Y.I. v. County of San Diego

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 Y.I., a minor, by and through her Case No.: 20cv588-LAB (LL) guardian ad litem, et al. 12 ORDER APPOINTING Plaintiffs, 13 GUARDIAN AD LITEM; AND v. 14 ORDER REQUIRING COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, et al. 15 AMENDMENT Defendants. 16 17 18 19 The motion to appoint Joy Singleton as guardian ad litem for Plaintiffs Y.I., 20 A.G., and D.G. (Docket no. 4), is GRANTED. 21 Plaintiffs are children of Mayra Gonzalez who, the complaint alleges, had a 22 history of alcohol abuse and drunk driving. On November 12, 2018, the complaint 23 alleges she drove while heavily intoxicated, and was involved in a serious accident 24 that injured all three children. 25 The Court sua sponte raised the adequacy of the complaint. See Sparling v. 26 Hoffman Const. Co., Inc., 864 F.2d 635, 637–38 (9th Cir. 1988). Specifically, 27 Plaintiffs’ only federal claims appeared to be foreclosed by the holding of 28 DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989). 1 DeShaney, in brief, stands for the proposition that government officials’ 2 failure to protect a person from private crime or violence does not violate 3 substantive Due Process. Specifically, DeShaney held that a county and its 4 employees were not liable under the Constitution for failing to prevent a child’s 5 being abused by his father, even if they knew he was at risk. The Court recognized 6 that the Constitution did impose such a duty to protect people whom the 7 government has deprived of their liberty (e.g., prisoners or involuntarily-committed 8 mental patients). 489 U.S. at 200. The Court also recognized that state law might 9 impose on the county and its officials a duty to protect the child, and that state tort 10 law might provide a remedy. Id. at 201. But the Constitution imposes no such duty, 11 and failure to carry out a duty created by state law does not violate substantive 12 Due Process. Id. 13 Plaintiffs have filed their response, and argue that the “state created danger” 14 doctrine distinguishes their claims from DeShaney. They conclude that Defendants 15 created a danger that Plaintiffs would not otherwise have faced. But to pursue 16 such a claim, they must plead enough factual matter that, if taken as true, would 17 plausibly suggest that their conclusion is correct. See Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 18 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). The only factual basis for Plaintiffs’ “state created 19 danger” theory is that Defendants determined Plaintiffs were in danger, 20 documented the danger, and yet left Plaintiffs in their mother’s custody without 21 doing anything. The response summarizes their theory this way: 22 Unlike in Deshaney, Plaintiffs raise the state-created danger exception. Here, the County Defendants – acting in their capacity as 23 government officers – made an official determination that Mayra 24 Gonzalez posed a serious present and future danger to the Plaintiffs. And, that services and/or safeguards were necessary to alleviate this 25 known danger. Defendants’ determination distinguished Plaintiffs from 26 the general public, and required Defendants to afford Plaintiffs some measure of personal and physical safety. 27 28 1 As set out in detail in the complaint, the Defendants were deliberately indifferent to the danger they knew Ms. Gonzalez posed to 2 her children, and left the children in a known dangerous circumstance. 3 Defendant’s actions were devastating for these children. 4 5 (Response at 1:8–17.) Plaintiffs contend that Defendants’ knowledge triggered a 6 duty to act. (Id. at 2:11–12.) 7 But even if Defendants had a duty under state law to act, failure to carry out 8 a duty imposed by state law does not amount to a federal substantive Due Process 9 violation. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201. The complaint does not allege anything they 10 did to create any danger, or make Plaintiffs any more vulnerable to it. See 11 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201. The response cites several other cases where social 12 workers placed foster children in the custody of people they knew were abusive, 13 and failed to protect them afterwards. But Plaintiffs here are alleged to be Ms. 14 Gonzalez’s own children, and the complaint does not allege Defendants entrusted 15 them to her. The response also cites cases where state actors actively exposed 16 plaintiffs to danger or prevented them from escaping. In situations like those, 17 government actors’ failure to rescue a plaintiff from danger the government actors 18 have exposed her to can amount to a Due Process violation. See, e.g., Henry A. 19 v. Willden, 678 F.3d 991, 998, 1002 (9th Cir. 2012). But a necessary element of 20 such a claim is that the government actors have by their affirmative action placed 21 the person in danger she would not otherwise have faced. Id. at 1002. The 22 complaint does not allege facts plausibly showing that Defendants took any 23 affirmative action to do this; it alleges nothing more than a failure to act, which is 24 not enough under DeShaney or any cited Ninth Circuit precedent. 25 If Plaintiffs believe they can successfully allege facts showing that 26 Defendants engaged in one or more affirmative act that put Plaintiffs in danger 27 they would not otherwise have faced, they may file an amended complaint by May 28 18, 2020. Because they can file electronically, they should comply with this 1 ||deadline regardless of whether the Clerk’s office is physically accessible on that 2 || date. 3 Because this defect has been pointed out to Plaintiffs, they should not 4 ||assume they will be given another opportunity to remedy it. If Defendants move to 5 ||dismiss on this same basis, and if the defect has not been corrected, the Due 6 Process claims will likely be dismissed with prejudice. 7 8 IT IS SO ORDERED. 9 ||Dated: May 5, 2020 10 / rt 4 Gs Ye 11 Honorable Larry Alan Burns 42 Chief United States District Judge 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28