People v. Cornett CA4/1

California Court of Appeal · D082432 · 2024-05-23 · Unpublished

Proceeding: appeal from a judgment
Trial court: Superior Court of San Diego County · No. SCD291704
Trial judge: Timothy R. Walsh
Outcome: remanded — Remanded with directions.
Area: criminal
Panel: Michele M. Castillo (author), Richard D. Huffman, Sr., Joan K. Irion

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T04:13Z · confidence high

The trial court denied the defendant's request for 37 days of custody credit for time spent on electronically monitored home detention, ruling that his specific tracking device was not a recognized legal alternative to custody. The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded, accepting the Attorney General's concession that the denial violated the defendant's right to equal protection because it treated him differently from participants in the statutory electronic monitoring program without a rational basis.

Ruling reviewed	Standard	The court	The model
Denial of 37 days of custody credit for time spent on electronically monitored home detention “At sentencing, the court awarded Cornett 590 days of custody credits for pre-conviction jailtime, but it denied his request for custody credits for time on home detention because his particular tracking device was not authorized as a legal alternative to custody within San Diego County.”	de novo	error	agree with court The appellate court found that the trial court's distinction between the defendant's home detention and the statutory electronic monitoring program lacked a rational basis, as both involved similar custodial conditions (curfew, tracking device, Fourth Amendment waiver). By denying credit to the defendant while granting it to statutory program participants, the trial court violated the Equal Protection Clause. The court relied on the Attorney General's concession and existing case law (People v. Gerson) to determine that the differential treatment was not justified by a legitimate state interest.

Authorities

relied: California Grocers Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (2011) 52 Cal.4th 177 — Establishes that equal protection claims are subject to de novo review.
relied: People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834 — Defines the key inquiry in equal protection cases as whether the challenged difference in treatment is adequately justified under the applicable standard of review.
relied: People v. Chatman (2018) 4 Cal.5th 277 — Establishes that when neither a suspect classification nor a fundamental right is at issue, differential treatment need only be rationally related to a legitimate state interest.
relied: People v. Gerson (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 1067 — Supports the conclusion that there is no rational basis for denying custody credit to defendants in similar custody conditions as those in the statutory electronic monitoring program.
relied: People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847 — Cited generally to support the use of a memorandum opinion for this resolution.

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly applies the rational basis test to the equal protection claim and relies on the Attorney General's concession, which is a valid procedural mechanism for resolving the appeal. The court accurately identifies that the trial court's distinction based on the specific type of tracking device lacks a rational basis when compared to the statutory program, aligning with the cited authorities.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

unusual disposition

A model's reading — claude-fable-5-1, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T04:29Z · confidence low

The trial court sentenced Cornett after his guilty plea to murder, awarded 590 days of presentence jail credit, but denied 37 days of credit for his time on GPS-monitored home detention because his tracking device was not an authorized alternative to custody in San Diego County. The Court of Appeal, in a memorandum opinion, accepted the Attorney General's concession that the denial violated equal protection and remanded with directions to amend the abstract of judgment to add the 37 days.

Ruling reviewed	Standard	The court	The model
Denial of 37 days of presentence custody credit for time on electronically monitored home detention, as challenged on equal protection grounds “it denied his request for custody credits for time on home detention because his particular tracking device was not authorized as a legal alternative to custody within San Diego County.”	de novo	error (law misapplied)	agree with court The court applied de novo review and rational basis scrutiny under Hardin and Chatman, and followed its own prior decision in Gerson holding there is no rational basis to deny credit to a defendant under custodial conditions functionally identical to a section 1203.018 program. The conclusion is consistent with Gerson, but the opinion relies heavily on the Attorney General's concession and does not itself consider whether the county's non-approval of the particular device could supply a conceivable legitimate basis under the deferential rational basis test; it simply asserts none exists.
Denial of custody credit on statutory grounds under Penal Code sections 2900.5 and 1203.018 “Given the Attorney General’s concession, we address only the equal protection claim.”	unclear	not reached	unsure The court expressly declined to decide whether Cornett's release qualified for credit under the statutes because the equal protection concession resolved the appeal. Nothing in the opinion suggests the trial court misread the statutes; section 2900.5 ties credit to detention 'pursuant to' section 1203.018, and the court acknowledged Cornett was not released 'in lieu of bail.'

