) ADOPTS the Magistrate 25 Judge’s Report in its entirety, and (2) DENIES the Petition. 26 Moreover, a certificate of appealability may issue only if the applicant makes a 27 substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). 28 Petitioner has not made this showing. Because reasonable jurists would not find the 1 Court’s assessment of the claims debatable or wrong, the Court DECLINES to issue a 2 ||certificate of appealability. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). 3 IT IS SO ORDERED. 4 5 ||Dated: July 9, 2020 2 □ 6 Hon. athe Ck 7 United States District Judge 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28