gno.law

Impact Engine, Inc. v. Google LLC

District Court, S.D. California · 3:19-cv-01301 · 2020-06-22 · Unknown

Proceeding
district
Area
civil
Panel
Cathy Ann Bencivengo (author)

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt own-v1, 2026-10-13T23:41Z · confidence high

The court considered Impact Engine's motion to strike Google's affirmative defense of inequitable conduct, which alleged that patent agents knowingly submitted claims lacking written description support. The court granted the motion and dismissed the defense without leave to amend, finding that the allegations were conclusory, failed to meet the heightened pleading standards of Rule 9(b), and improperly attempted to convert a patent validity challenge into a fraud claim.

What the court decidedThe model
Motion to strike inequitable conduct defense granted; defense dismissed without leave to amend
“For the foregoing reasons, Impact Engine’s motion to strike Google’s inequitable conduct defense is GRANTED, and Google’s inequitable conduct defense is DISMISSED.”
agree with court
The court correctly applied the heightened pleading standards of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) to the affirmative defense of inequitable conduct. The order identifies that Google's defense was based on a 'novel theory' that the mere lack of written description support (a 35 U.S.C. § 112 validity issue) constituted fraud. The court correctly reasoned that a disagreement over the sufficiency of a specification does not, without more, constitute an affirmative misrepresentation or material omission intended to deceive the PTO. Because the defense was based on a legal theory that the court found inapplicable to the facts alleged, denying leave to amend was appropriate as no amount of specificity could cure the fundamental legal defect in the theory.

