People v. Sanchez CA4/1
- Proceeding
- appeal from a judgment
- Trial court
- Superior Court of Riverside County · No. RIF1600163
- Trial judge
- John D. Molloy
- Outcome
- affirmed — Affirmed.
- Area
- criminal
- Panel
- Judith D. McConnell (author), Joan K. Irion, Julia C. Kelety
Analysis
The trial court denied Sanchez's petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, finding he failed to make a prima facie showing because he was not convicted of an enumerated offense and the jury was not instructed on imputed malice theories. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, concluding Sanchez was ineligible for relief as a matter of law.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Denial of petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6“We conclude Sanchez is ineligible for resentencing under section 1172.6 as a matter of law and no prima facie showing can be made, because Sanchez was not convicted of a crime enumerated in section 1172.6, subdivision (a).” | de novo | correct | agree with court The appellate court correctly applied the plain language of the statute, which limits relief to specific enumerated offenses (murder, attempted murder, voluntary manslaughter) and excludes attempted manslaughter. The court also correctly applied the independent review standard for Delgadillo appeals, finding no arguable issues in the record. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 — Establishes the procedure for independent review of the record when appellate counsel finds no arguable issues in a section 1172.6 appeal.
- relied: People v. Guzman (2005) 35 Cal.4th 577 — Courts must not add provisions to statutes; inserting additional language violates the cardinal rule of statutory construction.
- relied: People v. Connor (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 669 — When the Legislature makes express statutory distinctions, courts must presume they were deliberate and should not read statutes to include omitted language.
- relied: People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45 — Supports the conclusion that a petitioner is ineligible for section 1172.6 relief if the jury was not instructed on a theory of liability involving imputed malice.
- relied: People v. Offley (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 588 — Supports the conclusion that a petitioner is ineligible for section 1172.6 relief if the jury was not instructed on a theory of liability involving imputed malice.
- relied: People v. Cortes (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 198 — Supports the conclusion that a petitioner is ineligible for section 1172.6 relief if the jury was not instructed on a theory of liability involving imputed malice.
The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly applies the plain language of the statute to exclude attempted manslaughter and properly conducts an independent review of the record under Delgadillo. The court provides alternative grounds for affirmance by noting the absence of imputed malice instructions, which further supports the ineligibility for relief.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
unusual dispositionThe Riverside County Superior Court denied Victor Lopez Sanchez's Penal Code section 1172.6 resentencing petition at the prima facie stage, finding from the record of conviction (including the jury instructions) that no instruction could have allowed a conviction on an imputed-malice theory. On appeal under the People v. Delgadillo procedure, the Court of Appeal independently reviewed the record, held Sanchez ineligible as a matter of law because attempted voluntary manslaughter is not an offense enumerated in section 1172.6, subdivision (a), and alternatively because the jury was never instructed on felony murder, natural and probable consequences, or any imputed-malice theory, and affirmed.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Denial of section 1172.6 petition for failure to state a prima facie case because attempted voluntary manslaughter is not an offense enumerated in section 1172.6, subdivision (a)“We conclude Sanchez is ineligible for resentencing under section 1172.6 as a matter of law and no prima facie showing can be made, because Sanchez was not convicted of a crime enumerated in section 1172.6, subdivision (a).” | de novo | correct | agree with court The opinion does not expressly name a standard but resolves the question 'as a matter of law' on independent review, which is functionally de novo. Section 1172.6, subdivision (a), as amended by Senate Bill No. 775, extends relief to persons convicted of murder, attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, or manslaughter; attempted manslaughter is a distinct offense the Legislature did not list. The court's reliance on the rule against inserting language into statutes (Guzman) and on giving effect to express legislative distinctions (Connor) is a straightforward and correct application of statutory-construction principles. Sanchez's supplemental argument that his conviction shows he lacked malice does not bear on whether his offense is within the statute's enumerated list. |
