Ewing v. Aliera Healthcare

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 ANTON EWING, Case No.: 19cv845-CAB-LL 11 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING JOINT EX 12 v. PARTE APPLICATION TO STRIKE ECF NO. 31 FROM DOCKET 13 ALIERA HEALTHCARE, 14 Defendant. [ECF No. 39] 15 On September 12, 2019, the parties filed a joint ex parte application requesting that 16 the Court strike from the docket the Court’s August 12, 2019 order (hereinafter “Order”), 17 listed as ECF No. 31. ECF No. 39. In support, the parties state that “as the Order simply 18 governs how the parties and/or counsel for the parties must communicate during the course 19 of this litigation, and the parties have agreed to resolve their disputes and end this litigation, 20 the parties believe the Order is now moot and should be stricken.” Id. at 2. The parties 21 further argue that the Order is immaterial and should be stricken, citing the Court’s inherent 22 power and Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. 23 Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a “court may strike 24 from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or 25 scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). Additionally, trial courts have inherent power 26 “governed not by rule or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage 27 their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.” 28 Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991). Thus, a court may exercise its inherent 1 || power to strike filings other than pleadings that are redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or 2 ||scandalous. See Avendano v. Sec. Consultants Grp., No. 3:13-CV-00168-HDM, 2014 3 || WL 6611384, at *2 (D. Nev. Nov. 19, 2014). 4 Here, the Court finds no appropriate basis to strike the Order at issue. The Order was 5 Court’s determination of an ex parte application filed by Defendant and a subsequent 6 response in opposition filed by Plaintiff. ECF Nos. 18, 21, 31. At the time of its issuance, 7 |{the Order was not immaterial, but was in fact necessary to resolve issues involving 8 ||communications that the parties were unable to resolve on their own. See ECF No. 31. The 9 || Court is not persuaded by the parties’ argument that because they have agreed to settle, the 10 || Order is now moot. ECF No. 39 at 2. If the Court followed this line of thinking, every order 11 |/in every settled case would be able to be stricken for being moot. Such reasoning would go 12 || against this Circuit’s strong presumption in favor of access to court records because entire 13 |}documents, including properly issued orders, would be permanently removed from the 14 || docket. See Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th Cir. 2003). 15 the extent that the parties are concerned about the substance of the Order, the Court 16 |/notes that the Order governs only these parties in this litigation until this matter is 17 || terminated. See Mayweathers v. Terhune, 136 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1153-54 (E.D. Cal. 2001) 18 ||(“The law of the case doctrine requires that when a court decides on a rule, it should 19 || ordinarily follow that rule during the pendency of the matter.””). Because the Court finds 20 ||that the Order was properly issued, and is not immaterial, redundant, impertinent or 21 ||scandalous, the joint ex parte application is DENIED. See Avendano v. Sec. Consultants 22 ||Grp., 2014 WL 6611384, at *2. 23 IT IS SO ORDERED. 24 ||Dated: September 16, 2019 KO 25 QF 26 Honorable Linda Lopez 4 United States Magistrate Judge 28