gno.law

Vaughn v. Parker

District Court, S.D. California · 3:18-cv-02098 · 2019-09-27 · Unknown

Proceeding
district
Area
civil
Panel
Mitchell D. Dembin (author)

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt own-v1, 2026-10-14T00:06Z · confidence high

Defendant moved for a sixty-day continuance of the expert discovery cut-off date to allow for expert depositions, which Plaintiff did not oppose. The Court denied the motion, finding that Defendant failed to demonstrate good cause or diligence because no deposition notices had been served despite the deadline being set in April 2019.

What the court decidedThe model
Motion to modify scheduling order denied
“Accordingly, Defendant’s motion is DENIED.”
agree with court
The court correctly applied the 'good cause' standard from Rule 16(b)(4) and the Ninth Circuit precedent in Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc. The record shows the deadline was set months prior and the defendant failed to serve deposition notices, indicating a lack of diligence. The court's rejection of the pending summary judgment motion as 'good cause' is consistent with the requirement that the party seeking the modification must show why the deadline was missed, not just why the discovery is needed now.

The order itself: sound — The order is procedurally sound and applies the correct legal standard. It cites the controlling Ninth Circuit authority for the 'good cause' test and applies it logically to the facts: the defendant had months to prepare but failed to serve notices, demonstrating a lack of diligence. The reasoning is concise but sufficient for a procedural motion.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 SHARIFFE VAUGHN, Case No.: 18cv2098-JAH-MDD 12 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING EX PARTE 13 v. APPLICATION TO MODIFY SCHEDULING ORDER 14 A. PARKER, Correctional Officer, 15 Defendant. [ECF No. 58] 16 17 On September 26, 2019, Defendant A. Parker moved for a sixty-day 18 continuance of the September 30, 2019 expert discovery cut-off date for the 19 limited purpose of deposing each party’s experts in this matter. (ECF No. 20 58). Plaintiff does not oppose the motion. (See Docket). 21 A scheduling order “may be modified only for good cause and with the 22 judge’s consent.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). The “good cause” standard 23 “primarily considers the diligence of the party seeking amendment.” Johnson 24 v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 1992). 25 Defendant contends good cause exists to extend the deadline because 26 the parties could “evaluate the need and/or scope of costly expert depositions, 1 motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 58 at 2). Defendant contends he 9 ||has been diligent because the instant motion was filed “before the September 3 2019 expert cut-off.” Ud. at 2). Defendant concedes, however, that to 4 ||date, no deposition notices have been served. (/d.). 5 The Court finds that Defendant has not demonstrated good cause or 6 || diligence. The parties have known since the Court’s April 26, 2019 Order 7 ||that the pretrial motions deadline and expert discovery completion date are 8 || September 30, 2019. (ECF No. 19). No good cause is provided for failing to 9 || notice the depositions of the parties’ experts in advance of the expert 10 discovery completion date. (See ECF No. 58). The fact that a motion for 11 ||Summary judgment is pending is not good cause. Accordingly, Defendant’s 12 |}motion is DENIED. 13 IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: September 27, 2019 Mitel by. [= Hon. Mitchell D. Dembin 16 United States Magistrate Judge 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27