gno.law

People v. Hurst CA4/1

California Court of Appeal · D081990 · 2024-03-13 · Unpublished

Proceeding
appeal from a judgment
Trial court
Superior Court of San Diego County · No. SCD287570
Trial judge
Peter C. Deddeh
Outcome
affirmed — Affirmed.
Area
criminal
Panel
O'Rourke (author), Joan K. Irion, Buchanan

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T04:16Z · confidence high

The trial court convicted Hurst of robbery, sentenced him to the upper term of five years, and granted his motion to represent himself the day before trial. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, finding no error in the self-representation ruling and rejecting Hurst's ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

Ruling reviewedStandardThe courtThe model
Granting Hurst's motion to represent himself (Faretta waiver) the day before trial began.
“We conclude the court did not err in granting Hurst his constitutional right to represent himself.”
de novocorrectagree with court
The appellate court applied the correct standard of independent review to determine if the waiver was knowing and intelligent. The record shows the trial court probed Hurst's understanding and warned him of the disadvantages, satisfying the constitutional requirements for a valid Faretta waiver.
Rejection of Hurst's claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.
“We conclude Hurst has failed to carry his burden to establish that his appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance by filing a Wende brief.”
de novocorrectagree with court
The court correctly applied the Strickland/Lopez standard, noting that counsel filed a Wende brief and the court conducted its own independent review of the record. Since the court found no arguable issues for reversal, the claim of ineffective assistance fails.

Authorities

  • relied: People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 — Trial court has discretion to strike prior serious felony or strike allegations under the Three Strikes law.
  • relied: People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 — Appellate counsel must file a brief identifying arguable issues, and the court must independently review the record if no issues are found.
  • relied: Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 — Appellate counsel may file a brief stating there are no arguable issues, provided they submit a copy to the defendant and the court independently reviews the record.
  • relied: Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 — Defendants have a constitutional right to self-representation if the waiver of counsel is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.
  • relied: People v. Burgener (2009) 46 Cal.4th 231 — On appeal, the court independently examines the entire record to determine if the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived the right to counsel.
  • relied: People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041 — Courts must indulge every reasonable inference against waiver of the right to counsel, and review is not limited to the transcript of the Faretta hearing.
  • relied: People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1 — Review of a Faretta waiver includes proceedings that occurred after the purported invocation of the right of self-representation.
  • relied: People v. Kelley (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106 — A pro se note from a defendant can be interpreted as asserting an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
  • relied: People v. Lopez (2008) 42 Cal.4th 960 — To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient and that they were prejudiced by that deficiency.

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is procedurally sound, correctly applying the Wende/Anders framework and the Faretta standard for self-representation. It adequately addresses the defendant's pro se note by interpreting it as an IAC claim and rejecting it based on the court's independent review.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

unusual disposition

A model's reading — claude-fable-5-1, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T04:30Z · confidence low

A San Diego jury convicted Patrick Hurst of robbery and found true Three Strikes and aggravating-circumstance allegations; the trial court imposed the five-year upper term after striking both strike priors under Romero and striking the serious-felony prior because it was committed as a juvenile. On appeal counsel filed a Wende brief identifying only the grant of Hurst's day-before-trial Faretta request as a possible issue, and the Court of Appeal independently reviewed the record, found no arguable issue, rejected Hurst's informal ineffective-assistance complaint about appellate counsel, and affirmed.

