People v. Crawford CA4/1
- Proceeding
- appeal from a judgment
- Trial court
- Superior Court of San Bernardino · No. FSB049039
- Trial judge
- Colin J. Bilash
- Outcome
- affirmed — Affirmed.
- Area
- criminal
- Panel
- Judith D. McConnell (author), Richard D. Huffman, Sr., Julia C. Kelety
Analysis
The trial court denied Crawford's petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, finding he was not eligible because he was convicted as the actual shooter and the jury was not instructed on felony murder or the natural and probable consequences doctrine. The Court of Appeal affirmed the denial, determining that the record of conviction established as a matter of law that Crawford was not convicted under a theory of imputed malice.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Denial of petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6“The trial court found that Crawford had not made a prima facie case for resentencing because “[h]e was found to be the shooter,” and “[t]here was no finding, any verdict or otherwise, related to felony murder or any other analysis that would render a different verdict . . . based on the change in the law.”” | de novo | correct | agree with court The appellate court correctly applied the standard of review for a prima facie determination under section 1172.6, which is de novo. The court relied on the record of conviction to determine that Crawford was not convicted under a theory of felony murder or natural and probable consequences, which is the correct legal standard for determining eligibility at the prima facie stage. The court's conclusion that the implied malice instruction did not allow for imputed malice is supported by the cited authority, People v. Carr. |
Consideration of prior unpublished appellate opinion“Crawford also argues the trial court erred by considering our prior, unpublished opinion affirming his conviction. (People v. Crawford (Oct. 6, 2009, D054954 [nonpub. opn.].) The trial court may properly rely on the record of conviction, and “[a]ppellate opinions . . . are generally considered to be part of” that record. (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 970–972.)” | abuse of discretion | correct | agree with court The appellate court correctly held that the trial court did not err in considering the prior unpublished opinion because appellate opinions are generally part of the record of conviction. The court cited People v. Lewis to support this proposition. Furthermore, the court noted that it independently reviewed the record and found Crawford ineligible regardless of the prior opinion, making the issue moot. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 — Establishes the procedure for reviewing appeals where appointed counsel files a brief stating no meritorious issues are found, requiring the court to evaluate specific arguments in the appellant's own brief but not conduct an independent review of the entire record.
- relied: People v. Flores (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 974 — Defines the scope of section 1172.6 relief, limiting it to those convicted under a theory of felony murder, murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, or another theory of imputed malice.
- relied: People v. Carr (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 136 — Holds that an implied malice instruction requiring a finding that the defendant 'deliberately acted with conscious disregard for human life' does not allow implied malice to be imputed solely from the natural consequences of the act.
- relied: People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952 — Establishes that appellate opinions are generally considered part of the record of conviction for purposes of section 1172.6 proceedings.
- relied: People v. Williams (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1244 — Supports the appellate court's authority to independently review the record of conviction to determine eligibility for section 1172.6 relief.
- relied: People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 — Referenced in the context of Crawford's separate request for a hearing regarding his status as a youth offender, which the court noted was not before it on this appeal.
The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly applies the legal standards for section 1172.6 eligibility, relying on the record of conviction to determine that Crawford was not convicted under a theory of imputed malice. The court properly addresses the appellant's arguments regarding the implied malice instruction and the consideration of the prior unpublished opinion, citing appropriate authority for each.
