Primacy Engineering, Inc. v. ITE, Inc.
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Gonzalo P. Curiel (author)
Analysis
The parties filed a joint motion to vacate two prior orders regarding attorneys' fees and reconsideration, citing only a settlement and providing no legal authority. The court denied the motion without prejudice, reasoning that parties lack the authority to vacate court orders via settlement and that the motion failed to provide persuasive argument or citation.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Denial of Joint Motion to Vacate Prior Orders“Consequently, in the absence of a persuasive argument explaining how and why the Court should vacate the cited orders following the Parties’ settlement, the Court DENIES the Parties’ request without prejudice.” | agree with court The court correctly identified that the motion failed to meet basic pleading requirements by citing no authority. Furthermore, the court correctly applied the principle that parties cannot by agreement vacate a court's prior orders, particularly when those orders have precedential value. The denial without prejudice is appropriate given the lack of legal argument rather than a substantive rejection of the underlying facts. |
The order itself: sound — The order is procedurally sound. It correctly notes the failure of the parties to provide legal authority for their request. It accurately cites binding Ninth Circuit precedent (Bates) and Supreme Court precedent (U.S. Bancorp) supporting the proposition that parties cannot unilaterally vacate court orders through settlement agreements. The reasoning directly addresses the deficiencies in the motion (lack of authority and justification) and applies the correct legal standard regarding the finality and public interest nature of judicial orders.
Opinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 PRIMACY ENGINEERING, INC., a Case No.: 3:18-cv-01781-GPC-MDD New Jersey Corporation, 12 ORDER DENYING JOINT MOTION Plaintiff, 13 TO VACATE PRIOR ORDERS. 14 v. (ECF No. 63.) 15 ITE, INC., a Virginia Corporation; ISPA TECHNOLOGY, LLC, a Virginia 16 Limited Liability Company; TED 17 RAITCH, an individual; CHRISTIAN S. BROWN, an individual; and DOES 1-100, 18 Defendants. 19 20 21 On January 4, 2019, the Court granted in part and deferred in part Defendants’ 22 motion for attorneys’ fees and denied Defendants’ motion to amend the Court’s prior 23 orders and judgment. (ECF No. 45.) Then, on May 9, 2019, the Court denied Primacy’s 24 motion for reconsideration and granted Defendants’ motion for attorney’s fees. (ECF No. 25 58.) The Parties now move jointly to vacate these Orders.1 (ECF No. 63.) 26 27 1 The Parties’ motion does not offer any case or authority for the Court to vacate 2 prior orders, and provides no justification for vacating the subject orders other than a 3 cursory reference to a settlement. (Id. at 2.) Cf. True v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 520 F. 4 Supp. 2d 1175, 1182 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (denying defendant’s 12(b)(6) motion where 5 defendant “cite[d] not a single case in support of its” argument); Fed. Ins. Co. v. Cty. of 6 Westchester, 921 F. Supp. 1136, 1139 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“the adversary system, it is 7 counsel’s responsibility to explain why [its arguments] have legal merit; the Court does 8 not serve as counsel’s law clerk”). 9 Moreover, a number of cases have denied motions to vacate an order after a 10 settlement. See, e.g., POLAR-Mohr Maschinenvertriebsgesellschaft GmbH, Co. KG v. 11 Zurich Am. Ins. Co., No. 17-CV-01804-WHO, 2018 WL 8344296, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 12 11, 2018) (“The parties also stipulated to vacate the Order Regarding Cross-Motions for 13 Summary Judgment, Dkt. No. 60. The parties lack the authority to agree to vacate court 14 orders, it is not my practice to vacate orders as part of a settlement, and I will not vacate 15 the one in question.”); Reynolds v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. C-10-4893-SI, 2012 WL 16 4753499, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2012) (declining to vacate an order on summary 17 judgment as part of a global settlement). And, at a minimum, it appears district courts 18 “are not obliged to vacate a prior order at the behest of the parties in order to facilitate 19 settlement,” see Bates v. Union Oil Co., 944 F.2d 647, 650 (9th Cir. 1991), since 20 “[j]udicial precedents are presumptively correct and valuable to the legal community as a 21 whole.” See U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 26 (1994). 22 “They are not merely the property of private litigants and should stand unless a court 23 concludes that the public interest would be served by a vacatur.” Id. 24 25 however, is a motion and not an order. (See ECF No. 48 (captioned as, “PLAINTIFF PRIMACY 26 ENGINEERING, INC.’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES”)). Based on the content of the Parties’ motion, 27 1 Consequently, in the absence of a persuasive argument explaining how and why 2 ||the Court should vacate the cited orders following the Parties’ settlement, the Court 3 || DENIES the Parties’ request without prejudice. 4 IT IS SO ORDERED. 5 Dated: February 19, 2020 6 Hon. athe Coke 7 United States District Judge 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28