gno.law

Marriage of Haaswyk CA4/1

California Court of Appeal · D083306 · 2024-06-18 · Unpublished

Proceeding
appeal from an order
Trial court
Superior Court of Riverside County · No. RID1801244
Trial judge
Cheryl C. Murphy
Outcome
dismissed — Dismissed.
Area
family
Panel
Joan K. Irion (author), Truc T. Do, Buchanan

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T02:46Z · confidence high

The trial court granted the respondent's motion for judgment on the pleadings, denying the appellant's request for nullity of marriage based on fraud, and ordered the case to proceed as a dissolution of marriage. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the ruling on the nullity issue was neither a final judgment nor an appealable order under Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1.

Ruling reviewedStandardThe courtThe model
Granting of respondent's motion for judgment on the pleadings denying nullity of marriage
“The family court’s order granting judgment on the pleadings on the nullity issue is not on the list of prejudgment orders that are appealable.”
unclearnot reachedagree with court
The appellate court did not review the merits of the trial court's ruling on the nullity claim because it determined the appeal was not properly before it. The court held that the order was not appealable, rendering the trial court's substantive decision on the fraud-based nullity claim outside the scope of this specific appeal.

Authorities

  • relied: Griset v. Fair Political Practices Com. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 688 — A reviewing court has jurisdiction over a direct appeal only when there is an appealable order or judgment.
  • relied: In re Javier G. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1195 — A judgment or order is appealable only when made so by statute.
  • relied: Benton v. Benton (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 212 — In civil cases, including those governed by the Family Code, section 904.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is the main statute that identifies appealable judgments and orders.
  • relied: Reddish v. Westamerica Bank (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 275 — Most intermediate rulings are not appealable and must await review until final disposition of the case.
  • relied: Morehart v. County of Santa Barbara (1994) 7 Cal.4th 725 — An appeal cannot be taken from a judgment that fails to complete the disposition of all the causes of action between the parties.
  • relied: Aixtron, Inc. v. Veeco Instruments Inc. (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 360 — A decision or ruling must determine the rights and duties of the parties and leave nothing to be decided between them for it to constitute a final judgment.
  • relied: In re Marriage of Griffin (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 685 — Review of intermediate rulings in family law cases must await an appeal from the judgment to be entered in the pending dissolution proceeding.
  • relied: Little v. Mountain View Dairies (1950) 35 Cal.2d 232 — An order granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings is not final or appealable, and it is only from the subsequently entered judgment that an appeal will lie.
  • relied: Ellerbee v. County of Los Angeles (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1206 — An order granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings is not final or appealable.
  • relied: Adohr Milk Farms, Inc. v. Love (1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 366 — An order granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings is not final or appealable.
  • relied: In re Marriage of Deal (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 71 — If no appealable judgment or order is before the court, the court has no jurisdiction and must dismiss the appeal.

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion correctly applies the finality doctrine and Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1 to determine that the trial court's ruling on the nullity issue was an intermediate order that did not dispose of the entire case. The court properly notes that the dissolution proceeding remained pending, meaning the ruling on nullity was not a final judgment and was not a statutorily appealable order.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

unusual disposition

A model's reading — claude-fable-5-1, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T04:29Z · confidence low

The Riverside family court, at the start of a trial on the bifurcated nullity issue, granted Leticia's oral motion for judgment on the pleadings and denied Roy's request to annul the marriage for fraud under Family Code section 2210, subdivision (d), stating the case would proceed as a dissolution action. The Court of Appeal dismissed Roy's appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the ruling was neither an appealable final judgment nor an appealable prejudgment order under Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1 because the dissolution case remained pending.