Alternative ground: petitioner ineligible as a matter of law because the jury was not instructed on felony murder, natural and probable consequences, aiding and abetting, conspiracy, or any imputed-malice theory, and the attempted-murder/attempted-voluntary-manslaughter instructions required a finding of intent to kill“Instead, the jury was instructed under CALCRIM No’s. 600 and 603, which required the jury to find he acted with the intent to kill.” | de novo | correct | agree with court At the prima facie stage a court may consult the record of conviction, including jury instructions, to determine whether the petitioner is ineligible as a matter of law without engaging in factfinding. Where the only instructions given required the jury to find the defendant personally harbored intent to kill and no imputed-malice theory was presented, the petitioner could not have been convicted under a theory section 1172.6 abrogated. The court correctly cited Harden, Offley, and Cortes for this proposition and the record (judicially noticed instructions and verdict forms) supports it. The court did not cite People v. Lewis, the Supreme Court's controlling authority on use of the record of conviction at the prima facie stage, which the petitioner's reply brief in the trial court had implicitly challenged, but the result is consistent with Lewis. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 — Procedure for appeals from denial of section 1172.6 petitions where appointed counsel finds no arguable issues; appellate court may conduct independent review of the record when the defendant files a supplemental brief
- relied: People v. Guzman (2005) 35 Cal.4th 577 — Courts must not add provisions to statutes; inserting additional language violates the cardinal rule of statutory construction
- relied: People v. Connor (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 669 — When the Legislature makes express statutory distinctions, courts presume it did so deliberately and should not read statutes to include omitted language
- relied: People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45 — A petitioner is ineligible for section 1172.6 relief as a matter of law where the record of conviction, including jury instructions, shows the jury was not instructed on any theory of imputed malice
- relied: People v. Offley (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 588 — Jury instructions in the record of conviction may establish as a matter of law that the petitioner was not convicted under a felony-murder or natural and probable consequences theory
- relied: People v. Cortes (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 198 — A petitioner whose jury was instructed only on theories requiring personal intent to kill, and not on imputed-malice theories, is ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law
- missed: People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.4th 952 — At the prima facie stage of a section 1172.6 petition the court may consider the record of conviction, including jury instructions, to determine ineligibility as a matter of law, but may not engage in factfinding or weigh evidence; this is the controlling Supreme Court authority on the trial court's use of the record here and should have been cited
The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The opinion reaches a correct result on two independent grounds: the statute's plain text does not include attempted manslaughter, and the record of conviction shows no imputed-malice theory was ever presented to the jury, so the petitioner could not make a prima facie showing under any reading. It is a brief Delgadillo-review opinion that omits citation to People v. Lewis, the controlling authority on prima facie review of the record of conviction, but the Court of Appeal decisions it cites apply Lewis and the omission does not affect the outcome.
Opinion
Filed 2/23/24 P. v. Sanchez CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D083028
Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. RIF1600163)
VICTOR LOPEZ SANCHEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County, John D. Molloy, Judge. Affirmed. Jeanine Grimmond Strong for Defendant and Appellant. No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent. Victor Lopez Sanchez appeals from an order denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6.1 His appellate counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 (Delgadillo), and Sanchez filed a supplemental brief. We grant counsel’s request to take judicial notice of our decision in appeal No. D073727 and the jury 1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless indicated otherwise. instructions and the verdict forms from Sanchez’s record of conviction. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (c), 459.) Based on our independent review of the record, we find no reasonably arguable appellate issues and affirm the judgment. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND In 2016, a jury found Sanchez guilty of inflicting corporal injury upon a spouse (§ 273.5, subd. (a); counts 1 & 2); assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4); count 3); attempted voluntary manslaughter, as a lesser included offense of attempted murder (§§ 192, subd. (a), 664; count 4); assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2); count 5); discharging a firearm at an occupied vehicle (§ 246; count 6); using force or threat of force to dissuade a witness from reporting a suspected crime to law enforcement (§ 136.1, subds. (b) & (c); counts 7 & 9); making criminal threats (§ 422; counts 8 & 10); discharging a firearm at an inhabited dwelling (§ 246; count 11); intentionally and knowingly violating a court-issued domestic violence protective order (§ 273.6, subd. (a); count 12); possessing a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a); count 13); and possessing controlled substance paraphernalia (Health & Saf. Code, § 11364; count 14). As to counts 1 and 2, the jury found true allegations Sanchez personally inflicted great bodily injury (§§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(8), 12022.7, subd. (e)). As to counts 4, 6, and 11, the jury found true allegations he personally used a firearm (§§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(8); 12022.53, subd. (c).) Sanchez separately admitted allegations he had two prior convictions, which qualified as both prior serious felony convictions and prior strike convictions (§§ 667, subds. (a), (c) & (e)(2)(A), 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(A).) He also admitted he was released on bail when he committed the offense of discharging a firearm at an inhabited dwelling (§ 12022.1).
