Awmagan v. Bristol Bay Native Corporation

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 Abucar Nunow ABIKAR, Barkadle Case No.: 18-CV-1700 JLS (AGS) Sheikh Muhamed AWMAGAN, Arab 12 Mursal DEH, Majuma MADENDE, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 13 Osman Musa MOHAMED, Osman Musa MOTION TO STAY MUGANGA, Rukia MUSA, and Fatuma 14 SOMOW, on behalf of themselves and all (ECF No. 25) 15 others similarly situated, 16 Plaintiffs, 17 v. 18 Bristol Bay Native Corporation; Glacier Technical Solutions, LLC; Workforce 19 Resources, LLC; and DOES 1–50, 20 Defendants. 21 22 Presently before the Court is Defendants Bristol Bay Native Corporation; Glacier 23 Technical Solutions, LLC; and Workforce Resources, LLC’s Motion to Stay Proceedings 24 (“Mot.,” ECF No. 25). Also before the Court is Plaintiffs Abucar Nunow Abikar, Barkadle 25 Sheikh Muhamed Awmagan, Arab Mural Deh, Majuma Madende, Osman Musa 26 Mohamed, Osman Musa Muganga, Rukia Musa, and Fatuma Somow’s Opposition to 27 (“Opp’n,” ECF No. 31) and Defendants’ Reply in Support of (“Reply,” ECF No. 33) the 28 / / / 1 Motion. Having carefully considered the Parties’ arguments and the law, the Court 2 GRANTS Defendants’ Motion. 3 BACKGROUND 4 Plaintiffs filed a punitive class action complaint on July 25, 2018, asserting seven 5 causes of action against Defendants. See generally ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”). In the 6 Complaint, Plaintiffs allege Defendants intentionally engaged in a policy and practice of 7 failing to pay wages for all hours worked and overtime hours worked, to provide accurate 8 wage statements, and to pay all wages due upon termination of employment. Id. at ¶ 32. 9 On January 24, 2019, Plaintiffs moved to consolidate this action with a separate, 10 earlier-filed action pending before this Court, Jamil v. Workforce Resources, LLC, No. 18- 11 CV-27 JLS (NLS) (S.D. Cal. filed Jan. 4, 2018) (the “Jamil Action”). See generally ECF 12 No. 13. On January 25, 2019, Defendants moved to dismiss or, alternatively, stay this 13 action pending resolution of the Jamil Action. See generally ECF No. 14. On March 4, 14 2019, the Honorable Gonzalo P. Curiel granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ 15 motion to dismiss, denied as moot Plaintiffs’ motion for consolidation, and transferred the 16 case to this Court under the first-to-file rule. See generally ECF No. 20. 17 Defendants filed the instant Motion on April 23, 2019, renewing their request for a 18 stay of this action pending resolution of the Jamil Action. See generally Mot. On 19 September 26, 2019, Defendants in the Jamil Action filed a Notice of Settlement and Joint 20 Motion to Vacate Pending Dates, requesting that the Court vacate the current scheduling 21 deadlines and set a deadline for preliminary approval of the class action settlement. See 22 generally Jamil Action, ECF No. 45. The Court granted Defendants’ request and vacated 23 all pending dates in the Jamil Action. See generally Jamil Action, ECF No. 46. On 24 February 14, 2020, Defendants in the Jamil Action filed a Notice of Proposed Settlement. 25 See generally Jamil Action, ECF No. 52. 26 LEGAL STANDARD 27 “[T]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court 28 to control the disposition of the cases on its docket with economy of time and effort for 1 itself, for counsel, and for litigants.” Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936). This 2 power to stay proceedings includes the discretion to grant stays “pending resolution of 3 independent proceedings which bear upon the case.” Leyva v. Certified Grocers of Cal., 4 Ltd., 593 F.2d 857, 863 (9th Cir. 1979). Moreover, “[t]his rule applies whether the separate 5 proceedings are judicial, administrative, or arbitral in character, and does not require that 6 the issues in such proceedings are necessarily controlling of the action before the court.” 7 Id. at 863–64 (citations omitted). 8 The inherent power of district courts to grant stays “calls for the exercise of sound 9 discretion,” by which a court must weigh the competing interests of the parties that would 10 be affected by a grant or denial of a stay. CMAX, Inc. v. Hall, 300 F.2d 265, 268 (9th Cir. 11 1962). The Ninth Circuit has identified three competing interests that warrant the closest 12 examination in this analysis: (1) the hardship or inequity upon the non-moving party that 13 would result from granting the stay, (2) the hardship or inequity upon the moving party in 14 being required to go forward after denial of the stay, and (3) the orderly course of justice 15 measured in terms of the simplifying or complicating of issues, proof, and questions of law 16 that could be expected to result from a stay. Id.; see also Lockyer v. Mirant Corp., 398 17 F.3d 1098, 1110 (9th Cir. 2005). 