O'Brien v. Gularte

District Court, S.D. California · 3:18-cv-00980 · 2020-03-04 · Unknown

Proceeding: district
Area: civil
Panel: Mitchell D. Dembin (author)

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt own-v1, 2026-10-13T23:51Z · confidence high

The court considered a pro se plaintiff's motion for appointment of counsel in a civil rights action. The court denied the motion without prejudice, finding that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate the 'exceptional circumstances' required by statute.

What the court decided	The model
Motion for Appointment of Counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) denied without prejudice. “Accordingly, under the circumstances of this case, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to plead facts sufficient to show the “exceptional circumstances” required for appointment of counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) and therefore DENIES without prejudice Plaintiff's Motion for Appointment of Counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) [Doc. No. 71].”	agree with court The court correctly applied the Ninth Circuit's standard for appointment of counsel in civil cases, which requires a showing of 'exceptional circumstances' based on the likelihood of success and the plaintiff's ability to articulate claims. The court noted that the plaintiff's complaint had already survived initial screening, suggesting a likelihood of success, but concluded that the plaintiff's demonstrated ability to litigate pro se negated the need for appointed counsel. This is a defensible application of the discretionary standard.

What the court decided

The model

Motion for Appointment of Counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) denied without prejudice.

“Accordingly, under the circumstances of this case, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to plead facts sufficient to show the “exceptional circumstances” required for appointment of counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) and therefore DENIES without prejudice Plaintiff's Motion for Appointment of Counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) [Doc. No. 71].”

agree with court
The court correctly applied the Ninth Circuit's standard for appointment of counsel in civil cases, which requires a showing of 'exceptional circumstances' based on the likelihood of success and the plaintiff's ability to articulate claims. The court noted that the plaintiff's complaint had already survived initial screening, suggesting a likelihood of success, but concluded that the plaintiff's demonstrated ability to litigate pro se negated the need for appointed counsel. This is a defensible application of the discretionary standard.

The order itself: sound — The order correctly identifies the relevant legal standard from Ninth Circuit precedent (no right to counsel, discretionary appointment based on exceptional circumstances). It applies the two-part test from Wilborn v. Escalderon, noting the plaintiff's ability to articulate claims and the survival of the complaint through screening. The conclusion that the plaintiff failed to show exceptional circumstances is supported by the recited facts regarding the plaintiff's pro se activity.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 KORY T. O’BRIEN, Case No.: 18-cv-980-BAS-MDD 12 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 13 v. MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL PURSUANT TO 28 14 LISA GULARTE, et al., U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) 15 Defendant. [Doc. No. 71] 16 17 18 Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis (“IFP”) with a 19 seconded amended civil rights Complaint [Doc. No. 40] filed pursuant to 42 20 U.S.C. § 1983, and currently incarcerated at Valley State Prison, has 21 submitted a motion in which he requests that the Court appoint counsel for 22 him pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) [Doc. No. 71]. 23 “[T]here is no absolute right to counsel in civil proceedings.” Hedges v. 24 Resolution Trust Corp. (In re Hedges), 32 F.3d 1360, 1363 (9th Cir. 1994) 25 (citation omitted). Thus, federal courts do not have the authority “to make 26 coercive appointments of counsel.” Mallard v. United States District Court, 27 490 U.S. 296, 310 (1989); see also United States v. $292,888.04 in U.S. 1 || Currency, 54 F.3d 564, 569 (9th Cir. 1995). 2 Districts courts have discretion, however, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 3 1915(e)(1), to “request” that an attorney represent indigent civil litigants 4 ||}upon a showing of exceptional circumstances. See Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d |{1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991); Burns v. County of King, 883 F.2d 819, 823 (9th 6 || Cir. 1989). “A finding of exceptional circumstances requires an evaluation of 7 both the ‘likelihood of success on the merits and the ability of the plaintiff to 8 || articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues 9 ||involved.’ Neither of these issues is dispositive and both must be viewed 10 || together before reaching a decision.” Jd. (quoting Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 11 || F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986)). 12 Here, it is apparent that Plaintiff has a sufficient grasp of his case, the 13 || legal issues involved, and is able to adequately articulate the basis of his 14 |/claims. In fact, Plaintiffs pro se pleading has survived the initial screening 15 || provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). The Court’s docket 16 reflects Plaintiffs active ability to articulate the claims of his case. 17 Accordingly, under the circumstances of this case, the Court finds that 18 || Plaintiff has failed to plead facts sufficient to show the “exceptional 19 |/circumstances” required for appointment of counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 20 || 1915(e)(1) and therefore DENIES without prejudice Plaintiff's Motion for 21 || Appointment of Counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) [Doc. No. 71]. 22 IT IS SO ORDERED. 23 Dated: March 4, 2020 Mitel [> Hon. Mitchell D. Dembin 25 United States Magistrate Judge 26 27