McDougal v. U.S. Department of Education

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 YUTZ MCDOUGAL, Case No.: 19-CV-1978 JLS (BGS)

12 Plaintiff, ORDER: (1) GRANTING MOTION 13 v. TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS; (2) DISMISSING 14 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, COMPLAINT; AND (3) DENYING et al., 15 PENDING MOTIONS Defendants. 16 (ECF Nos. 2, 15, 17, 19) 17 18 Presently before the Court is Plaintiff Yutz McDougal’s Motion to Proceed In Forma 19 Pauperis (“IFP”) (ECF No. 2). Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, alleges various government 20 agencies have “interfered with [Plaintiff]’s pursuit of property and . . . [have] prevented his 21 ability to seek, acquire and prosper within the private sector.” ECF No. 1 at 16. Plaintiff 22 seeks “discovery and disclosure from [D]efendants” as well as declaratory and injunctive 23 relief. See id. at 18–19. 24 Also before the Court are Plaintiff’s various motions requesting to appear before the 25 Court (ECF No. 15), requesting an assessment of the Court’s capability to render an 26 unbiased opinion (ECF No. 17), and requesting the status of his case (ECF No. 19). The 27 Court addresses these motions and the sufficiency of the Complaint below. 28 /// 1 I. Motion to Proceed IFP 2 All parties instituting any civil action, suit, or proceeding in a district court of the 3 United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 4 $400. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 5 prepay the entire fee only if the party is granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant 6 to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). A 7 federal court may authorize the commencement of an action without the prepayment of 8 fees if the party submits an affidavit, including a statement of assets, showing that the party 9 is unable to pay the required filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). 10 Plaintiff’s application to proceed IFP indicates that his average monthly income 11 during the past year was $300.00, he is currently unemployed, and he has no other assets. 12 ECF No. 2 at 1–2. At the time of filing, Plaintiff had negative $40.00 in his bank account. 13 Id. at 2. Plaintiff indicates that his monthly expenses total $290. Id. Given these facts, the 14 Court concludes Plaintiff is unable to pay the requisite fees and costs. Accordingly, the 15 Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP. 16 II. Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b) 17 Notwithstanding IFP status, the Court must screen every civil action brought 18 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) and dismiss any case it finds “frivolous or malicious,” 19 “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a 20 defendant who is immune from relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also Calhoun v. 21 Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 22 are not limited to prisoner.”); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en 23 banc) (noting that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) “not only permits but requires a district court to 24 dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to state a claim”). 25 A pleading, “containing as it does both factual allegations and legal conclusions, is 26 frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 27 U.S. 319, 325 (1989) (“[The] term ‘frivolous,’ when applied to a complaint, embraces not 28 only the inarguable legal conclusion, but also the fanciful factual allegation.”). A pleading 1 is “factual[ly] frivolous[]” if “the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly 2 incredible, whether or not there are judicially noticeable facts available to contradict them.” 3 Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 25–26 (1992). When determining whether a complaint 4 is frivolous, the court need not accept the allegations as true, but must “pierce the veil of 5 the complaint’s factual allegations,” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327, to determine whether they 6 are “‘fanciful,’ ‘fantastic,’ [or] ‘delusional.’” Denton, 504 U.S. at 33 (quoting Neitzke, 490 7 U.S. at 328). 8 Here, the Court finds Plaintiff’s Complaint “lacks an arguable basis” in both law and 9 fact and is therefore frivolous. Plaintiff contends that multiple government agencies have 10 conspired over the course of his entire life to deprive him of fair and equal education and 11 employment opportunities. See generally ECF No. 1. Among the many allegations, 12 Plaintiff alleges the United States Department of Education enacted a plan to have other 13 students lie to lower Plaintiff’s grades, force professors to deny Plaintiff advancement in 14 sporting and academic endeavors, and have professors and students cause physical and 15 mental harm to Plaintiff. Id. at 7. Once out of school, Plaintiff alleges the Department of 16 Labor, the Department of Health and Human Services, the Department of Justice, and the 17 Department of Defense arranged for Plaintiff to work at various jobs so they could force 18 Plaintiff “to perform the work the government need[ed] performed.” See id. at 7–11. These 19 government agencies also ensured Plaintiff suffered hostile work environments and 20 “general unpleasantness” at each of these jobs. Id. Finally, Plaintiff alleges he “has been 21 forced to endure ‘homelessness’ in California for the past 6 years” because of “either (a) 22 an unsanctioned prison scenario used to punish certain human targets or (b) a training 23 scenario designed by the U.S. departments so named.” Id. at 11. 24 After a review of the allegations in the Complaint, the Court finds the facts as alleged 25 are “wholly incredible” and rise to the level of “fanciful, fantastic, and delusional.” 26 Denton, 504 U.S. at 25–26, 33 (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 328) (internal quotations 27 omitted). Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint as frivolous and 28 without leave to amend. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 n.8 (9th Cir. 2000) (en 1 || banc) (noting that if a claim is classified as frivolous, “there is by definition no merit to the 2 underlying action and so no reason to grant leave to amend.”’). 3 ||TII. Conclusion 4 Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP, 5 || (ECF No. 2). The Court hereby DISMISSES Plaintiff's Complaint as frivolous pursuant 6 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and without leave to amend. Plaintiff's remaining motions are 7 || DENIED AS MOOT (ECF Nos. 15, 17, 19). The Court CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal 8 this Order would also be frivolous and, therefore, would not be taken in good faith 9 || pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 10 ||(1962); Gardner v. Pogue, 558 F.2d 548, 550 (9th Cir. 1977) (indigent appellant 1s 11 || permitted to proceed IFP on appeal only if appeal would not be frivolous). The Clerk of 12 ||Court SHALL CLOSE the file. 13 IT IS SO ORDERED. 14 ||Dated: April 20, 2020 . tt f Le 15 on. Janis L. Sammartino 16 United States District Judge 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28