The trial court denied Michael Crawford's Penal Code section 1172.6 resentencing petition at the prima facie stage, finding he was the actual shooter convicted of first degree murder with no felony-murder or natural-and-probable-consequences instructions given. On appeal, after a Delgadillo brief and a pro per supplemental brief, the Court of Appeal addressed each of Crawford's arguments, found no meritorious issue, and affirmed.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Denial of section 1172.6 petition at the prima facie stage for failure to state a prima facie case of eligibility“The jury was not given any instructions concerning felony murder, the natural and probable consequences doctrine, or any other theory of imputed malice.” | de novo | correct | agree with court The jury convicted Crawford of a sole count of first degree murder and found he personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing death, and no imputed-malice theory was instructed. Under Lewis and Flores, the record of conviction establishes ineligibility as a matter of law, so denial without an order to show cause was proper. |
Rejection of argument that the CALCRIM No. 520 implied malice instruction's 'natural and probable consequences' language made Crawford eligible for relief“This instruction “did not allow implied malice to be imputed solely from the natural consequences of [his] act.”” | de novo | correct | agree with court The implied malice instruction required the jury to find Crawford personally and deliberately acted with conscious disregard for human life; it describes the mental state of the actual perpetrator and is not the natural and probable consequences doctrine of accomplice liability. Carr directly supports the court's conclusion. |
Trial court's consideration of the prior unpublished appellate opinion affirming the conviction“Even without considering the prior appellate opinion, the record clearly demonstrates that Crawford is not entitled to relief.” | de novo | correct | agree with court Lewis holds appellate opinions are generally part of the record of conviction that may be consulted at the prima facie stage, and the reviewing court independently confirmed ineligibility from the jury's verdict, firearm finding, and instructions without relying on the prior opinion. Any error would therefore be harmless in any event. |
Crawford's youth offender / Franklin hearing claim“Any such ruling is not before us at this time.” | unclear | not reached | agree with court The notice of appeal was limited to the order denying the section 1172.6 petition and the record did not show any ruling on a separate Franklin request, so the appellate court correctly declined to address the issue for lack of an appealable ruling before it. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 — In an appeal from denial of a section 1172.6 petition where counsel finds no arguable issues, the appellate court must evaluate arguments in the defendant's supplemental brief but need not independently review the entire record.
- relied: People v. Flores (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 974 — A petitioner is ineligible for section 1172.6 relief as a matter of law where the record shows he was not convicted under felony murder, natural and probable consequences, or another imputed malice theory.
- relied: People v. Carr (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 136 — The CALCRIM implied malice instruction requiring conscious disregard for human life does not permit malice to be imputed solely from the natural consequences of the act and does not make a petitioner eligible for relief.
- relied: People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952 — At the prima facie stage a court may rely on the record of conviction, of which appellate opinions are generally a part, to determine whether a petitioner is ineligible as a matter of law.
- relied: People v. Williams (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1244 — The appellate court reviews independently whether the record of conviction establishes ineligibility for section 1172.6 relief.
- relied: People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 — A youth offender may be entitled to a hearing to make a record of youth-related mitigating factors for a future parole hearing.
The appellate opinion: sound — The court answered each of Crawford's five supplemental arguments with on-point authority, correctly explained why the implied malice instruction is not an imputed malice theory, and independently confirmed ineligibility from the verdict and firearm finding so that any reliance on the prior unpublished opinion was immaterial. The analysis is brief but complete for the issues presented.
Opinion
Filed 6/17/24 P. v. Crawford CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D083926
Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. FSB049039) MICHAEL THOMAS CRAWFORD, Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Bernardino, Colin J. Bilash, Judge. Affirmed. Michael Thomas Crawford, in pro. per; and Valerie G. Wass, under appointment by the Court of Appeal for Defendant and Appellant. No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent. In 2008, a jury convicted Michael Thomas Crawford of one count of first degree murder. (Pen. Code,1 § 187, subd. (a).) In 2023, Crawford filed a petition for resentencing under section 1172.6 on the ground that he was convicted of murder and “could not presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective 1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code. January 1, 2019.” The court appointed counsel for Crawford, received briefing, and held a hearing. Appointed defense counsel conceded Crawford was not eligible for relief. The trial court found that Crawford had not made a prima facie case for resentencing because “[h]e was found to be the shooter,” and “[t]here was no finding, any verdict or otherwise, related to felony murder or any other analysis that would render a different verdict . . . based on the change in the law.” The court denied Crawford’s petition. Crawford filed a timely notice of appeal. Appellate counsel subsequently filed a brief pursuant to People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 (Delgadillo), indicating she has not been able to identify any potentially meritorious issues for reversal on appeal. Crawford was notified of his right to file his own brief on appeal. He elected to do so and has raised the following issues: “1) [Is Crawford entitled to resentencing as a youth offender?]
“2) Does [Crawford’s] petition in conjunction with the record of conviction establish that [he] made [a] prima facie showing that he is entitled to resentencing pursuant to section 1172.6 so that the [trial] court was required to issue an order to show cause and hold evidentiary hearing?
