People v. Baltrip CA4/1
- Proceeding
- appeal from a judgment
- Trial court
- Superior Court of San Diego County · No. SCD294912
- Trial judge
- Eugenia A. Eyherabide
- Outcome
- affirmed — Affirmed.
- Area
- criminal
- Panel
- Michele M. Castillo (author), William S. Dato, Julia C. Kelety
Analysis
The trial court sentenced the defendant to the middle term of two years for making a criminal threat, declining to apply the presumptive lower term under Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (b)(6) despite the defendant's claim of PTSD. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the defendant failed to provide sufficient factual evidence to establish that he experienced qualifying trauma or that such trauma was a contributing factor to the offense.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Imposition of the middle term instead of the presumptive lower term under Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (b)(6).“On this record, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to make a finding that Baltrip experienced qualifying trauma.” | abuse of discretion | correct | agree with court agree with court |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Hilburn (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 189 — Section 1170(b)(6) requires the court to make additional factual findings for the defendant to qualify for a presumptive lower term; if the defendant fails to show qualification, the standard middle term presumptively applies.
- relied: People v. Banner (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 226 — A finding of trauma alone is insufficient for the presumptive lower term; the trauma must also be a contributing factor in the commission of the offense.
- relied: Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 — Sentencing to the middle term does not violate Apprendi when the lower term presumption does not apply due to lack of qualifying mitigating factors.
- relied: People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847 — General authority for resolving matters by memorandum opinion.
The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly applies the statutory requirement that a defendant must provide sufficient factual evidence to trigger the presumptive lower term under section 1170(b)(6). The court properly identifies that the defendant's bare assertion of PTSD without corroborating evidence or a link to the offense is insufficient to shift the presumption from the middle term.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
unusual dispositionAfter a jury convicted Baltrip of making a criminal threat, the trial court, without expressly addressing the Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (b)(6)(A) lower-term presumption raised in his sentencing memorandum, weighed mitigating and aggravating circumstances and imposed the middle term of two years. The Court of Appeal affirmed in a memorandum opinion, holding Baltrip failed to establish either qualifying trauma or a link between that trauma and the offense, so the middle term presumptively applied and no Apprendi violation occurred.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Implicit rejection of the section 1170(b)(6)(A) lower-term presumption for lack of a factual showing that Baltrip experienced qualifying psychological trauma“On this record, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to make a finding that Baltrip experienced qualifying trauma.” | abuse of discretion | correct | agree with court Hilburn places on the defendant the burden to supply a factual basis for the additional findings section 1170(b)(6) requires. The record described shows only the bare fact of a youthful prison term, an unsupported PTSD assertion, and a denial of psychological concerns to probation; on that record a trial court could reasonably decline to find trauma, and the appellate court's refusal to treat all youthful incarceration as trauma per se is a fair reading of the statute's text. |
Implicit finding that any trauma was not shown to be a contributing factor in the commission of the criminal threat offense“Thus, the mere fact of Baltrip’s trauma is insufficient for the presumptive lower term to apply without evidence linking that trauma to Baltrip’s criminal threat offense.” | abuse of discretion | correct | agree with court Section 1170(b)(6) expressly requires the mitigating circumstance to be a contributing factor in the offense, and Banner and Hilburn confirm a factual nexus must be shown. The only link offered was an unsupported argument in the sentencing memorandum, and the court reasonably noted the asserted 'keep people at bay' theory sits uneasily with an unprovoked armed pursuit of three victims. The conclusion follows from the cited authority. |
Imposition of the middle term without pled and proven aggravating circumstances“In sentencing Baltrip to the middle term, we conclude the trial court did not apply any aggravating circumstances in a manner that violates Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466.” | unclear | correct | agree with court Once the (b)(6) presumption is not triggered, the middle term is the statutory default under section 1170(b)(1)-(2) and may be imposed without any jury-found aggravating facts; Apprendi is implicated only by sentences exceeding the default maximum. Hilburn supports this, and the opinion's reasoning is consistent with the statute. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Hilburn (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 189 — Section 1170(b)(6) requires additional factual findings, supported by a sufficient factual basis, before the lower-term presumption applies; absent such a showing the middle term presumptively applies and imposing it does not violate Apprendi.
- relied: People v. Banner (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 226 — A qualifying mitigating circumstance must be shown to be a contributing factor in the commission of the offense; trauma alone does not trigger the lower-term presumption.
- relied: Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 — Facts that increase the penalty beyond the statutory maximum must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
- relied: People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847 — Authority for resolving an appeal by memorandum opinion.
