Bonilla v. Marin County

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 STEVEN WAYNE BONILLA, Case No.: 3:20-cv-00841-LAB-AGS CDCR #J-48500, 12 ORDER: Plaintiff, 13 vs. 1) DENYING MOTION TO 14 PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 15 AS BARRED BY 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) MARIN COUNTY and ALAMEDA [ECF No. 2] 16 COUNTY, 17 Defendants. AND 18 2) DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION 19 FOR FAILURE TO PAY FILING FEE REQUIRED BY 28 U.S.C. § 20 1914(a) 21 24 Plaintiff Steven Wayne Bonilla, proceeding pro se and currently incarcerated at San 25 Quentin State Prison has filed a civil action captioned as challenging “Marin County’s 26 Vexatious Litigant Order and Alameda County’s Void Judgment.” (See ECF No. 1, 27 Compl., at 1.) Also attached to Plaintiff’s Complaint is a document captioned “In re: to 28 1 the matter of Steven Wayne Bonilla Void Judgment on its face, rendered by the Alameda 2 County Superior Court . . .” purporting to challenge Plaintiff’s underlying conviction and 3 two subsequent orders issued by the Alameda County Superior Court in Plaintiff’s habeas 4 case. (See id. at 6; see also id. at 12-13 (attaching the orders).) Plaintiff has not paid the 5 filing fee required to commence a civil action; instead, he has filed a Motion to Proceed In 6 Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(a). (See ECF No. 2.) 7 I. Motion to Proceed IFP 8 A. Standard of Review 9 “All persons, not just prisoners, may seek IFP status.” Moore v. Maricopa Cnty. 10 Sheriff’s Office, 657 F.3d 890, 892 (9th Cir. 2011). Prisoners, like Plaintiff, however, 11 “face an additional hurdle.” Id. In addition to requiring prisoners to “pay the full amount 12 of a filing fee,” in “increments” as provided by 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(a)(3)(b), Williams 13 v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2015), the Prison Litigation Reform Act 14 (“PLRA”) amended Section 1915 to preclude the privilege to proceed IFP: 15 . . . if [a] prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or 16 appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the 17 grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, unless the prisoner is under 18 imminent danger of serious physical injury. 19 20 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). “This subdivision is commonly known as the ‘three strikes’ 21 provision.” Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1116 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005). 22 “Pursuant to § 1915(g), a prisoner with three strikes or more cannot proceed IFP.” 23 Id.; see also Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 2007) (hereafter 24 “Cervantes”) (stating that under the PLRA, “[p]risoners who have repeatedly brought 25 unsuccessful suits may entirely be barred from IFP status under the three strikes 26 rule . . . .”). The objective of the PLRA is to further “the congressional goal of reducing 27 frivolous prisoner litigation in federal court.” Tierney v. Kupers, 128 F.3d 1310, 1312 28 (9th Cir. 1997). “[S]ection 1915(g)’s cap on prior dismissed claims applies to claims 1 dismissed both before and after the statute’s effective date.” Id. at 1311. 2 “Strikes are prior cases or appeals, brought while the plaintiff was a prisoner, which 3 were dismissed on the ground that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim,” 4 Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1116 n.1 (internal quotations omitted), “even if the district court 5 styles such dismissal as a denial of the prisoner’s application to file the action without 6 prepayment of the full filing fee.” O’Neal v. Price, 531 F.3d 1146, 1153 (9th Cir. 2008). 7 When courts “review a dismissal to determine whether it counts as a strike, the style of the 8 dismissal or the procedural posture is immaterial. Instead, the central question is whether 9 the dismissal ‘rang the PLRA bells of frivolous, malicious, or failure to state a claim.’” El- 10 Shaddai v. Zamora, 833 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Blakely v. Wards, 738 11 F.3d 607, 615 (4th Cir. 2013)). “When . . . presented with multiple claims within a single 12 action,” however, courts may “assess a PLRA strike only when the case as a whole is 13 dismissed for a qualifying reason under the Act.” Hoffman v. Pulido, 928 F.3d 1147, 1152 14 (9th Cir. 2019) (citing Washington v. L.A. Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 833 F.3d 1048, 1057 (9th 15 Cir. 2016)). 16 Once a prisoner has accumulated three strikes, he is prohibited by Section 1915(g) 17 from pursuing any other IFP action in federal court unless he can show he is facing 18 “imminent danger of serious physical injury.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); Cervantes, 493 19 F.3d at 1051-52 (noting Section 1915(g)’s exception for IFP complaints which “make[] a 20 plausible allegation that the prisoner faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ at 21 the time of filing.”). 22 B. Discussion 23 As a preliminary matter, the Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s Complaint and finds that 24 it does not contain any “plausible allegations” to suggest that he “faced ‘imminent danger 25 of serious physical injury’ at the time of filing.” Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1055 (quoting 28 26 U.S.C. § 1915(g)). Instead, Plaintiff alleges that his Alameda County judgment of 27 conviction and an order from Marin County declaring him a vexatious litigant should be 28 “vacated” because they were issued without subject-matter jurisdiction. (See Compl. at 5.) 1 Additionally, Plaintiff contends that the Court should declare two orders issued by the 2 Alameda County Superior Court in Plaintiff’s habeas case void for lack of subject-matter 3 jurisdiction, discharge Plaintiff from custody because his underlying judgment of 4 conviction is void, and compel individuals who were evidently witnesses at Plaintiff’s 5 criminal trial to disclose the source of certain information used in the case. (See id. at 10.) 6 While Defendants typically carry the initial burden to produce evidence 7 demonstrating a prisoner is not entitled to proceed IFP, Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119, “in 8 some instances, the district court docket may be sufficient to show that a prior dismissal 9 satisfies at least one on the criteria under § 1915(g) and therefore counts as a strike.” Id. 10 at 1120. That is true here. 11 Based on the dockets of many court proceedings available on PACER,1 this Court 12 finds that Plaintiff Steven Wayne Bonilla, identified as CDCR #J-48500, while 13 incarcerated, has had dozens of prisoner civil actions or appeals dismissed on the grounds 14 that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim upon which relief may be 15 granted. See In re Steven Bonilla, 2012 WL 216401, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2012) (noting 16 Plaintiff’s litigation history in the Northern District of California, including the dismissal 17 of 34 pro se civil rights actions between June 1 and October 31, 2011 alone, which were 18 dismissed “because the allegations in [his] complaints d[id] not state a claim for relief 19 under § 1983.”); id. at *3 (“The following five actions are DISMISSED without prejudice 20 and without leave to amend for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted: 21 Bonilla v. Superior Court of Alameda County, C 11-6306; Bonilla v. Alameda County 22 District Attorney’s Office, C 11-6307; Bonilla v. California Supreme Court, C 12-0026; 23 24 25 1 A court may take judicial notice of its own records, see Molus v. Swan, No. 3:05-cv-00452-MMA-WMc, 2009 WL 160937, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2009) (citing United States v. Author Servs., 804 F.2d 1520, 26 1523 (9th Cir. 1986)); Gerritsen v. Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc., 112 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1034 (C.D. Cal. 2015), and “‘may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial 27 system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.’” Bias, 508 F.3d at 1225 (quoting Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d 801, 803 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002)); see also United States ex rel. Robinson 28 1 || Bonilla v. Cullen, C 12-0027; Bonilla v. California Supreme Court, C 12-0206.”); id. at *3 2 |{n.1 (“The Court recently informed Plaintiff that, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), 3 ||he no longer qualifies to proceed in forma pauperis in any civil rights action.” (citing Jn re 4 || Steven Bonilla, Nos. C 11-3180, et seq. CW (PR), Order of Dismissal at 6:23-7:19)). 5 Accordingly, because Plaintiff has, while incarcerated, accumulated far more than 6 ||the three “strikes” permitted by Section 1915(g), and he fails to make any plausible 7 || allegation that he faced imminent danger of serious physical injury at the time he filed this 8 he is not entitled to the privilege of proceeding IFP. See Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1055; 9 || Rodriguez, 169 F.3d at 1180 (noting that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) “does not prevent all 10 || prisoners from accessing the courts; it only precludes prisoners with a history of abusing 11 || the legal system from continuing to abuse it while enjoying IFP status”); see also Franklin 12 ||v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1231 (9th Cir. 1984) (“[C]ourt permission to proceed IFP 1s 13 |/itself a matter of privilege and not right.”’). 14 Conclusion and Orders 15 For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed 16 || IFP (ECF No. 2) as barred by 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(g), DISMISSES this civil action 17 || based on Plaintiff’s failure to pay the civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. Section 1914(a), 18 || CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal from this Order would not be taken in good faith pursuant 19 || to 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(a)(3), and DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to close the file. 20 IT IS SO ORDERED. 21 22 |! Dated: May 12, 2020 ( iM / 4. by Wy 23 Hon. Larry Alan Burns 4 Chief United States District Judge 25 26 27 28 5 oo