“3) Has [Crawford] made a prima facie showing that he is entitled to relief under section 1172.6 because his jury was instructed with CALCRIM No. 520, which [sic] the following:
“The defendant acted with implied malice if: 1. He intentionally committed an act; 2. The natural and probable consequences of the act were dangerous to human life; 3. At the time he acted he [k]new his act was dangerous to human life; AND 4. He deliberately acted with conscious disregard for human life[”]?
2 “4) In determining [Crawford’s] eligibility for resentencing, was the [trial] court’s erroneous consideration of the unpublished opinion in [Crawford’s] prior direct appeal prejudicial so that it requires reversal of the court’s order denying [his] petition for resentencing.
“5) Does the record of conviction establish that [Crawford] is ineligible for resentencing pursuant to section 1172.6 as a matter of law where it reflects the following: the jury was not instructed on felony murder or the natural and probable consequences doctrine, and the jury found true the allegation that in the commission of the murder [Crawford] personally and intentionally discharged a firearm which proximately caused great bodily injury and death?”
We have reviewed the issues raised by Crawford and relevant portions of the record of conviction, and we agree with counsel that there are no potentially meritorious arguments for appeal. We therefore affirm. DISCUSSION As we have noted, appellate counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Delgadillo, and Crawford has elected to file his own supplemental brief. Although we are “required to evaluate the specific arguments presented in that brief,” we are not “compel[led to conduct] an independent review of the entire record to identify unraised issues.” (Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 232.) As an initial matter, Crawford raises an argument regarding his youth offender status. However, Crawford’s notice of appeal is limited to the order denying his section 1172.6 petition. The record does not reflect whether the trial court has ruled on Crawford’s separate request for a hearing pursuant to People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261. Any such ruling is not before us at this time. With respect to Crawford’s section 1172.6 petition, the record establishes, as a matter of law, that he was not convicted “under a theory of 3 felony murder, murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, or another theory of imputed malice.” (People v. Flores (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 974, 987.) Crawford was convicted of a sole count of first degree murder, and the jury found true that he “personally and intentionally discharged a firearm, a handgun, which proximately caused great bodily injury and death” to the victim. The jury was not given any instructions concerning felony murder, the natural and probable consequences doctrine, or any other theory of imputed malice. Crawford notes an implied malice instruction given to the jury that references “natural and probable consequences.” However, this instruction states, in relevant part: “The defendant acted with implied malice if:
“1. He intentionally committed an act;
“2. The natural consequences of the act were dangerous to human life;
“3. At the time he acted, he knew his act was dangerous to human life;
“AND “4. He deliberately acted with conscious disregard for human life.
“. . .
“An act causes death if the death is the direct, natural, and probable consequence of the act and the death would not have happened without the act. A natural and probable consequence is one that a reasonable person would know is likely to happen if nothing unusual intervenes. In deciding whether a consequence is natural and probable, consider all of the circumstances established by the evidence.”
4 To find that Crawford acted with implied malice, the jury had to find that he “deliberately acted with conscious disregard for human life.” This instruction “did not allow implied malice to be imputed solely from the natural consequences of [his] act.” (People v. Carr (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 136, 145.) Crawford also argues the trial court erred by considering our prior, unpublished opinion affirming his conviction. (People v. Crawford (Oct. 6, 2009, D054954 [nonpub. opn.].) The trial court may properly rely on the record of conviction, and “[a]ppellate opinions . . . are generally considered to be part of” that record. (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 970–972.) In any event, we have reviewed Crawford’s eligibility for section 1172.6 relief independently. (See People v. Williams (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1244, 1251.) Even without considering the prior appellate opinion, the record clearly demonstrates that Crawford is not entitled to relief. DISPOSITION The order denying Crawford’s petition for resentencing under section 1172.6 is affirmed.
McCONNELL, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
HUFFMAN, J.
KELETY, J.
Cites, in this corpus
- People v. Delgadillo S266305 · 2022-12-19
- People v. Lewis S260598 · 2021-07-26
- People v. Franklin S217699 · 2016-05-26