The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The opinion answers the only argument raised with the governing statute and the directly applicable Hilburn and Banner decisions, and the result follows from the undisputed thinness of Baltrip's showing. It does not, however, address whether the trial court should have expressly ruled on the (b)(6)(A) claim that was squarely raised in the sentencing memorandum, and the appellate court itself does much of the factual evaluation the trial court never articulated.
Opinion
Filed 3/28/24 P. v. Baltrip CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D081430
Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD294912)
JUSTIN ALLEN BALTRIP,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Eugenia A. Eyherabide, Judge. Affirmed. Britton Donaldson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Christopher B. Beesley and Daniel Rogers, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. MEMORANDUM OPINION A jury found Justin Allen Baltrip guilty of making a criminal threat. Baltrip’s sentencing memorandum claimed that “he suffers from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder [PTSD]” as a result of a prison term he served in his youth and that this “trauma was a contributing factor to the commission of this offense” such that the lower term presumptively applied under Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (b)(6)(A). No one—not Baltrip, the People, nor the trial court—expressly referenced subdivision (b)(6)(A) during the sentencing hearing. After “consider[ing] the possible circumstances in mitigation as well as the possible circumstances in aggravation,” the court sentenced Baltrip to the middle term of two years in state prison for the offense. On appeal, Baltrip claims that, as the low term presumptively applied, the court abused its discretion by imposing the middle term absent pled and proven aggravating factors outweighing the substantial mitigating factors. We resolve this matter by memorandum opinion (see generally People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847) and affirm. Under recent amendments to section 1170, “the court shall order imposition of the lower term” if one or more specified mitigating circumstances was “a contributing factor in the commission of the offense,” unless the court finds the low term “would be contrary to the interests of justice” because aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6).) Here, Baltrip claims he “experienced psychological, physical, or childhood trauma,” one of the specified mitigating circumstances. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6)(A).) According to Baltrip, the word shall in subdivision (b)(6) required the trial court to impose the lower term; in failing to do so, the court abused its discretion. We perceive two flaws in this argument. First, section 1170(b)(6) requires the court to “ma[k]e” “additional factual findings” for the defendant to “qualif[y]” for a presumptive lower 2 term. (People v. Hilburn (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 189, 203-205 (Hilburn).) Baltrip asserts subdivision (b)(6)(A) applies here due to trauma arising from a previous prison term he served in his early twenties. However, Baltrip failed to provide the trial court with any facts or evidence beyond the bare fact of his time in prison as a young adult to support a finding that he in fact experienced trauma. For example, he provided no medical records or affidavits to corroborate his unsubstantiated claim of PTSD. And, in an interview with a probation officer, Baltrip “[d]enied” having any psychological or medical concerns or needs. We agree with the People that Baltrip essentially asked the trial court to conclude as a matter of law that all persons incarcerated in their youth are traumatized by that experience. Had the Legislature intended subdivision (b)(6)(A) to have this broad reach, the wording of the statute would reflect as much. On this record, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to make a finding that Baltrip experienced qualifying trauma. Second, even assuming Baltrip satisfactorily evidenced trauma for purposes of section 1170(b)(6)(A), such a finding alone would not qualify him for the lower term presumption. For the presumption to arise, Baltrip’s trauma also must have been “a contributing factor in the commission of the offense.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6).) Thus, the mere fact of Baltrip’s trauma is insufficient for the presumptive lower term to apply without evidence linking that trauma to Baltrip’s criminal threat offense. (People v. Banner (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 226, 241.) Again, we agree with the People that Baltrip presented no such evidence. Instead, his sentencing memorandum simply argued without support that Baltrip’s trauma was a contributing factor because “Baltrip’s desire to project a certain persona and keep people at bay comes from [his] experience” of “living in that environment as a young man.”
3 There was thus an “[in]sufficient factual basis” to support this necessary finding. (Hilburn, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 205.) Rather, as the People note, Baltrip’s argument that his trauma induces him to “keep people at bay” is inconsistent with the facts of the offense: Baltrip, unprovoked, threatened three people, including an elderly woman and a child, with a switchblade and pursued them. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to make a finding that Baltrip’s purported trauma was a “contributing factor in the commission of the offense.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6).) While Baltrip “disagrees” with Hilburn’s reasoning, we reaffirm its interpretation of section 1170(b)(6). Because Baltrip failed to show he qualified for the presumptive lower term under section 1170(b)(6)(A), the standard middle term presumptively applied instead. (Hilburn, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at pp. 204-205.) In sentencing Baltrip to the middle term, we conclude the trial court did not apply any aggravating circumstances in a manner that violates Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466. (Hilburn, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at pp. 204-205.) DISPOSITION We affirm. CASTILLO, J.
WE CONCUR:
DATO, Acting P. J.
KELETY, J.
Cites, in this corpus
- People v. Garcia F034831 · 2002-04-17