gno.law

Arellano, Jr. v. San Diego, County of

District Court, S.D. California · 3:14-cv-02404 · 2020-01-28 · Unknown

Proceeding
district
Area
civil
Panel
Karen S. Crawford (author)

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt own-v1, 2026-10-13T23:55Z · confidence high

The court considered plaintiff Raul Arellano, Jr.'s ninth motion for appointment of counsel, in which he requested an attorney to help identify and locate the individuals who arrested him. The court denied the motion, finding that the plaintiff's inability to locate officers does not constitute exceptional circumstances, that he has demonstrated the ability to litigate pro se, and that he has not shown a likelihood of success on the merits.

What the court decidedThe model
Denial of Plaintiff's Ninth Motion for Appointment of Counsel
“Consequently, plaintiff’ s Motion for Appointment of Counsel is DENIED.”
agree with court
The court correctly applied the Ninth Circuit standard for appointment of counsel in civil cases, requiring a showing of 'exceptional circumstances' based on the likelihood of success and the plaintiff's ability to articulate claims. The court's finding that the plaintiff's filings are organized and clear supports the conclusion that he can litigate pro se. The finding that the case remaining open for five years does not indicate a likelihood of success is a reasonable exercise of discretion, as the survival of a case past the motion to dismiss stage does not guarantee success on the merits. The court properly noted that the difficulty of locating officers is a common hardship for incarcerated litigants and not an exceptional circumstance.

The order itself: sound — The order is sound. It correctly identifies the applicable legal standard from binding Ninth Circuit precedent. It applies the standard to the specific facts of the case, noting the plaintiff's demonstrated ability to file organized and clear briefs and his failure to show a likelihood of success on the merits. The reasoning directly addresses the plaintiff's specific argument (need for help locating officers) and correctly categorizes it as a common hardship rather than an exceptional circumstance.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

record incomplete

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 RAUL ARELLANO, JR., Case No.: 14CV2404-JLS(KSC)

12 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 13 v. NINTH MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 14 SAN DIEGO, COUNTY OF, et al., [DOC. NO. 161] 15 Defendants. 16 17 Presently before the Court is a Motion for Appointment of Counsel filed by plaintiff 18 Raul Arellano, Jr., in which he requests counsel be appointed on his behalf to identify and 19 locate the individuals who arrested him so that he can determine whether these individuals 20 work for either defendant. [Doc. No. 161.] This is plaintiff’s ninth Motion for Appointment 21 of Counsel. [See Doc. Nos. 7, 18, 119, 125, 131, 134, 139 & 147.] At least three of his prior 22 requests for counsel were made on the basis he wants assistance locating these individuals. 23 [See e.g. Doc. Nos. 134, p. 2, 139, p. 3 and 147, pp. 1-2.] 24 As explained in the Court’s prior orders, “[t]here is no absolute right to counsel in 25 civil proceedings.” Hedges v. Resolution Trust Corp., 32 F.3d 1360, 1363 (9th Cir. 1994). 26 District Courts have discretion, however, pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 1915(c)(1) to “request” 27 that an attorney represent indigent civil litigants upon a showing of exceptional 28 circumstances. See Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991); Burns v. 1 || County of King, 883 F.2d 819, 823 (9th Cir. 1989). “A finding of exceptional 2 || circumstances requires an evaluation of both the ‘likelihood of success on the merits and 3 || the ability of the plaintiff to articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the 4 ||legal issues involved.’ Neither of these issues is dispositive and both must be viewed 5 ||together before making a decision.” Terrell, 935 F.2d at 1017 (quoting Wilborn v. 6 || Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986)). 7 First, plaintiff's contention that a lawyer should be appointed on his behalf because 8 ||he has been unable to identify and locate the arresting officers on his own does not 9 || constitute an exceptional circumstance. The hardships associated with litigating □□□□□□□□□□ 10 || case are shared by all incarcerated litigants lacking legal expertise. 11 Second, there is no basis to find plaintiff lacks the ability to articulate and litigate 12 claims. He has filed numerous documents with the Court, including briefs in opposition 13 defendants’ Motions to Dismiss the First and Second Amended Complaints and 14 defendants’ Summary Judgment Motions, and eight previous motions requesting counsel 15 || be appointed on his behalf. [See e.g. Doc. Nos. 7, 18, 53, 81 119, 125, 131, 134, 139, 147, 16 |}157 and 168.] His filings are organized and present his arguments with reasonable 17 || efficiency and clarity. 18 Furthermore, plaintiff has not shown the likelihood of success on the merits, nor is 19 likelihood of success evident from the face of the Second Amended Complaint. [Doc. 20 62]. While plaintiff has had some measure of success in opposing the Motions to 21 || Dismiss, the fact that his case remains open five years after it was initiated does not indicate 22 || plaintiff is likely to succeed on the claims that remain in the case. Consequently, plaintiff’ s 23 || Motion for Appointment of Counsel is DENIED. 24 IT IS SO ORDERED. 25 Dated: January 27, 2020 Mle. i. ™) 26 Wi a See Hori. Karen 8S. Crawford United States Magistrate Judge