The order itself: sound — The order is legally sound. It correctly identifies the governing law for inequitable conduct defenses, specifically the requirement to plead fraud with particularity under Rule 9(b). The court effectively distinguishes between a patent validity challenge (lack of written description under 35 U.S.C. § 112) and a fraud claim (inequitable conduct). By finding that Google's allegations amounted to a disagreement with the examiner's conclusion rather than an affirmative act of deception, the court applied the law correctly to the facts recited in the order. The denial of leave to amend is justified because the court found the underlying legal theory (that lack of support alone equals fraud) to be invalid, meaning further factual specificity would not cure the defect.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 IMPACT ENGINE, INC., Case No.: 3:19-cv-01301-CAB-BGS 11 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 12 v. STRIKE INEQUITABLE CONDUCT DEFENSE 13 GOOGLE LLC, 14 Defendant. [Doc. No. 65] 15 16 17 This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Impact Engine, Inc.’s motion to strike 18 Defendant Google, LLC’s inequitable conduct defense. The motion has been fully briefed, 19 and the Court deems it suitable for submission without oral argument. For the following 20 reasons, the motion is granted without leave to amend. 21 I. Background 22 On March 4, 2020, Impact Engine filed a supplemental complaint, which is the 23 operative complaint in this action. [Doc. No. 53.] The supplemental complaint includes 24 claims for infringement of eight Impact Engine patents from the same patent family,1 25 26 1 The patents are: U.S. Patent No. 7,870,497 (the “’497 Patent”); U.S. Patent No. 8,356,253 (the “’6,253 27 Patent”); U.S. Patent No. 8,930,832 (the “’832 Patent”); U.S. Patent No. 9,361,632 (the “’632 Patent”); U.S. Patent No. 9,805,393 (the “’393 Patent”); U.S. Patent No. 10,068,253 (the “’8,253 Patent”); U.S. 28 1 covering systems and methods that automate the process of constructing and distributing 2 professional quality advertisement media. [Doc. No. 53-2 at 20.] 3 In its answer to the supplemental complaint, Google asserted an inequitable conduct 4 affirmative defense for the first time. [Doc. No. 55.] After Impact Engine informed Google 5 that it intended to move to strike the inequitable conduct defense from Google’s answer, 6 Google filed an amended answer with additional allegations related to the inequitable 7 conduct defense. [Doc. No. 57.] In its amended answer to Impact Engine’s supplemental 8 complaint, Google asserts the inequitable conduct defense as to six of the eight patents at 9 issue in the supplemental complaint (the ‘832 Patent; the ‘632 Patent; the ‘393 Patent; the 10 ‘8,253 Patent; the ‘618 Patent; and the ‘898 Patent). [Doc. No. 57 at 20-29.] Impact Engine 11 now moves to strike Google’s inequitable conduct defense. [Doc. No. 65.] 12 II. Discussion 13 “Inequitable conduct is an equitable defense to patent infringement that, if proved, 14 bars enforcement of a patent.” Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., 649 F.3d 15 1276, 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc). The Federal Circuit has described it as the “atomic 16 bomb” of patent law because a finding of inequitable conduct renders the entire patent 17 unenforceable, incurable by reissue or reexamination at the PTO. Id. at 1288 (internal 18 citations omitted). 19 To successfully prove inequitable conduct, the accused infringer must present 20 evidence that the applicant (1) made an affirmative misrepresentation of a material fact, 21 failed to disclose material information, or submitted false material information; and (2) 22 intended to deceive the [Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”)].” Star Scientific, Inc., v. 23 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Exergen Corp. v. Wal- 24 Mart Stores, Inc., 575 F.3d 1312, 1327 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2009). At least a threshold level of 25 each element – i.e., both materiality and intent to deceive – must be proven by clear and 26 convincing evidence. Star Scientific, 537 F.3d at 1365. Further because an inequitable 27 conduct defense sounds in fraud, it must satisfy the heightened pleading standards of 28 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), including “identification of the specific who, what, 1 when, where, and how of the material misrepresentation or omission committed before the 2 PTO.” Exergen, 575 F.3d. at 1327. “A pleading that simply avers the substantive elements 3 of inequitable conduct, without setting forth the factual bases for the allegation, does not 4 satisfy Rule 9(b).” Id. at 1326-27. 5 Here, according to Google’s opposition brief, the “crux” of its inequitable conduct 6 defense is that each of the individuals who prosecuted the six patents in question on Impact 7 Engine’s behalf “submitted patent claims to the PTO knowing that the claims lacked 8 written description . . . .” [Doc. No. 73 at 6.] To that end, the amended answer alleges that 9 Impact Engine’s agents “knowingly and intentionally presented claims that they knew were 10 unsupported by the specification that accompanied the application.” [Doc. No. 57 at ¶¶ 11 164, 171, 178, 185, 192, 199.] In its opposition brief, Google cites to no authority 12 supporting this inequitable conduct theory, arguing only that no court has rejected it. This 13 Court will not expand the affirmative defense of inequitable conduct to embrace Google’s 14 novel theory. 15 Google does not identify any specific misrepresented fact or material omission or 16 false material information that was submitted to or withheld from the PTO during the 17 prosecution of the patents. Google simply alleges that claims of the continuation patents 18 asserted by Impact Engine are not supported by their common specification, a validity 19 challenge under 35 U.S.C. §112. Google makes no allegations that the inventors or 20 prosecuting attorney intentionally misled the patent examiner with false or misleading 21 statements in the written description to obtain those claims. 22 Google’s theory of inequitable conduct is a conclusory statement that the inventors 23 and prosecuting attorney all knew that the claims they sought, and were granted, were not 24 supported by the written description. This assertion does not support a claim of fraudulent 25 intent to deceive the PTO. Without some allegation of misrepresented fact or material 26 omission in the written description made or withheld to allow the claims to issue, there is 27 no fraud. There is only disagreement that the examiner, who was in full possession of the 28 1 || written description, wrongly concluded that the requirements for § 112 were met when the 2 ||claims were allowed. 3 Google has already once amended its inequitable conduct defense, expanding the 4 || length of its allegations from one paragraph to almost nine full pages. [Doc. No. 55; Doc. 5 || No. 57.] Despite substantial alterations, Google’s allegations fail to meet even the pleading 6 || standards of Rule 8(a), much less the heightened requirements in Rule 9(b). No amount of 7 || additional specificity as to Google’s allegation that Impact Engine’s agents failed to inform 8 ||the PTO that the claims they presented were not supported by the specification would be 9 sufficient to state a plausible inequitable conduct defense. As such, Impact Engine’s 10 || motion is granted without leave to amend. 11 III. Disposition 12 For the foregoing reasons, Impact Engine’s motion to strike Google’s inequitable 13 ||conduct defense is GRANTED, and Google’s inequitable conduct defense is 14 || DISMISSED. 15 It is SO ORDERED. 16 || Dated: June 22, 2020 € □ 17 Hon. Cathy Ann Bencivengo 18 United States District Judge 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28