18 The Court must balance the “possible damage [to Plaintiff] which may result from 19 the granting of a stay,” with “the hardship or inequity which [Defendant] may suffer in 20 being required to go forward.” CMAX, 300 F.2d at 268. Additionally, “[t]he party 21 requesting a stay bears the burden of showing that the circumstances justify an exercise of 22 that discretion.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 433–34 (2009) (citing Clinton v. Jones, 23 520 U.S. 681, 708 (1997); Landis, 299 U.S. at 255). If there is “even a fair possibility that 24 the stay for which [Defendant] prays will work damage to someone else,” then Defendant 25 must show “a clear case of hardship or inequity in being required to go forward.” Landis, 26 299 U.S. at 255. 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 ANALYSIS 2 I. Hardship to Plaintiff in Granting a Stay 3 Defendants claim that any “possible damage that may result from the granting of a 4 stay is minimal, particularly because [Plaintiffs] . . . are covered as putative class members 5 in the Jamil action.” Mot. at 10. Plaintiffs counter they will be harmed by a stay because 6 it unnecessarily delays adjudication of their claims for unpaid wages pursuant to the Fair 7 Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and conversion. Opp’n at 7–8. 8 For a court to issue a stay, the parties in the two cases need not be the same and the 9 issues need not be identical. Landis, 299 U.S. at 254. The Court recognizes that the Jamil 10 Action does not contain a FLSA or conversion claim, see Opp’n. at 7–8; nonetheless, the 11 Court believes a stay will not create undue hardship or inequity for the Plaintiff. The Court 12 notes, and the parties do not dispute, that there is substantial overlap between the putative 13 classes in this action and the Jamil Action, that the Defendants in this action and the Jamil 14 Action are identical, and that five of Plaintiffs’ seven causes of action are also asserted in 15 the Jamil Action. Opp’n at 13–14. Given the significant similarities between the two 16 cases, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs, as putative class members of the Jamil Action, 17 have an interest in settlement of the Jamil Action. Consequently, the Court is not persuaded 18 that Plaintiffs will be prejudiced by a limited stay pending the settlement of an action in 19 which Plaintiffs themselves have a significant interest. 20 Nonetheless, the Court recognizes the potential harm to Plaintiffs stemming from 21 delayed adjudication of Plaintiffs’ FLSA and conversion claims. This delay, however, is 22 mitigated in part because the Court will only stay this proceeding until the resolution of the 23 Jamil Action, at which time Plaintiffs may request that the Court lift the stay. As stated in 24 Leyva, “a stay should not be granted unless it appears likely the other proceedings will be 25 concluded within a reasonable time in relation to the urgency of the claims presented to the 26 court.” 593 F.2d at 864. Here, any delay in the adjudication of Plaintiffs’ FLSA and 27 conversion claims will be minimal because the parties to the Jamil Action filed a Notice of 28 Settlement on September 26, 2019, and a Notice of Proposed Settlement on February 14, 1 2020, and the Court will hear the Motion for Settlement in the Jamil Action on April 9, 2 2020.1 A stay will not significantly damage Plaintiffs because it will only be in place for 3 several months and because resolution of the Jamil Action will not bar Plaintiffs from 4 adjudicating their FLSA and conversion claims after the stay is lifted. See In re JPMorgan 5 Chase LPI Hazard Litig., No. C-11-03058 JCS, 2013 WL 3829271, at *3 (N.D. Cal. 6 July 23, 2013). 7 Finally, as noted in Judge Curiel’s March 4, 2019 Order, “Plaintiffs [did] not oppose 8 a stay of the action pending resolution of the Jamil case.” ECF No. 20 at 5. Plaintiffs fail 9 to explain their change of heart. For all these reasons, this factor favors granting a brief 10 stay. 11 II. Hardship to Defendant Absent a Stay 12 Defendants argue that a refusal to stay this action will result in significant hardship 13 and prejudice to Defendants. Mot. at 10–11. Specifically, Defendants assert that allowing 14 two virtually identical putative class actions to proceed will burden the two Defendants 15 who live in Alaska and Texas, because they will have to make a second trip to San Diego 16 for an early neutral evaluation conference for this action. Id. Additionally, Defendants 17 argue they will have to commence separate discovery with respect to similar issues of law 18 and fact. Id. at 11–12. 