gno.law

Emrit v. Horus Music Video Distribution

District Court, S.D. California · 3:20-cv-00060 · 2020-02-03 · Unknown

Proceeding
district
Area
civil
Panel
Dana M. Sabraw (author)

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt own-v1, 2026-10-13T23:55Z · confidence high

The court reviewed a pro se plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis and his complaint alleging breach of contract and tortious interference arising from the removal of his music videos from TIDAL. The court granted the motion to proceed IFP and dismissed the complaint without prejudice for failure to state a claim.

What the court decidedThe model
Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis granted
“Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).”
agree with court
The order recites that the plaintiff's affidavit of assets is sufficient to show an inability to pay fees, which satisfies the statutory requirement for IFP status under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).
Complaint dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim
“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP is GRANTED and the Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to state a claim.”
agree with court
The court applied the standard from Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), finding the complaint lacked a 'short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.' The court noted that the basis for the claims was unclear and consisted of general facts and conclusory allegations. Dismissing without prejudice is the standard remedy for a pro se complaint that fails to state a claim, allowing the plaintiff to amend.
Request for appointment of counsel denied
“In light of this ruling, Plaintiff’s request for appointment of counsel is denied.”
agree with court
The denial is a consequence of the dismissal of the complaint. Since the case is dismissed, there is no pending matter for which counsel would be appointed.

The order itself: sound — The order correctly identifies the statutory mandate for sua sponte screening of IFP complaints under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). It correctly applies the pleading standard of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) to determine that the complaint failed to state a claim because the basis for the claims was unclear and conclusory. The dismissal without prejudice is the appropriate procedural outcome for a pro se plaintiff who has not yet had the opportunity to amend. The reliance on Ninth Circuit precedent (Lopez, Calhoun, Barren) is accurate and supports the court's authority and duty to dismiss.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 RONALD SATISH EMRIT, Case No.: 20cv0060 DMS (RBB)

12 Plaintiff, ORDER (1) GRANTING 13 v. PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 14 HORUS MUSIC VIDEO AND (2) DISMISSING COMPLAINT DISTRIBUTION, et al., 15 WITHOUT PREJUDICE FOR Defendants. FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM 16 UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE 17 GRANTED PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) 18 19 20 Plaintiff, a non-prisoner proceeding pro se, has submitted a Complaint along with a 21 request to proceed In Forma Pauperis. 22 Motion to Proceed IFP 23 All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 24 United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 25 $400. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 26 prepay the entire fee only if the plaintiff is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 27 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). This Court 28 finds Plaintiff’s affidavit of assets is sufficient to show he is unable to pay the fees or post 1 securities required to maintain this action. See Civil Local Rule 3.2(d). Accordingly, the 2 Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). 3 Sua Sponte Screening per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) 4 Notwithstanding payment of any filing fee or portion thereof, a complaint filed by 5 any person proceeding IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) is subject to a mandatory and 6 sua sponte review and dismissal by the court to the extent it is frivolous, malicious, fails to 7 state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant 8 immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 9 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to 10 prisoners.”); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Prior to 11 its amendment by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the former 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) 12 permitted sua sponte dismissal of only frivolous and malicious claims. Id. at 1130. The 13 newly enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), however, mandates that the court reviewing a 14 complaint filed pursuant to the IFP provisions of section 1915 make and rule on its own 15 motion to dismiss before directing that the complaint be served by the U.S. Marshal 16 pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2). Lopez, 203 F.3d 1127 (“[S]ection 1915(e) not only 17 permits, but requires a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to 18 state a claim.”); see also Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting 19 the “the language of § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil 20 Procedure 12(b)(6)”). 21 Here, Plaintiff alleges he communicated to an employee of Defendant Horus Music 22 Video Distribution that one of its recording artists “contributed copyright infringement 23 on . . . [P]laintiff’s song ‘Dilemma[.]’ ” (Compl. at ¶¶ 15–16). Plaintiff alleges Defendant 24 Horus Music Video Distribution then removed four of Plaintiff’s music videos from 25 Defendant TIDAL’s website. (Id. at 16). Plaintiff alleges he had previously paid 26 Defendant Horus Music Video Distribution “to have four music videos distributed to Jay- 27 Z’s website TIDAL.” (Id. at 17). Based on these alleged facts, Plaintiff filed suit against 28 Defendants for (1) breach of contract, (2) tortious interference with contract, and (3) 1 tortious interference with business relations. Aside from general facts and conclusory 2 || allegations, however, the basis for Plaintiff's claims is unclear. Absent a “short and plain 3 || statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), 4 || Plaintiff’s complaint is subject to sua sponte dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) □□□□□ 5 || Conclusion and Order 6 For these reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed 7 || IFP is GRANTED and the Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to state 8 claim.! 9 IT IS SO ORDERED. 10 11 ||Dated: February 3, 2020 12 3 ins ym. 44) Hon. Dana M. Sabraw 14 United States District Judge 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 0 0 0—CO 9g ||' In light of this ruling, Plaintiffs request for appointment of counsel is denied.