Ruling reviewedStandardThe courtThe model
Grant of Hurst's renewed Faretta motion to represent himself the day before trial began
“We conclude the court did not err in granting Hurst his constitutional right to represent himself.”
de novocorrectagree with court
The court applied the correct independent-review standard from Burgener and Koontz, indulged inferences against waiver, and relied on a signed waiver form plus a colloquy in which the trial judge warned Hurst that self-representation was foolish and Hurst still unequivocally insisted. A defendant who successfully invokes Faretta cannot ordinarily complain that his own request was granted, so the result follows. The opinion does not discuss timeliness under People v. Windham, but because the motion was granted rather than denied, the Windham discretionary framework would not supply a ground for reversal.
Wende/Anders independent review of the entire record for arguable issues (including conviction and upper-term sentence)
“we have reviewed the entire record as required by Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436 and Anders, supra, 386 U.S. 738, and have not discovered any arguable issues for reversal on appeal.”
de novocorrectagree with court
The procedure followed matches Wende and Anders. The recited facts (eyewitness manager, video, curbside identification, force and threat used to retain the merchandise) comfortably support a robbery conviction, and the jury found the aggravating circumstances true, which satisfies the requirement for an upper term; the court additionally exercised leniency by striking the strike and serious-felony priors. Nothing in the opinion suggests an overlooked arguable issue.
Hurst's informal claim that appellate counsel was ineffective for filing a Wende brief
“We conclude Hurst has failed to carry his burden to establish that his appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance by filing a Wende brief.”
de novocorrectagree with court
The court properly construed the pro se note liberally under People v. Kelly (cited in the opinion as 'Kelley'), applied the Strickland-based deficiency-and-prejudice test from Lopez, and reasoned that because its own independent review disclosed no arguable issue, counsel's filing of a Wende brief was neither deficient nor prejudicial. The complaints about counsel's vacation and the defendant's surgery do not identify any appellate issue counsel failed to raise.

Authorities

  • relied: People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 — When appointed appellate counsel finds no arguable issues, the Court of Appeal must independently review the entire record for error.
  • relied: Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 — Counsel filing a no-merit brief should identify anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal to assist the court's review.
  • relied: Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 — A defendant has a constitutional right to self-representation if the election is timely, unequivocal, voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.
  • relied: People v. Burgener (2009) 46 Cal.4th 231 — On appeal the court independently examines the whole record to decide whether the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived counsel.
  • relied: People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041 — Courts indulge every reasonable inference against waiver of counsel, and review of a Faretta waiver is not confined to the hearing transcript.
  • relied: People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1 — Review of the validity of a Faretta invocation includes proceedings occurring after the purported invocation.
  • relied: People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106 — In a Wende appeal the court must address a defendant's supplemental pro se contentions and explain why they fail; the opinion cites this case as 'Kelley'.
  • relied: People v. Lopez (2008) 42 Cal.4th 960 — Ineffective assistance requires showing both deficient performance below prevailing professional norms and resulting prejudice.
  • relied: People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 — Trial courts have discretion under section 1385 to strike prior strike convictions in furtherance of justice.

The appellate opinion: sound — The court applied the correct independent-review standard to the Faretta waiver, quoted the colloquy showing an unequivocal and warned election, and used the proper Wende/Anders and Kelly framework to dispose of the pro se ineffective-assistance complaint. Its only omission is any mention of the timeliness rule from People v. Windham for eve-of-trial Faretta requests, but since the motion was granted that omission does not affect the result.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

Filed 3/13/24 P. v. Hurst CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D081990

Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD287570)

PATRICK DORIEN HURST,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Peter C. Deddeh, Judge. Affirmed. Richard J. Moller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent. The People in a second amended information charged Patrick Dorien Hurst with robbery (Pen. Code,1 § 211; count 1) and alleged that under the “Three Strikes” law he had suffered a serious felony prior (§§ 667, subd. (a)(1), 668, 1192.7, subd. (c)) and two strike priors (§§ 211, 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 668, 1170.12). The People also alleged as aggravating circumstances that Hurst had served a prior prison term (California Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(3)) and his performance was unsatisfactory while on probation or parole (California Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(5)). The jury convicted Hurst of robbery, and found true the allegations under the Three Strikes law as well as the aggravating circumstances. The court sentenced Hurst to the upper term of five years on count 1, struck the two strike priors under People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, and struck the serious felony prior because Hurst committed it as a juvenile. Appellate counsel has filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende) indicating he has been unable to identify any arguable issues for reversal on appeal. Counsel asks the court to review the record for error as mandated by Wende. We offered Hurst the opportunity to file his own brief on appeal. He responded with a one-paragraph note that does not include any substantive legal argument: “My name is Patrick Dorian Hurst. The attorney that represented me on [a]ppeal is Richard Jay Moller. Right now I am claiming inaffective [sic] assistance of counsel due to him currently being on vacation in Hawaii, and rushing through my case and filing a Wende brief. I recently had a hip replacement surgery on 10/24/23. I have issues that need to be addressed.” FACTUAL BACKGROUND At one point, the court granted Hurst’s motion to represent himself under Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 (Faretta). It later granted his motion seeking appointment of counsel. On August 29, 2022, the day before trial began, the court granted Hurst’s renewed request to represent himself.

