Stark v. Fusion Consulting Services 2, LLC
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Cathy Ann Bencivengo (author)
Analysis
A non-party individual filed a request for the appointment of counsel for the corporate defendant in a civil case. The court denied the request, holding that it lacks authority to appoint counsel for a corporation in a civil matter.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Request for appointment of counsel for Defendant Fusion Consulting Services #2, LLC is denied.“Accordingly, the request for appointment of counsel is DENIED.” | agree with court The court correctly applied the principle that there is no right to appointed counsel in civil cases and specifically that federal courts lack the authority to appoint counsel for corporate entities in civil litigation. The order correctly identifies that the requester is not a party and that the entity is a corporation. |
The order itself: sound — The order is procedurally correct and relies on binding Ninth Circuit precedent (Hedges) and persuasive district court authority to deny the request. The footnote provides appropriate warnings regarding the consequences of failure to appear through counsel, citing relevant case law for the standards of default judgment. The reasoning is concise and directly addresses the legal limitations on the court's power.
Opinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 COLLETTE STARK, Case No.: 19-CV-1897-CAB-WVG 12 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING REQUEST FOR 13 v. APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 14 FUSION CONSULTING SERVICES #2, LLC, [Doc. No. 9] 15 Defendant. 16 17 18 Martin S. Heinman, a non-lawyer who represents that he is somehow affiliated with 19 Defendant Fusion Consulting Services #2, LLC (“Fusion”), has filed a request for 20 appointment of counsel in this case. Because Heinman himself is not a party to this case, 21 he does not need counsel personally. As for Fusion, “there is no absolute right to counsel 22 in civil proceedings,” Hedges v. Resolution Tr. Corp., 32 F.3d 1360, 1363 (9th Cir. 1994), 23 and regardless, “there is no authority allowing this court to appoint counsel for a 24 corporation in a civil matter.” TI Beverage Grp. Ltd. v. S.C. Cramele Recas SA, No. LA 25 CV 06-07793-VBF, 2014 WL 1795042, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2014) (citations omitted); 26 see also Int’l Underwater Dive & Expls. LLC v. Boart Longyear Co., No. C16-1831-RAJ, 27 2017 WL 951073, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 10, 2017) (“The Court . . . lacks authority to 28 1 || appoint counsel to represent a corporation.”). Accordingly, the request for appointment of 2 counsel is DENIED.' 3 It is SO ORDERED. 4 ||Dated: November 4, 2019 <6 5 . Hon. Cathy Ann Bencivengo 6 United States District Judge 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 ||' Fusion may only appear in this case through counsel. Failure to appear through counsel may result in a default judgment being entered against Fusion (but not against Heinman individually because he is not a 23 |! named party). However, to obtain a default judgment against Fusion, the complaint must in fact state a claim against Fusion, and Plaintiff must prove that she suffered damages as a result of any claims adequately pled in the complaint. See DIRECTV, Inc. v. Hoa Huynh, 503 F.3d 847, 854 (9th Cir. 2007) 25 || (affirming district court’s refusal to enter default judgment on claims not adequately pled in the complaint); Geddes v. United Fin. Grp., 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977) (“The general rule of law is 26 || that upon default the factual allegations of the complaint, except those relating to the amount of damages, will be taken as true.”); Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Castworld Prod., Inc., 219 F.R.D. 494, 498 (C.D. Cal. 27 2003) (“Plaintiff is required to prove all damages sought in the complaint.”); see also Eitel v. McCool, 28 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986) (listing the factors to be considered on a motion for default judgment). ty