Raiser v. United States District Court for the Southern District of California
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Cathy Ann Bencivengo (author)
Analysis
The court screened a pro se complaint filed in forma pauperis that sought to order judicial staff in a separate case to stop working and required a judge to perform all legal research and drafting. The court dismissed the action as frivolous and for failure to state a claim, denied the IFP motion as moot, and certified that an appeal would not be taken in good faith.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Dismissal of the civil action as frivolous and for failing to state a claim“1) DISMISSES this civil action, Raiser v. United States District Court for the Southern District of California, 19cv1571-CAB-WVG, as frivolous and for failing to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii);” | agree with court The court correctly applied the mandatory screening requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The relief requested—ordering a judge in a different case to perform all legal work personally and prohibiting staff from working—is legally impermissible because district judges lack authority to direct the internal operations of another judge's case. Furthermore, the defendants (judges and staff) are protected by absolute judicial and quasi-judicial immunity for acts integral to the judicial process. The dismissal is supported by the cited authorities. |
Denial of Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis as moot“2) DENIES Plaintiff's Motions to Proceed IFP as moot (Doc. No. 2, );” | agree with court Because the underlying action was dismissed, the motion to proceed without prepaying fees is no longer necessary and is therefore moot. This is a standard procedural consequence of a dismissal. |
Denial of Motion to File Electronically as moot“3) DENIES Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Electronically File Documents [Doc. No. 5] as moot;” | agree with court With the case dismissed and the file closed, any motion regarding the method of filing documents is moot. |
Certification that an IFP appeal would not be taken in good faith“4) CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal of this Order of dismissal would not be taken in good faith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3).” | agree with court The court correctly applied the standard from Coppedge v. United States. Given the frivolous nature of the claims and the clear application of absolute judicial immunity, an appeal would not be taken in good faith. |
The order itself: sound — The order correctly identifies the statutory basis for screening and dismissal. It accurately applies the doctrine of absolute judicial and quasi-judicial immunity to the defendants named. The reasoning that a district judge cannot order another judge to perform specific legal tasks is legally sound. The authorities cited are appropriate and correctly applied to the facts recited.
Opinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 Aaron Raiser, Case No.: 19cv1571-CAB-WVG 12 Plaintiff, 1) DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION 13 vs. AS FRIVOLOUS AND FOR FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM PURSUANT 14 TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (ii); United States District Court for the 15 2) DENYING MOTION TO Southern District of California, et al., PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 16 Defendants. AND AS MOOT [Doc. No. 2]; AND 17 3) DENYING MOTION TO FILE ELECTRONICALLY AS MOOT 18 [Doc. No. 5] 19 20 21 22 Aaron Raiser (“Plaintiff”), filed this civil action against the United States District 23 Court for the Southern District of California, Chief Judge Larry Burns, Daniel Nanula, and 24 all non-judicial staff of this Court. [Doc. No. 1.] In the complaint, Plaintiff requests a court 25 order that judicial staff not be allowed to perform any work in another pending case 26 (19cv1295-AJB-JLB), and that only “a judge read Plaintiff’s filings, do the research and 27 draft the orders in that case.” [Doc. No. 1 at ¶32.] 28 Plaintiff did not prepay the civil filing fees required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) at the 1 time of filing; instead he has filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant 2 to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). [Doc. No. 2.] 3 I. Screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 4 A. Standard of Review 5 A complaint filed by any person seeking to proceed IFP is subject to sua sponte 6 dismissal if it is “frivolous, malicious, fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief may be 7 granted, or seek[s] monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. 8 § 1915(e)(2)(B); Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (holding 9 that “the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”); Lopez v. 10 Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“[S]ection 1915(e) not only permits, 11 but requires a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to state a 12 claim.”); see also Chavez v. Robinson, 817 F.3d 1162, 1167-68 (9th Cir. 2016) (noting that 13 § 1915(e)(2)(B) “mandates dismissal—even if dismissal comes before the defendants are 14 served.”). “When a case may be classified as frivolous or malicious, there is, by definition, 15 no merit to the underlying action and so no reason to grant leave to amend.” Lopez, 203 16 F.3d at 1128, n.8. 17 B. Plaintiff’s Complaint 18 Here, Plaintiff’s complaint clearly fails to state a claim upon which relief may be 19 granted because he is asking this Court to issue an order regarding how the work in another 20 case should be conducted. This Court knows of no authority for the proposition that one 21 district judge can order another district judge to handle a particular case in a particular 22 manner.1 Moreover, the relief Plaintiff seeks is unrealistic and frivolous, as judicial staff 23 work for and at the direction of the judges. Finally, judges and their staff are absolutely 24 immune from suit when performing judicial responsibilities. See In re Castillo, 297 F.3d 25 940, 947 (9th Cir. 2002), as amended (Sept. 6, 2002) (absolute judicial immunity is 26 27 28 1 If Plaintiff objects to rulings made in 19cv1295-AJB-JLB, he should pursue his appellate rights in that 1 || afforded to judges for acts performed by the judge that relate to the judicial process); 2 ||Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986)(‘Judicial immunity applies 3 || ‘however erroneous the act may have been, and however injurious in its consequences it 4 ||may have proved to the plaintiff.’ ” Id. (quoting Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193 5 ||(1985)); Mullis v. U.S. Bankruptcy Court for Dist. of Nev., 828 F.2d 1385, 1390 (9th Cir. 6 || 1987)C“[c]ourt clerks have absolute quasi-judicial immunity from damages for civil rights 7 || violations when they perform tasks that are an integral part of the judicial process.”’); 8 || Samuel v. Michaud, 980 F.Supp.1381, 1403 (D. Idaho 1996)(conspiracy allegations against 9 || federal clerks “precluded from suit by the doctrine of absolute quasi-judicial immunity). 10 || Therefore, the complaint is frivolous and fails to state a claim. 11 Conclusion and Order 12 Good cause appearing, the Court: 13 1) DISMISSES this civil action, Raiser v. United States District Court for the 14 || Southern District of California, 19cv1571-CAB-WVG, as frivolous and for failing to state 15 ||a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)G) and (ii); 16 2) DENIES Plaintiff's Motions to Proceed IFP as moot (Doc. No. 2, ); 17 3) DENIES Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Electronically File Documents [Doc. 18 || No. 5] as moot; 19 4) CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal of this Order of dismissal would not be taken 20 |/in good faith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 21 445 (1962); Gardner v. Pogue, 558 F.2d 548, 550 (9th Cir. 1977) (indigent appellant 22 permitted to proceed IFP on appeal only if appeal would not be frivolous); and 23 5) DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to enter a final judgment of dismissal in this 24 || matter and to close the file. 29 ||Dated: August 28, 2019 yk 26 Hon. Cathy Ann Bencivengo 27 United States District Judge 28