Ruling reviewedStandardThe courtThe model
Grant of oral motion for judgment on the pleadings and denial of request for nullity of marriage based on fraud (Fam. Code, § 2210, subd. (d)), with the case to proceed as a dissolution action
“The court’s ruling against Roy on Leticia’s motion for judgment on the pleadings on the nullity issue lacks the finality required to make it appealable.”
unclearnot reachedagree with court
The appellate court did not review the merits of Roy's three challenges (failure to construe facts favorably, lack of a noticed written motion, inconsistency with prior ruling). It treated appealability as a threshold jurisdictional question and correctly concluded that an order granting judgment on the pleadings is not appealable (Little v. Mountain View Dairies) and that no judgment of dismissal was entered because the court expressly stated the case would continue as a dissolution proceeding, so Morehart's one-final-judgment rule bars the appeal. The unsigned minute entries saying 'dismisses with prejudice' do not change the reality that the action remains pending. The court did not mention Family Code section 2025 or rule 5.392 as a route for review of a bifurcated issue, but Roy sought no certification, so the result is unaffected. Review of the nullity ruling must await appeal from the dissolution judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 906.

Authorities

  • relied: Griset v. Fair Political Practices Com. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 688 — A reviewing court has jurisdiction over a direct appeal only when there is an appealable order or an appealable judgment; appealability is wholly statutory.
  • relied: Morehart v. County of Santa Barbara (1994) 7 Cal.4th 725 — An appeal cannot be taken from a judgment that fails to dispose of all causes of action between the parties, even if the disposed-of causes were ordered tried separately or are characterized as separate and independent.
  • relied: Little v. Mountain View Dairies (1950) 35 Cal.2d 232 — An order granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings is not final or appealable; an appeal lies only from the subsequently entered judgment.
  • relied: In re Marriage of Griffin (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 685 — A family court ruling on a bifurcated issue that does not finally dispose of the case is not appealable and review must await the final judgment.
  • relied: Ellerbee v. County of Los Angeles (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1206 — An order granting judgment on the pleadings is not appealable; the ruling is reviewable on appeal from the ensuing judgment.
  • relied: Benton v. Benton (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 212 — Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1 governs appealability in family law cases, and most intermediate rulings are not appealable.
  • relied: Reddish v. Westamerica Bank (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 275 — Intermediate rulings generally are not appealable and must await review until final disposition of the case.
  • relied: Aixtron, Inc. v. Veeco Instruments Inc. (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 360 — A final judgment is one that determines the rights and duties of the parties and leaves nothing further to be decided between them.
  • relied: In re Marriage of Deal (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 71 — Absent an appealable judgment or order, the Court of Appeal lacks jurisdiction and must dismiss the appeal.
  • relied: In re Javier G. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1195 — A judgment or order is appealable only when made so by statute.
  • relied: Adohr Milk Farms, Inc. v. Love (1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 366 — An order granting judgment on the pleadings is nonappealable; appeal lies from the judgment.
  • missed: In re Marriage of Lafkas (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1429 — A ruling on a bifurcated issue in a family law case is not appealable before final judgment absent the trial court's certification under Family Code section 2025 and the applicable rule of court; the Court of Appeal may in its discretion treat such an appeal as a writ petition.

The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The court correctly identified the jurisdictional defect, applying the settled rule that an order granting judgment on the pleadings is nonappealable and the one-final-judgment rule from Morehart, and properly looked past the ambiguous unsigned minute entries to the court's express statement that the dissolution would proceed. It did not address Family Code section 2025 and the bifurcated-issue certification procedure, or whether to treat the appeal as a writ petition, though Roy sought no certification and the omission does not change the outcome.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

Filed 6/18/24 Marriage of Haaswyk CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re the Marriage of ROY and LETICIA HAASWYK. D083306 ROY HAASWYK, Appellant, (Super. Ct. No. RID1801244)

v.

LETICIA HAASWYK,

Respondent.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Riverside County, Cheryl C. Murphy, Judge. Dismissed. Brandon C. Roesler for Appellant. Oscar E. Toscano for Respondent.

