Williams v. Rucker
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Bernard G. Skomal (author)
Analysis
The court considered a pro se plaintiff's motion for appointment of counsel in a civil rights action. The court denied the motion, finding that the plaintiff had not demonstrated the 'exceptional circumstances' required under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1).
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Motion for Appointment of Counsel denied“Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion for appointment of counsel is DENIED.” | agree with court The court correctly applied the Ninth Circuit's two-part test for appointing counsel in civil cases: (1) likelihood of success on the merits, and (2) ability to articulate claims pro se given complexity. The court found the plaintiff's complaint survived initial screening, indicating an ability to articulate claims, and noted the case was not particularly complex. It also noted that the likelihood of success was not yet clear as the case had not reached summary judgment. This application of the law to the facts recited in the order is consistent with Ninth Circuit precedent. |
The order itself: sound — The order correctly identifies the legal standard for appointing counsel in civil cases under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) and applies the relevant Ninth Circuit precedent. It addresses both prongs of the 'exceptional circumstances' test: the plaintiff's ability to articulate claims (supported by the complaint surviving screening) and the complexity of the case (found to be not particularly complex). It also addresses the likelihood of success, noting it is premature to determine. The reasoning is sound and directly answers the motion.
Opinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 RICKY L. WILLIAMS, Case No.: 19CV468 LAB (BGS)
12 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 13 v. APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 14 RUCKER, Correctional Officer, et al., [ECF 19] 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff has filed a Motion for Appointment of Counsel. (ECF 19.) Plaintiff seeks 18 appointment of counsel for the following reasons: (1) cannot afford to hire a lawyer; (2) 19 his incarceration will limit his ability to litigate this case that he believes will involve 20 substantial investigation and discovery; (3) the issues in the case are complex for someone, 21 like Plaintiff, that has not previously litigated a case; (4) trial will involve conflicting 22 testimony, and (5) Plaintiff has been unable to obtain counsel despite contacting a civil 23 rights attorney. (Id.) 24 “[T]here is no constitutional right to appointed counsel for § 1983 claims.” 25 Storseth v. Spellman, 654 F.2d 1349, 1353 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Palmer v. Valdez, 26 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Generally, a person has no right to counsel in civil 27 actions”) and Rand v. Rowland, 113 F.3d 1520, 1525 (9th Cir. 1997) (“There is no 28 constitutional right to appointed counsel in a § 1983 action”) withdrawn only as to notice 1 by Rand v. Rowland, 113 F.3d 952, 954 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc). “However, a court 2 may, under ‘exceptional circumstances,’ appoint counsel for indigent civil litigants 3 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1).” Palmer, 560 F.3d at 960 (citing Agyeman v. Corrs. 4 Corp. of Am., 390 F.3d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 2004)). “When determining whether 5 ‘exceptional circumstances’ exist, a court must consider ‘the likelihood of success on the 6 merits as well as the ability of the petitioner to articulate his claims pro se in light of the 7 complexity of the legal issues involved.” Id. (quoting Weygandt v. Look, 718 F.2d 952, 8 954 (9th Cir. 1983)). “Neither of these considerations is dispositive and instead must be 9 viewed together.” Id. (citing Wilbron v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 10 1986)). 11 Plaintiff has not shown exceptional circumstances warranting appointment of 12 counsel. Plaintiff has demonstrated his ability to articulate his claims and this case is not 13 particularly complex. Plaintiff’s Complaint described the factual basis for his claims 14 sufficiently to survive the sua sponte screening required by 28 U.S.C. §§1915(e)(2) and 15 1915A(b). (See ECF 6 at 3-6.) Additionally, there is nothing particularly complex about 16 this case or unique about the the limitations Plaintiff faces based on his incarceration that 17 would warrant appointment of counsel at this stage of the proceedings. See Wilbron, 789 18 F.2d at 1331 (noting that, “[i]f all that was required to establish successfully the complexity 19 of the relevant issues was a demonstration of the need for development of further facts, 20 practically all cases would involve complex legal issues.”). Plaintiff’s likelihood of 21 success on the merits also does not warrant appointment of counsel at this time. Although 22 Plaintiff’s Complaint has survived screening based on the facts alleged, those allegations 23 present only one view of the case and it is not at all clear Plaintiff’s claims could survive 24 summary judgement. See Garcia v. Smith, No. 10-cv-1187 AJB (RBB), 2012 WL 25 2499003, at *3 (S.D. Cal. June 27, 2012) (denying appointment of counsel when it was too 26 early to determine whether any of plaintiff’s claims would survive a motion for summary 27 judgment) 28 1 Viewing the two factors together, Plaintiff has not established exceptional 2 ||circumstances justify the appointment of counsel. Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion for 3 || appointment of counsel is DENIED. 4 IT IS SO ORDERED. 5 Dated: September 17, 2019 2 p / / 6 on. Bernard G. Skomal 7 United States Magistrate Judge 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28