gno.law

Currier v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, NA

District Court, S.D. California · 3:20-cv-00227 · 2020-03-16 · Unknown

Proceeding
district
Area
civil
Panel
Larry Alan Burns (author)

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt own-v1, 2026-10-13T23:50Z · confidence high

The court denied plaintiff's requests for judicial notice and reconsideration, finding that the submitted documents did not cure the pleading deficiencies in his ADA claims. The court ordered the plaintiff to file an amended complaint by April 6, 2020, and warned that further unsolicited filings would be rejected.

What the court decidedThe model
Denial of requests for judicial notice
“All requests for judicial notice filed in the docket or submitted for filing are DENIED.”
agree with court
The court correctly applied the principle that judicial notice is not a substitute for pleading facts required by Rule 12(b)(6). The documents submitted were largely evidentiary in nature (e.g., medical records, dog health issues) rather than matters of public record or indisputable fact, making them inappropriate for judicial notice. Furthermore, the court noted that even if noticed, the documents did not cure the failure to plead plausible facts regarding ADA disability and service animal status.
Denial of request for reconsideration
“To the extent Currier is asking the Court to reconsider any of its earlier rulings, his requests are DENIED.”
agree with court
The court previously construed a similar motion as a request for reconsideration and denied it because the plaintiff had not been asked to produce evidence. The current order reaffirms that the plaintiff's strategy of submitting exhibits does not address the fundamental pleading defects identified in the prior order. Denial is consistent with the prior ruling and the lack of new, dispositive legal arguments.
Order to file amended complaint by April 6, 2020
“Currier is ORDERED prepare and file his amended complaint as ordered, no later than April 6, 2020.”
agree with court
The court had previously directed the plaintiff to file an amended complaint. The plaintiff's failure to do so, coupled with the filing of irrelevant motions, justified the court's insistence on a firm deadline. The court also noted the plaintiff's ability to file voluminous documents, undermining any claim of inability to pay or lack of time, which supports the denial of further extensions.

The order itself: sound — The order is procedurally sound and legally accurate. It correctly distinguishes between judicial notice and pleading requirements, citing the appropriate Supreme Court precedent (Iqbal) for the plausibility standard and Kirkingburg for the specific ADA disability issue. The court's observation that the plaintiff's filings demonstrate an ability to litigate (contradicting claims of financial burden) is a reasonable factual inference from the docket. The order effectively manages the case by setting a hard deadline and warning against further frivolous filings.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

inconsistent with cited authority

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 RICHARD SCOTT CURRIER Case No.: 20cv227-LAB (JLB)

12 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING REQUESTS 13 v. FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE 14 JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, NA, et al. 15 Defendants. 16 17 Since the Court directed Plaintiff Richard Currier to file an amended 18 complaint, he has submitted four substantial documents asking the Court to take 19 judicial notice. The Court on March 5 construed his first motion as a motion for 20 reconsideration, and denied the request. The order explained that Currier had not 21 been asked to produce evidence, and that “asking the Court to take judicial notice 22 of documents is not a substitute for filing a complaint that meets federal pleading 23 standards.” (Docket no. 12 at 2:9–11.) After that, Currier submitted three more 24 documents asking for judicial notice. 25 Judicial notice is unnecessary for reasons the Court has already explained. 26 Furthermore, most of the documents are not appropriate for judicial notice. 27 The Court has already made clear it does cannot comb through Currier’s 28 exhibits and plead his case for him. But even if the Court were inclined to do this, 1 and could do this, it apparently would not help Currier plead his case, because the 2 exhibits do little to supply missing facts that the Court directed Currier to allege. In 3 fact, they tend to confirm the defects the Court noted in the complaint. These 4 include (among other things), Currier’s failure to plead facts showing he is disabled 5 within the meaning of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the 6 implausibility that his dog either was or appeared to be acting as a service animal 7 within the meaning of the ADA. 8 It may be that Currier is disabled for ADA purposes and that his dog is a 9 service animal for ADA purposes. But he must plead facts in his complaint showing 10 those things. Receiving social security disability benefits does not show that he is 11 disabled for ADA purposes. The fact that he has monocular vision is consistent 12 with his being disabled, but it is not the same as being disabled. See Albertson’s, 13 Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 565–66 (1999) (citation omitted) (“While some 14 impairments may invariably cause a substantial limitation of a major life activity . . . 15 we cannot say that monocularity does.”); 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (defining disability). 16 Later amendments to the ADA do not appear to have undermined the Supreme 17 Court’s holding on this issue. See, e.g., Littlefield v. Nevada, ex rel. Dept. of Pub. 18 Safety, 195 F. Supp. 3d 1147 (D. Nev. 2016) (applying Kirkingburg to hold that 19 plaintiff with monocular vision was not disabled under the ABA). And bearing in 20 mind his dog’s age and health problems as well as the lack of any facts suggesting 21 it was trained to do anything, he has not alleged facts plausibly showing that it was 22 a service animal under the ADA, or that Defendants’ employees would have known 23 this. See 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (definition of service animal). 24 These are just examples of what Currier must plead. To meet federal 25 pleading standards, his entire amended complaint must plead allege enough 26 factual allegations that, if accepted as true, would state a claim for relief that is 27 plausible on its face. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 28 / / / 1 All requests for judicial notice filed in the docket or submitted for filing are 2 |{|DENIED. Any more such requests will be summarily rejected for filing. To the 3 ||}extent Currier is asking the Court to reconsider any of its earlier rulings, his 4 ||requests are DENIED. 5 Currier previously claimed he needed more time to prepare his amended 6 ||complaint. He also claimed that the cost of printing his amended complaint and 7 || delivering it to the Court for filing were much of a burden for him. But after being 8 || directed to file his amended complaint, he filed a notice of appeal; two motions to 9 || proceed in forma pauperis; and six lengthy documents no one asked him for, four 10 ||of which are duplicative. It is obvious he has plenty of time, and enough money to 11 || print voluminous documents and deliver them to the Court. 12 Currier is ORDERED prepare and file his amended complaint as ordered, no 13 |/later than April 6, 2020. Until then, he is ORDERED to stop filing requests for 14 judicial notice. He should not expect that he will be granted any more extensions 15 time to file his amended complaint, or that any requests for reconsideration will 16 ||be entertained or granted. 17 After Currier files his amended complaint (or if the deadline passes without 18 ||his having filed one), Defendant should answer, file a dispositive motion, or 19 || otherwise defend. 20 21 IT IS SO ORDERED. 22 ||Dated: March 16, 2020 23 (A / AG, WY 24 Honorable Larry Alan Burns 25 Chief United States District Judge 26 27 28