Roy Haaswyk purports to appeal an order denying his request for an annulment of his marriage to Leticia Haaswyk. The order is not appealable, and the record contains no other order or judgment that is appealable and would allow us to review the challenged order. We dismiss the appeal. BACKGROUND The parties met in May 2012, when neither was a citizen of the United States. Roy became a citizen in November 2013. He and Leticia consulted attorneys in March 2014 to inquire how marriage would affect her immigration status. The parties married in September 2014. Several months later, Leticia’s conditional residency was approved. The parties separated in February 2018. Roy filed a petition for dissolution of marriage the following April. In May 2020, Roy filed a request for order to amend the petition to change it from one for dissolution to one for nullity. The alleged ground for nullity of the marriage was that Leticia had obtained Roy’s consent by fraud.

(See Fam. Code, § 2210, subd. (d).)1 Specifically, Roy alleged Leticia never intended to remain faithful to him and married him only to become a citizen or permanent resident of the United States. In support of the request, Roy submitted a proposed amended petition, a declaration describing his relationship with Leticia and the reasons he suspected her of fraud, and exhibits. Leticia filed opposition to Roy’s request for order. She contended there was no basis to annul the marriage, because the parties had lived together and shared a full intimate relationship for years, and separated when Roy became emotionally, verbally, and physically abusive. Leticia denied Roy’s allegation that she married him only so that she could become a citizen or 1 “A marriage is voidable and may be adjudged a nullity if any of the following conditions existed at the time of the marriage: [¶] . . . [¶] (d) The consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless the party whose consent was obtained by fraud afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as his or her spouse.” (Fam. Code, § 2210.) 2 permanent resident of the United States. She argued a petition for nullity of marriage based on fraud would be untimely because more than four years had passed since they married. (See Fam. Code, § 2211, subd. (d) [proceeding to nullify marriage based on fraud must be commenced “within four years after the discovery of the facts constituting the fraud”].) As part of her opposition, Leticia submitted a declaration describing her relationship with Roy and her reasons for marrying him. Roy filed a reply the gist of which was that Leticia was not credible. At a hearing in April 2021, the family court stated that fraud was a ground to annul a marriage; Roy had sufficiently alleged grounds for nullity of his marriage to Leticia; if Roy prevailed at trial on his fraud claim, the marriage would be annulled; and if he did not prevail, the case would go forward as a dissolution proceeding. The court ruled that Roy did not have to file an amended petition and that it would hold a trial on the issue of nullity. At the trial readiness conference, the court confirmed that it was going to decide the issue of nullity first. If the court ruled in favor of Roy on that issue, the marriage would be annulled; if the court ruled against him, it would proceed with the petition for dissolution of marriage to address “issues like property division, spousal support, things like that.” After several continuances, the trial on the issue of nullity was finally held in January 2023. The court asked whether either counsel wished to make an opening statement. Roy’s counsel submitted on his prior filings “as an opening statement as far as the preview of the facts.” Leticia’s counsel made “an oral motion for judgment on the pleadings based on the declarations that [Roy] submitted himself.” Leticia’s counsel argued the marriage could not be annulled on the ground of fraud, because Roy admitted he lived with her for years after he knew about the alleged fraud and did not 3 seek to annul the marriage until more than four years had passed since he knew about it. In response, Roy’s counsel conceded that Roy learned in April or May 2016 that Leticia had “told a third party that she only married [him] for immigration purposes” and that she told him the same thing in a therapy session in June 2016. Roy’s counsel argued, however, that in 2016 Roy believed Leticia was saying many things she did not actually mean due to a mental illness, and he did not realize until he filed the petition for dissolution of the marriage in February 2020 that she actually meant what she had said about marrying him only for immigration purposes. After hearing counsel’s arguments, the family court agreed with Leticia’s counsel that it could not annul the marriage on the basis of fraud, because Roy’s own declarations showed he continued to live with Leticia for years after he learned about the alleged fraud. The court granted Leticia’s request for judgment on the pleadings and stated: “[T]his case is dismissed with prejudice -- denied. The [c]ourt is denying the annulment, and it will proceed as a dissolution of marriage action.” There are two corresponding unsigned minute entries. One states: “Court Grants [Leticia’s] request for Judgment. [¶] Court dismisses with prejudice. [¶] Court denies the Nullity.” The other states: “Request for Order re: Nullity is denied.” Roy filed a form notice of appeal in which he identified the judgment or order being appealed by checking the box “Other” and typing in, “Petitioner is appealing Respondent’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure 438.” He did not identify any statute authorizing the appeal. DISCUSSION Roy challenges the family court’s decision to grant Leticia’s oral motion for judgment on the pleadings on three grounds: (1) the court failed to view 4 the facts most favorably to him; (2) Leticia failed to file a properly noticed written request for judgment on the pleadings; and (3) the court previously ruled Roy had alleged adequate grounds to annul the marriage and could not change that ruling. Leticia disagrees with Roy on each of those points and contends his appeal is frivolous. She also contends, “There is no final judgment to be appealed from.” On the appealability issue, Roy responds that the court’s ruling on the nullity issue was final and appealable. As we shall explain, the ruling is not appealable and we must dismiss the appeal. “A reviewing court has jurisdiction over a direct appeal only when there is (1) an appealable order or (2) an appealable judgment.” (Griset v. Fair Political Practices Com. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 688, 696.) A judgment or order is appealable only when made so by statute. (Ibid.; In re Javier G. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1195, 1199.) In civil cases, including those governed by the Family Code, section 904.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is the main statute that identifies appealable judgments and orders. (Benton v. Benton (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 212, 217; see Fam. Code, § 210 [rules of procedure applicable to civil actions generally apply to family law proceedings].) Under that statute, final judgments, postjudgment orders, and specified prejudgment orders are appealable. (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a).) Most intermediate rulings are not appealable and must await review until final disposition of the case. (Reddish v. Westamerica Bank (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 275, 277; Benton, at p. 217.) The record contains no appealable judgment. A decision or ruling must determine the rights and duties of the parties and leave nothing to be decided between them for it to constitute a final judgment that may be appealed. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 577, 904.1, subd. (a)(1); Morehart v. County of Santa Barbara (1994) 7 Cal.4th 725, 741; Aixtron, Inc. v. Veeco Instruments Inc.

