Hood v. Director of the California Department of Corrections
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Cathy Ann Bencivengo (author)
Analysis
Petitioner Daniel Roger Hood filed a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1), (2), and (3) in a habeas corpus case. The court denied the motion as untimely because it was filed more than one year after the entry of judgment.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Motion Pursuant to Rule 60(b) [Doc. No. 71] is DENIED.“For the reason set forth above, the motion pursuant to Rule 60(b) is DENIED.” | agree with court The court correctly applied the one-year time limit for Rule 60(b)(1) and (3) motions. The judgment was entered on February 13, 2017, and the motion was filed on September 26, 2019, which is approximately 31 months later. Since the motion was not filed within one year of the judgment, it is procedurally barred under Rule 60(c) for the grounds of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect, and fraud. While the motion also cited Rule 60(b)(2) (newly discovered evidence), which is subject to a 'reasonable time' standard rather than a strict one-year limit, the court's reliance on the untimeliness of the (1) and (3) grounds is sufficient to deny the motion as a whole, particularly given the significant delay. The decision follows from the law and the recited dates. |
The order itself: sound — The order is sound. It correctly identifies the relevant legal standard (Rule 60(b) and (c)), cites the appropriate Ninth Circuit authority regarding the high bar for Rule 60 relief, and applies the specific time limits of Rule 60(c) to the dates in the record. The conclusion that the motion is untimely for the cited grounds (1) and (3) is legally correct based on the dates provided.
Opinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 DANIEL ROGER HOOD, 15cv1564-CAB-DHB 11 Petitioner, ORDER DENYING MOTION 12 v. PURSUANT TO RULE 60(b) [Doc. No. 71] 13 DIRECTOR OF THE CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 14 AND REHABILITATION, 15 Respondent. 16 17 On September 26, 2019, Petitioner Daniel Roger Hood filed a Motion Pursuant to 18 Rule 60(b). [Doc. No. 71.] In the motion, Petitioner states that he is seeking relief 19 pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1)(2)(3). [Doc. No. 71 at 1.] 20 A. Legal Standard. 21 Rule 60 provides for extraordinary relief and may be invoked only upon a showing 22 of “exceptional circumstances.” Engleson v. Burlington N.R. Co., 972 F.2d 1038, 1044 23 (9th Cir. 1994). The Rule identifies six permissible grounds for relief from a final 24 judgment, order, or proceeding, namely: “(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or 25 excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could 26 not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud by 27 the adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied; (6) and 28 1 || other reason justifying relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Further, the Rule provides that a 2 || motion brought under it “must be made within a reasonable time — and for reasons (1), 3 and (3) no more than a year after the entry of judgment or order of the date of the 4 || proceeding.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c). 5 B. Discussion. 6 Here, the petition was denied, and judgment was entered accordingly, on February 7 || 13, 2017. [Doc. Nos. 52 and 53.] This motion -- seeking relief under Rule 60(b)(1), (2), 8 || and (3) — was filed two and a half years later. Therefore, pursuant to Rule 60(c), the 9 || motion is untimely. 10 C. Conclusion. 11 For the reason set forth above, the motion pursuant to Rule 60(b) is DENIED. 12 IT IS SO ORDERED. 13 ||Dated: October 4, 2019 € □ 14 Hon. Cathy Ann Bencivengo 15 United States District Judge 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28