Bonilla v. Clay

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 STEVEN WAYNE BONILLA, Case No.: 3:20-cv-00704-BAS-AGS 11 CDCR #J-48500, Case No.: 3:20-cv-00823-BAS-MDD 12 Plaintiff, ORDER:

13 v. (1) DENYING MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA 14 JUDGE AMALIA L. MEZA, et al., PAUPERIS AS BARRED BY 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) [ECF No. 3] 15 Defendants. AND 16 STEVEN WAYNE BONILLA, (2) DISMISSING CIVIL ACTIONS 17 CDCR #J-48500, FOR FAILURE TO PAY FILING FEE REQUIRED 18 Plaintiff, BY 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a)

19 v. 20 CLARENCE DON CLAY, et al., 21 Defendants. 22 23 Plaintiff Steven Wayne Bonilla, proceeding pro se and currently incarcerated at San 24 Quentin State Prison, has filed two civil actions. In Bonilla v. Meza, et al., S.D. Cal. Civil 25 Case No. 3:20-cv-00704-BAS-AGS (“Bonilla I”), Plaintiff has filed a civil action against 26 a number of state judges seeking to have Defendants declare his Alameda County Superior 27 Court capital conviction and sentence void for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. (See 28 Compl. at 2–4, ECF No. 1.) On April 21, 2020, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s Complaint 1 for failure to pay the filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. Section 1914(a) and/or to file a motion 2 to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(a) and granted 3 Plaintiff thirty days leave in which to pay the filing fee or file a complete motion to proceed 4 IFP. (See ECF No. 2 at 2–3.) Plaintiff later filed a Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 5 U.S.C. Section 1915(a) on May 4, 2020. (See ECF No. 3.) 6 In Bonilla v. Clay, et al., S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 3:20-cv-00823-BAS-MDD 7 (“Bonilla II”), Plaintiff has filed a civil action against a number of state and federal judges 8 also seeking to compel Defendants to “perform a duty owed to the Plaintiff to declare the 9 Alameda judgment void.” (See ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff has not filed a Motion to Proceed 10 IFP in this matter. 11 I. MOTION TO PROCEED IFP 12 A. Standard of Review 13 “All persons, not just prisoners, may seek IFP status.” Moore v. Maricopa Cnty. 14 Sheriff’s Office, 657 F.3d 890, 892 (9th Cir. 2011). Prisoners, like Plaintiff, however, “face 15 an additional hurdle.” Id. In addition to requiring prisoners to “pay the full amount of a 16 filing fee,” in “increments” as provided by 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(a)(3)(b), Williams v. 17 Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2015), the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) 18 amended Section 1915 to preclude the privilege to proceed IFP: 19 . . . if [a] prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or 20 appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim 21 upon which relief can be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury. 22 23 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). “This subdivision is commonly known as the ‘three strikes’ 24 provision.” Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1116 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005). 25 “Pursuant to § 1915(g), a prisoner with three strikes or more cannot proceed IFP.” 26 Id.; see also Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 2007) (hereafter 27 “Cervantes”) (stating that under the PLRA, “[p]risoners who have repeatedly brought 28 unsuccessful suits may entirely be barred from IFP status under the three strikes 1 rule . . . .”). The objective of the PLRA is to further “the congressional goal of reducing 2 frivolous prisoner litigation in federal court.” Tierney v. Kupers, 128 F.3d 1310, 1312 (9th 3 Cir. 1997). “[S]ection 1915(g)’s cap on prior dismissed claims applies to claims dismissed 4 both before and after the statute’s effective date.” Id. at 1311. 5 “Strikes are prior cases or appeals, brought while the plaintiff was a prisoner, which 6 were dismissed on the ground that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim,” 7 Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1116 n.1 (internal quotations omitted), “even if the district court 8 styles such dismissal as a denial of the prisoner’s application to file the action without 9 prepayment of the full filing fee.” O’Neal v. Price, 531 F.3d 1146, 1153 (9th Cir. 2008). 10 When courts “review a dismissal to determine whether it counts as a strike, the style of the 11 dismissal or the procedural posture is immaterial. Instead, the central question is whether 12 the dismissal ‘rang the PLRA bells of frivolous, malicious, or failure to state a claim.’” El- 13 Shaddai v. Zamora, 833 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Blakely v. Wards, 738 14 F.3d 607, 615 (4th Cir. 2013)). “When . . . presented with multiple claims within a single 15 action,” however, courts may “assess a PLRA strike only when the case as a whole is 16 dismissed for a qualifying reason under the Act.” Hoffman v. Pulido, 928 F.3d 1147, 1152 17 (9th Cir. 2019) (citing Washington v. L.A. Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 833 F.3d 1048, 1057 (9th 18 Cir. 2016)). 19 Once a prisoner has accumulated three strikes, he is prohibited by § 1915(g) from 20 pursuing any other IFP action in federal court unless he can show he is facing “imminent 21 danger of serious physical injury.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1051– 22 52 (noting § 1915(g)’s exception for IFP complaints which “make[] a plausible allegation 23 that the prisoner faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ at the time of filing.”). 