gno.law

(PC) Bradford v. Khamooshian

District Court, S.D. California · 3:17-cv-02053 · 2020-01-31 · Unknown

Proceeding
district
Area
civil
On appeal
Raymond Bradford v. M. Voong (2021-09-20) — affirmed — the Ninth Circuit's later ruling on this docket
Panel
Allison H. Goddard (author)

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt own-v1, 2026-10-13T23:55Z · confidence high

The court considered a pro se prisoner's motion to voluntarily dismiss the sole remaining defendant and that defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint. The court recommended granting the voluntary dismissal without prejudice and denying the defendant's motion as moot.

What the court decidedThe model
Grant Plaintiff's Motion to Voluntarily Dismiss Defendant Voong without prejudice
“Therefore, the Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s motion to voluntarily dismiss Defendant Voong be GRANTED without prejudice.”
agree with court
The order correctly applies Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(i), which grants a plaintiff an absolute right to dismiss an action or a claim against a defendant without a court order (via notice) before the opposing party serves an answer or a motion for summary judgment. The record indicates Defendant Voong filed a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer, which does not trigger the requirement for court approval under Rule 41(a)(2). Therefore, the dismissal is procedurally proper and the 'without prejudice' designation is the default consequence of a Rule 41(a)(1) dismissal.
Deny Defendant Voong's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint as moot
“Consequently, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendant Voong’s motion to dismiss be DENIED AS MOOT without prejudice.”
agree with court
Because the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the claims against the defendant, the defendant's motion to dismiss those same claims is rendered moot. Denying the motion as moot is the standard procedural response to a pending motion that becomes irrelevant due to the dismissal of the underlying claims.

The order itself: sound — The order correctly identifies the procedural posture and applies the relevant rule (Rule 41(a)(1)) to the facts (no answer or summary judgment motion served). It correctly cites Ninth Circuit authority supporting the absolute right to dismiss and the ability to dismiss specific defendants. The decision to deny the opposing motion as moot is procedurally sound. The order is a Report and Recommendation, which is standard for magistrate judges in this context.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 RAYMOND ALFORD BRADFORD, Case No.: 3:17-cv-2053-BAS-AHG 12 Plaintiff, REPORT AND 13 v. RECOMMENDATION FOR ORDER:

