Bentacourt v. California Western School of Law
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Larry Alan Burns (author)
Analysis
Plaintiff Shiloh Bentacourt moved pro se to voluntarily dismiss her discrimination action without prejudice to secure new representation. The court granted the motion to dismiss the case without prejudice and denied the defendant's pending motion to dismiss as moot.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Plaintiff's Motion to Voluntarily Dismiss is granted, and the action is dismissed without prejudice.“Ms. Bentacourt’s Motion to Voluntarily Dismiss is GRANTED, and this action is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.” | agree with court The court correctly applied Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2), which requires a court order for voluntary dismissal after responsive pleadings are filed. The court cited the Ninth Circuit standard from Smith v. Lenches, which presumes voluntary dismissal is granted unless the defendant shows plain legal prejudice. The court found no such prejudice because the defendant's pending motion to dismiss could be renewed if the plaintiff re-files. This follows the law and the record recited in the order. |
Defendant Susan Finster's Motion to Dismiss is denied without prejudice as moot.“Ms. Finster’s Motion to Dismiss is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE AS MOOT.” | agree with court Because the case was dismissed without prejudice, the pending motion to dismiss became moot. Denying it without prejudice is the standard procedural mechanism to clear the docket while preserving the defendant's right to raise the same arguments if the plaintiff re-files the action. |
The order itself: sound — The order is concise but legally sound. It correctly identifies the procedural requirement for a court order under Rule 41(a)(2) and applies the correct Ninth Circuit standard for voluntary dismissal. It addresses the only potential prejudice (the pending motion to dismiss) and explains why it does not bar dismissal (renewability). No significant arguments or authorities are missing for this procedural ruling.
Opinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 SHILOH ANGEL BENTACOURT, CASE NO. 19cv714-LAB (MDD) 11 Plaintiff, 12 ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO vs. DISMISS [Dkt. 19] 13 CALIFORNIA WESTERN SCHOOL OF 14 LAW, et al., 15 Defendants.
16 Until July of this year, Plaintiff Shiloh Bentacourt was represented in this 17 discrimination action by her retained counsel, Maria Hinayon. On July 15, 2019, the Court 18 granted Ms. Hinayon’s to withdraw as counsel and instructed Ms. Bentacourt to file a 19 motion for substitution within 60 days, indicating whether she would represent herself or 20 have new counsel to represent her in this action. Instead, Ms. Bentacourt now moves 21 pro se to dismiss this case without prejudice while she secures representation. 22 Because Defendants have filed responsive pleadings, a court order is required to 23 unilaterally dismiss the case. See Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 41(a)(2). But “a district court should 24 grant a motion for voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2) unless a defendant can show 25 that it will suffer some plain legal prejudice as a result.” Smith v. Lenches, 263 F.3d 972, 26 975 (9th Cir. 2001). There’s no legal prejudice here. Although Defendant Susan Finster 27 has a currently pending motion to dismiss that she may want resolved on the merits prior 28 to dismissal, she may renew that motion if Ms. Bentacourt elects to re-file. 1 Ms. Bentacourt’s Motion to Voluntarily Dismiss is GRANTED, and this action is 2 || DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Dkt. 19. Ms. Finster’s Motion to Dismiss is 3 || DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE AS MOOT. Dkt. 6. The clerk is directed to close the 4 || case. 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. 6 || Dated: August 22, 2019 b A. (buy 7 hd 8 Chief United States District Judge 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28