24 B. Discussion 25 As a preliminary matter, the Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s Complaint in Bonilla I1 26 and finds that it does not contain any “plausible allegations” to suggest that he “faced 27 1 While Plaintiff is not currently seeking IFP status in Bonilla II, if Plaintiff were to file a Motion to Proceed IFP, the Court would find that he is not entitled to IFP status for the same reasons set forth in this 28 1 ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ at the time of filing.” Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 2 1055 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)). Instead, in Bonilla I, Plaintiff alleges that his 3 judgment of conviction should be declared “null and void” because the “evidence in the 4 case is the fruit of a federal grand jury subpoena” that was “never entered on the court 5 docket as an exhibit.” (See Compl. at 2.) As a result, Plaintiff argues that Defendants had 6 a duty to declare his judgment of conviction void. (See id.) 7 While Defendants typically carry the initial burden to produce evidence 8 demonstrating a prisoner is not entitled to proceed IFP, Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119, “in 9 some instances, the district court docket may be sufficient to show that a prior dismissal 10 satisfies at least one on the criteria under § 1915(g) and therefore counts as a strike.” Id. 11 at 1120. That is true here. 12 Based on the dockets of many court proceedings available on PACER,2 this Court 13 finds that Plaintiff Steven Wayne Bonilla, identified as CDCR #J-48500, while 14 incarcerated, has had dozens of prisoner civil actions or appeals dismissed on the grounds 15 that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim upon which relief may be 16 granted. See In re Steven Bonilla, 2012 WL 216401, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2012) (noting 17 Plaintiff’s litigation history in the Northern District of California, including the dismissal 18 of 34 pro se civil rights actions between June 1 and October 31, 2011 alone, which were 19 dismissed “because the allegations in [his] complaints d[id] not state a claim for relief 20 under § 1983.”); id. at *3 (“The following five actions are DISMISSED without prejudice 21 and without leave to amend for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted: 22 Bonilla v. Superior Court of Alameda County, C 11-6306; Bonilla v. Alameda County 23 District Attorney’s Office, C 11-6307; Bonilla v. California Supreme Court, C 12-0026; 24 2 A court may take judicial notice of its own records. See Molus v. Swan, No. 3:05-cv-00452-MMA- 25 WMc, 2009 WL 160937, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2009) (citing United States v. Author Servs., 804 F.2d 1520, 1523 (9th Cir. 1986)); Gerritsen v. Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc., 112 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1034 (C.D. 26 Cal. 2015). Additionally, a court “‘may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.’” Bias v. 27 Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1225 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d 801, 803 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002)); see also United States ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 28 1 || Bonilla v. Cullen, C 12-0027; Bonilla v. California Supreme Court, C 12-0206.”); id. at *3 2 (‘The Court recently informed Plaintiff that, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), 3 ||he no longer qualifies to proceed in forma pauperis in any civil rights action.”) (citing Jn 4 || re Steven Bonilla, Nos. C 11-3180, et seq. CW (PR), Order of Dismissal at 6:23-7:19)). 5 Accordingly, because Plaintiff has, while incarcerated, accumulated far more than 6 ||the three “strikes” permitted by § 1915(g), and he fails to make any plausible allegation 7 he faced imminent danger of serious physical injury at the time he filed this case, he 8 not entitled to the privilege of proceeding IFP. See Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1055; 9 || Rodriguez, 169 F.3d at 1180 (noting that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) “does not prevent all 10 || prisoners from accessing the courts; it only precludes prisoners with a history of abusing 11 || the legal system from continuing to abuse it while enjoying IFP status”); see also Franklin 12 ||v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1231 (9th Cir. 1984) (“[C]ourt permission to proceed IFP is 13 |Jitself a matter of privilege and not right.’’). 14 ||. CONCLUSION AND ORDERS 15 For the reasons set forth above: 16 (1) The Court DENIES Plaintiff's Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF No. 3) filed in 17 || Bonilla v. Meza, et al., S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 3:20-cv-00704-BAS-AGS as barred by 28 18 ||}U.S.C. § 1915(g); 19 (2) DISMISSES Bonilla v. Meza, et al.,S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 3:20-cv-00704- 20 || BAS-AGS and Bonilla v. Clay, et al., S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 3:20-cv-00823-BAS-MDD 21 || based on Plaintiff’s failure to pay the civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); 22 (3) DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to enter this Order in both matters. 23 (4) CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal from this Order would not be taken in good 24 faith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(a)(3); and 25 (5) DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to close both files. 26 IT IS SO ORDERED. 27 /\ yy 28 || DATED: May 11, 2020 ( itl A (Hiphan How. Cynthia Bashant a United States District Judge