14 K. KHAMOOSHIAN, et al., (1) GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 15 Defendants. MOTION TO VOLUNTARILY DISMISS DEFENDANT VOONG, and 16 17 (2) DENYING AS MOOT DEFENDANT VOONG’S MOTION 18 TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S THIRD 19 AMENDED COMPLAINT 20 [ECF Nos. 164, 171] 21 22 Before the Court are two motions: (1) Plaintiff Raymond Alford Bradford’s 23 (“Plaintiff”) Motion to Voluntarily Dismiss Defendant M. Voong (“Defendant Voong”) 24 Without Prejudice and (2) Defendant Voong’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Third 25 Amended Complaint. ECF Nos. 164, 171. For the reasons set forth below, the Court 26 RECOMMENDS that the District Judge GRANT Plaintiff’s motion and consequently 27 DENY AS MOOT Defendant Voong’s motion. 28 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this civil rights 3 action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming that multiple defendants violated several of his 4 constitutional rights while he was incarcerated at the Richard J. Donovan Correctional 5 Facility in San Diego, California. ECF No. 160. In his third amended complaint, Plaintiff 6 alleged that Defendants Zhang, Khamooshian, Freund, Merritt, and Voong violated his 7 Eighth Amendment Rights and denied him access to courts. Id. at 3. After sua sponte 8 screening Plaintiff’s third amended complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the 9 Court dismissed Defendants Zhang, Khamooshian, Freund, and Merritt with prejudice, and 10 permitted Plaintiff’s case to proceed against Defendant Voong. ECF No. 162 at 6. 11 Defendant Voong subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state 12 a claim. ECF No. 164. Though Plaintiff initially opposed Defendant Voong’s motion to 13 dismiss (see ECF No. 168), he thereafter filed a motion to voluntarily dismiss Defendant 14 Voong, so that he could seek appellate review of the Court’s earlier order dismissing the 15 other defendants. ECF No. 171. 16 II. PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO VOLUNTARILY DISMISS DEFENDANT VOONG WITHOUT PREJUDICE 17 A plaintiff is entitled to voluntary dismissal of a defendant under Federal Rule of 18 19 Civil Procedure 41(a) if he seeks dismissal “before the opposing party serves either an 20 answer or a motion for summary judgment.” FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i). The resulting 21 dismissal is without prejudice. FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1)(B). Here, Defendant Voong has not answered the complaint nor filed a motion for 22 summary judgment. See ECF No. 164 (filing a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer). 23 Accordingly, under Rule 41(a)(1), Plaintiff has “an absolute right to voluntarily dismiss his 24 action.” Wilson v. City of San Jose, 111 F.3d 688, 692 (9th Cir. 1997); see also Romoland 25 Sch. Dist. v. Inland Empire Energy Ctr., LLC, 548 F.3d 738, 748 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating 26 that Rule 41 “allows plaintiffs voluntarily to dismiss some or all of their claims against 27 28 some or all defendants”). The present motion was not required to effectuate the dismissal; 1 mere notice of dismissal would have sufficed. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1)(A) (requiring a 2 notice or stipulation, not a motion); Jessup v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC, No. 16-cv-503- 3 BLW, 2017 WL 1943951, at *1 (D. Idaho May 10, 2017) (granting plaintiff’s motion to 4 voluntarily dismiss, while noting that plaintiff’s motion was unnecessary because plaintiff 5 had an absolute right to voluntarily dismiss the action via “mere notice” because defendant 6 had filed a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer). 7 Therefore, the Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s motion to voluntarily dismiss 8 Defendant Voong be GRANTED without prejudice. See Jessup, 2017 WL 1943951, at *1. 9 III. DEFENDANT VOONG’S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT 10 11 Defendant Voong moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s third amended complaint, contending that Plaintiff does not adequately state claims against Defendant Voong. ECF No. 164 at 1. 12 More specifically, Defendant Voong argues that the complaint does not contain any 13 allegations of personal liability and likewise fails to sufficiently plead supervisory liability, 14 15 and also argues that “merely being a reviewer of an inmate grievance does not give raise to a § 1983 claim.” Id. at 3–5. 16 Though Plaintiff initially opposed the motion, as a result of Plaintiff’s subsequent 17 request that Defendant Voong be dismissed, the Court will not address the merits of 18 19 Defendant Voong’s motion. Consequently, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendant Voong’s motion to dismiss be DENIED AS MOOT without prejudice. 20 IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 21 This report and recommendation is submitted to the United States District Judge 22 assigned to this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). For the reasons discussed above, 23 IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the District Judge issue an Order: 24 (1) adopting this Report and Recommendation; 25 (2) GRANTING Plaintiff’s Motion to Voluntarily Dismiss Defendant Voong 26 without prejudice (ECF No. 171); and 27 28 1 (3) DENYING AS MOOT without prejudice Defendant Voong’s Motion to 2 Dismiss Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint (ECF No. 164). 3 IT IS ORDERED that no later than February 14, 2020, any party to this action 4 ||may file written objections and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be 5 ||captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” The parties are advised that 6 ||failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those 7 || objections on appeal of the Court’s Order. See Turner vy. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th 8 || Cir. 1998); Martinez v. YIst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1991). 9 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Reply to the Objections shall be filed with 10 || the Court and served on all parties no later than February 28, 2020. 11 12 IT IS SO ORDERED. 13 Dated: January 31, 2020 14 _Abiomt. Xl Honorable Allison H. Goddard 15 United States Magistrate Judge 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28