5 (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 360, 384; In re Marriage of Griffin (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 685, 689 (Griffin).) The court’s ruling against Roy on Leticia’s motion for judgment on the pleadings on the nullity issue lacks the finality required to make it appealable. Although the family court’s unsigned minutes state, “Court Grants [Leticia’s] request for Judgment” and “Court dismisses with prejudice,” the court did not actually enter a judgment of dismissal. Rather, when it denied Roy’s request for nullity, the court stated the case “will proceed as a dissolution of marriage action.” The case thus remains pending between the parties. “[A]n appeal cannot be taken from a judgment that fails to complete the disposition of all the causes of action between the parties even if the causes of action disposed of by the judgment have been ordered to be tried separately, or may be characterized as ‘separate and independent’ from those remaining.” (Morehart, at p. 743.) The record contains no appealable order either. The family court’s order granting judgment on the pleadings on the nullity issue is not on the list of prejudgment orders that are appealable. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a).) “It is settled that an order granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings is not final or appealable, and that it is only from the subsequently entered judgment that an appeal will lie.” (Little v. Mountain View Dairies (1950) 35 Cal.2d 232, 234 (Little); accord, Ellerbee v. County of Los Angeles (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1206, 1212–1213; Adohr Milk Farms, Inc. v. Love (1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 366, 369.) Review of the ruling on the nullity issue must await an appeal from the judgment to be entered in the pending dissolution proceeding. (Code Civ. Proc., § 906; Ellerbee, at p. 1213; Griffin, supra, 15 Cal.App.4th at p. 689.) In sum, no appealable judgment or order is before us. We have no jurisdiction and must dismiss the appeal. (Little, supra, 35 Cal.2d at p. 234;

6 In re Marriage of Deal (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 71, 78; Griffin, supra, 15 Cal.App.4th at p. 689.) DISPOSITION The appeal is dismissed.

IRION, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

DO, J.

BUCHANAN, J.

Cites, in this corpus