19 The Court agrees that not granting a stay “would be burdensome for both parties to 20 spend time, energy, and resources on pretrial and discovery issues” when this case may 21 largely be resolved by the good faith settlement efforts in the Jamil Action. See Alvarez v. 22 T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. CIV. 2:10-2373 WBS GGH, 2010 WL 5092971, at *2 (E.D. Cal. 23 Dec. 7, 2010). Given that Plaintiffs have not demonstrated adequate prejudice from a brief 24 stay, Defendants’ burden in further litigating this action is sufficient to establish a 25 26 1 The Court can sua sponte take judicial notice of the docket of the Jamil Action. See, e.g., Headwaters, 27 Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 399 F.3d 1047, 1051 n.3 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that courts may take judicial 28 notice of dockets in related cases because materials from proceedings in other tribunals are appropriate 1 prevailing hardship. In re JPMorgan 2013 WL 3829271 at *5; Lockyer, 398 F.3d at 1112. 2 Consequently, this factor narrowly favors the granting of the requested, limited stay. 3 III. The Orderly Course of Justice 4 The Court must consider “the orderly course of justice measured in terms of the 5 simplifying or complicating of issues, proof, and questions of law which could be expected 6 to result from a stay.” CMAX, 300 F.2d at 268. “[T]he court may order a stay of the action 7 pursuant to its power to control its docket and calendar and to provide for a just 8 determination of the cases pending before it.” Id. Furthermore, “a district court has 9 inherent power to control the disposition of the causes on its docket in a manner which will 10 promote economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants.” Id. 11 Defendants argue that allowing this action to proceed simultaneously with the Jamil 12 Action would “result in an unnecessary waste of the Court’s and the parties’ resources, 13 while a stay would best serve the interests of judicial economy.” Mot. at 2–3. Plaintiffs 14 counter that, “if [D]efendants [we]re truly concerned about waste of their own resources 15 and the [C]ourt’s, Defendants would/should want to resolve . . . [the] FLSA claims at the 16 same time it resolves Jamil’s state law wage and hour claims.” Opp’n. at 9. As such, 17 Plaintiffs assert judicial economy is best served by the Court denying the stay and sua 18 sponte consolidating the two cases. Id. 19 The Court agrees with Defendants that a stay would best serve the interests of 20 judicial economy and, consequently, the Court declines to grant Plaintiffs’ request for 21 consolidation. The Court finds Defendants’ requested stay to be reasonable given the 22 advanced stage of the settlement negotiations in the Jamil Action, resolution of which will 23 significantly streamline the remaining issues in this case, thereby promoting economy of 24 time and effort for the Parties and the Court. Further, a stay will allow Parties to conserve 25 their resources pending resolution of the Jamil Action. See In re JP Morgan at *5 (holding 26 that when a plaintiff does not demonstrate prejudice, a stay avoids unnecessary 27 expenditures of resources). On the other hand, consolidating this action with the Jamil 28 Action, when the two cases are no longer in similar procedural stages, would unnecessarily 1 ||complicate the course of litigation and waste resources for all involved. Therefore, this 2 factor strongly favors a brief stay. 3 CONCLUSION 4 The Court finds that each of the three CMAX factors weighs in favor of granting a 5 ||brief stay of this action pending resolution of the Jamil Action. Further, granting the 6 || requested stay would best promote the interests of securing a just, speedy, and inexpensive 7 determination of the action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS 8 || Defendants’ Motion (ECF No. 25) and STAYS this action in its entirety pending the 9 ||resolution of the Jamil Action. The Court therefore VACATES all pending deadlines in 10 || this action pending resolution of the Jamil Action. The Parties SHALL FILE a joint status 11 |/report within the earlier of fourteen (14) days of the resolution of the Jamil Action or six 12 ||(6) months of the electronic docketing of this Order. 13 IT IS SO ORDERED. 14 15 ||Dated: March 18, 2020 (ee 16 on. Janis L. Sammartino United States District Judge 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28