2 Sanchez was sentenced to a total prison term of 38 years four months for the felony counts, and a total consecutive jail term of two years six months for the misdemeanor counts. In the direct appeal, this court reversed the judgment as to his conviction for discharging a firearm at an inhabited dwelling, remanded the matter for further proceedings, but affirmed the judgment in all other respects. (People v. Sanchez (Aug. 28, 2018, D073727) [nonpub. opn.].) On remand, Sanchez was resentenced to a total prison term of 35 years six months. On September 26, 2022, Sanchez filed a petition for resentencing under former section 1170.95, now section 1172.6.2 Counsel was appointed and filed a brief in support of resentencing. In response, the People filed a “Request for Judicial Notice of Materials Re Latent Defects in Penal Code § 1172.6 Petition for Resentencing”, requesting the court take judicial notice of the jury instructions, the opinion in the direct appeal, and the entire court file from the original case. Counsel for Sanchez filed a reply, contending the absence of jury instructions at Sanchez’s trial on the felony murder rule or the natural and probable consequences doctrine should not preclude him from section 1172.6 relief at the prima facie stage. After a hearing, the superior court found Sanchez failed to state a prima facie case for relief and denied the petition. Based on the record of conviction, including the jury instructions, the court concluded there was “no instruction that could have allowed an improper conclusion of guilt[.]”
2 Effective June 30, 2022, former section 1170.95 was renumbered to section 1172.6, with no change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) 3 DISCUSSION Sanchez’s appellate counsel has filed a brief raising no issues and requesting this court proceed pursuant to Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th 216. In its brief, counsel identifies the following issue to assist the court in its search of the record for error: Although section 1172.6, subdivision (a) limits resentencing relief to convictions for murder, attempted murder, and manslaughter, should the statute be interpreted to include attempted manslaughter? In his supplemental brief, Sanchez contends he is eligible for resentencing because his conviction for attempted voluntary manslaughter shows he did not act with the requisite malice. We conclude Sanchez is ineligible for resentencing under section 1172.6 as a matter of law and no prima facie showing can be made, because Sanchez was not convicted of a crime enumerated in section 1172.6, subdivision (a). The amendments enacted by Senate Bill No. 775 (2020–2021 Reg. Sess.) limited resentencing to petitioners convicted after trial of murder, attempted murder, and voluntary manslaughter, subject to certain express requirements. The Legislature did not include attempted manslaughter within those provisions. “ ‘[I]nsert[ing]’ additional language into a statute ‘violate[s] the cardinal rule of statutory construction that courts must not add provisions to statutes.’ ” (People v. Guzman (2005) 35 Cal.4th 577, 587.) “Where, as here, the Legislature makes express statutory distinctions, ‘we must presume it did so deliberately, giving effect to the distinctions, unless the whole scheme reveals the distinction is unintended . . . [W]e presume the Legislature intended everything in a statutory scheme, and we should not read statutes to omit expressed language or include omitted language.’ ” (People v. Connor (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 669, 691.)
4 Even if Sanchez’s conviction for attempted voluntary manslaughter was within the provisions of section 1172.6, he would still be ineligible for resentencing. During his trial, the jury was not instructed on the felony- murder rule, the natural and probable consequences doctrine, principals and accomplices, aiding and abetting, conspiracy, or any theory of imputed malice. Instead, the jury was instructed under CALCRIM No’s. 600 and 603, which required the jury to find he acted with the intent to kill. Sanchez is thus ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 as a matter of law, because the jury was not instructed on any theory of liability for attempted voluntary manslaughter in which malice could be imputed solely based on his participation in a crime. (See People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 52; People v. Offley (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 588, 599; People v. Cortes (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 198, 205.) Accordingly, based on our independent review of the record, we have not discovered any arguable issues for reversal on appeal. DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed.
McCONNELL, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
IRION, J.
KELETY, J.
Cites, in this corpus
- People v. Delgadillo S266305 · 2022-12-19
- People v. Guzman S119129 · 2005-03-21
- People v. Connor H024743 · 2004-02-06