Authorities

relied: People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834 — The core equal protection inquiry is whether the challenged difference in treatment is adequately justified under the applicable standard of review.
relied: People v. Chatman (2018) 4 Cal.5th 277 — Where no suspect class or fundamental right is involved, differential treatment need only be rationally related to a legitimate state interest.
relied: People v. Gerson (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 1067 — There is no rational basis for denying custody credit to a defendant subject to custodial electronic monitoring conditions while granting credit to participants in the statutory electronic monitoring program.
relied: California Grocers Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (2011) 52 Cal.4th 177 — Equal protection claims are reviewed de novo.
relied: People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847 — An appellate court may resolve an appeal by memorandum opinion where the issues are straightforward.

The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The result is defensible and follows the same division's published decision in Gerson, applying the correct de novo and rational basis framework from Hardin and Chatman. The opinion is thin, however: it accepts the Attorney General's concession without independently examining whether the state's interest in approved monitoring programs could furnish a conceivable rational basis, and it leaves the statutory question undecided.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

Filed 5/23/24 P. v. Cornett CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D082432

Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD291704)

CARLIN EDWARD CORNETT,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Timothy R. Walsh, Judge. Remanded with directions. Sheila O’Connor, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Collette C. Cavalier and Kathryn Kirschbaum, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. MEMORANDUM OPINION Carlin Edward Cornett appeals a judgment denying his request for 37 days of custody credit for his time spent on GPS-monitored home detention. Cornett challenges the denial on two grounds. First, he claims his supervised release complies with Penal Code sections 2900.5 and 1203.018, which govern eligibility for custody credit. Second, Cornett argues that awarding custody credit to individuals participating in section 1203.018 electronic monitoring programs, while denying credit to persons like him subject to similar monitoring, violates his right to equal protection. The Attorney General concedes that the denial of custody credit here violates Cornett’s right to equal protection. Resolving this matter by memorandum opinion (see generally People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847), we accept the Attorney General’s concession and remand to the trial court to grant Cornett the additional 37 days of custody credits. In April 2023, Cornett pled guilty to murder. Before sentencing, the trial court released Cornett on his own recognizance for medical reasons but imposed numerous restrictions. Cornett was required to wear an ankle tracking device, remain in San Diego County, adhere to a curfew, and consent to a Fourth Amendment waiver. He could leave his house for specified purposes, such as getting groceries or going to medical appointments. At sentencing, the court awarded Cornett 590 days of custody credits for pre-conviction jailtime, but it denied his request for custody credits for time on home detention because his particular tracking device was not authorized as a legal alternative to custody within San Diego County. Given the Attorney General’s concession, we address only the equal protection claim. An equal protection claim is subject to de novo review. (California Grocers Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (2011) 52 Cal.4th 177, 208.) The key inquiry is “whether the challenged difference in treatment is adequately justified under the applicable standard of review.” (People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834, 850-851.) When neither a suspect 2 classification nor a fundamental right is at issue, the differential treatment need only be rationally related to a legitimate state interest. (People v. Chatman (2018) 4 Cal.5th 277, 288.) Like the parties, we discern no rational basis for denying Cornett custody credit while granting credit to participants subject to similar custody conditions in the statutory electronic monitoring program. (See People v. Gerson (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 1067, 1091.) Penal Code section 2900.5, subdivision (a) entitles defendants to credit for “days served in home detention pursuant to . . . Section 1203.018.” Section 1203.018 establishes an electronic monitoring program offered to inmates released “in lieu of bail” who abide by a curfew, allow probation officers into their home, and wear a tracking device. (§ 1203.018, subds. (a) & (d)(1)-(3).) Although Cornett was not released “in lieu of bail,” he, like statutory electronic monitoring program participants, had to adhere to a curfew, consent to a Fourth Amendment waiver, and wear a tracking device. That Cornett’s particular tracking device is not a recognized legal alternative to custody does not change the fundamentally custodial nature of Cornett’s release. We thus conclude denial of Cornett’s request for home monitoring custody credits violated his right to equal protection.

3 DISPOSITION We remand to the trial court to (1) amend the June 22, 2023 abstract of judgment to grant Cornett 37 days of custody credits for his time spent on electronically monitored home detention, and (2) forward a certified copy of the amended abstract of judgment to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

CASTILLO, J.

WE CONCUR:

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

IRION, J.

Cites, in this corpus

People v. Chatman S237374 · 2018-02-01
California Grocers Assn. v. City of Los Angeles S176099 · 2011-07-18
People v. Garcia F034831 · 2002-04-17