2 At trial, a female manager who was working alone at a gym testified that in 2020, Hurst entered the gym and she asked if she could help him. Hurst did not respond but approached an area where merchandise was displayed for sale, including headphones and gloves. Hurst ripped a pair of headphones from its lock, and took a pair of gloves and put them on his lap. The manager urged Hurst to return the items and promised not to call the police. Hurst refused, sat in his wheelchair, and pushed it against her body while attempting to leave. Hurst told her, “Move, bitch, or I will fucking move you myself.” He exited the gym. The manager called police, who arrived shortly afterwards, recovered the merchandise, and detained Hurst. Minutes later, the manager identified Hurst in a curbside lineup. Much of the incident was caught on videotape and played for the jury. DISCUSSION Appellate counsel in his Wende brief asks the court to independently review the record for error. To assist the court in its review, and in compliance with Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders), counsel has identified one possible issue in evaluating the potential merits of this appeal: Whether the trial court erred in granting Hurst his right to represent himself the day before trial began. This issue has no arguable merit. Hurst represented himself under Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. 806 after he filled out a form entitled “Acknowledgement Regarding Self-Representation of Waiver of Right to Counsel,” and after the court reviewed the Faretta waiver form with Hurst. The court explained the disadvantages of self- 3 representation and urged Hurst to allow trial counsel to continue to represent him. Hurst insisted on representing himself.2 Defendants have a constitutional right to defend themselves if they elect to do so in a timely, unequivocal, voluntary, knowing, and intelligent fashion. (Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. 806, 834-836.) “On appeal, we independently examine the entire record to determine whether the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived the right to counsel.” (People v. Burgener (2009) 46 Cal.4th 231, 241.) “ ‘Courts must indulge every reasonable inference against waiver of the right to counsel.’ ” (People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1069.) Review is not limited to the transcript of the hearing for the Faretta motion. (Koontz, at p. 1070.) Our review includes proceedings that occurred after the purported invocation of the right of self- representation. (People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 24.) We conclude the court did not err in granting Hurst his constitutional right to represent himself. Under People v. Kelley (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 120-121, we interpret Hurst’s note as asserting an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. To 2 In part of a colloquy with Hurst, the court probed whether Hurst was knowingly electing to represent himself: “[The court]: Mr. Hurst, do you want to go ahead and represent yourself then? “[Hurst]: Yes. “[The court]: Any doubts in your mind if you are doing the right thing for yourself? “[Hurst]: No. “[The court]: And you understand that I disagree with you? I think you are doing a very foolish thing, but the law says you can do it, if you would like to, and you understand my position, correct? “[Hurst]: Yes. “[The court]: All right. Good enough. Counsel, thank you very much. I will relieve you[.]” 4 establish such a claim, a defendant has the burden of demonstrating that counsel’s performance was deficient because it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms and he or she was prejudiced by that deficiency. (People v. Lopez (2008) 42 Cal.4th 960, 966.) We conclude Hurst has failed to carry his burden to establish that his appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance by filing a Wende brief. To the contrary, we have reviewed the entire record as required by Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436 and Anders, supra, 386 U.S. 738, and have not discovered any arguable issues for reversal on appeal. We also conclude competent counsel has represented Hurst in this appeal. DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed.

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

IRION, J.

BUCHANAN, J.

Cites, in this corpus