People v. Ross CA4/1

California Court of Appeal · D081673 · 2024-02-02 · Unpublished

Proceeding: appeal from a judgment
Trial court: Superior Court of San Diego County · No. SCE406629
Trial judge: Frank L. Birchak
Outcome: affirmed — Remanded with directions and affirmed in all other respects.
Area: criminal
Panel: Michele M. Castillo (author), Joan K. Irion, Truc T. Do

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T04:19Z · confidence high

The trial court issued a criminal protective order containing a term (No. 10) that conflicted with its oral sentencing pronouncement, which omitted that term. The Court of Appeal remanded the case for the limited purpose of clarifying whether term 10 applies, affirming the judgment in all other respects.

Ruling reviewed	Standard	The court	The model
Whether term number 10 of the criminal protective order applies to the defendant given the conflict between the written form and the oral sentencing pronouncement. “In matters where the trial court’s intention is ambiguous, we do not substitute our judgment for the trial court’s. (See People v. Price (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 224, 243).”	unclear	error	agree with court The appellate court correctly identified that the written protective order and the oral pronouncement conflicted. It applied the principle that when a trial court's intent is ambiguous, the appellate court should not substitute its own judgment but should remand for clarification. This is a standard procedural approach to resolving conflicts in the record where the trial court's specific intent cannot be definitively determined from the existing record.

Authorities

relied: People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380 — The oral pronouncement of a sentence controls when it conflicts with the written record.
relied: People v. Harrison (2005) 35 Cal.4th 208 — Conflicting records should be harmonized if possible.
relied: People v. Contreras (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 868 — If conflicting records cannot be harmonized, the circumstances of the case determine which prevails.
relied: People v. Price (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 224 — In matters where the trial court’s intention is ambiguous, the appellate court does not substitute its judgment for the trial court’s.
relied: People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847 — Matters can be appropriately resolved by memorandum opinion.

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly applies established California law regarding the hierarchy of oral versus written sentencing records and the appropriate remedy (remand) when the trial court's intent is ambiguous. It avoids substituting its own judgment for the trial court's, which is the correct procedural posture.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

unusual disposition

A model's reading — claude-fable-5-1, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T04:30Z · confidence medium

The trial court issued a Judicial Council Form CR-160 criminal protective order at sentencing but orally read only terms 7 through 9 while leaving the good-cause checkbox for term 10 unmarked, creating a conflict between the oral pronouncement and the written order. The Court of Appeal, by memorandum opinion, found the record ambiguous as to the trial court's intent regarding term 10, declined to correct the order itself, remanded for the limited purpose of clarifying whether term 10 applies, and otherwise affirmed the judgment.

Ruling reviewed	Standard	The court	The model
Issuance of criminal protective order (Form CR-160) including term 10 (restriction on obtaining addresses/locations of protected persons) without checking the good-cause box, despite not orally pronouncing term 10 at sentencing “On this record, we cannot definitively determine the court’s intention as to term number 10. In matters where the trial court’s intention is ambiguous, we do not substitute our judgment for the trial court’s.”	unclear	error (procedure)	agree with court The opinion correctly identifies a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement and the written order and applies the settled rule that the oral pronouncement generally controls, while recognizing that where the trial court's intent is genuinely ambiguous the matter should be remanded rather than resolved by the appellate court. Given that the court knew the defendant and protected person lived together with children, the omission of term 10 from the oral reading is plausibly intentional, but the unmarked checkbox leaves room for doubt; a limited remand is a measured and defensible disposition consistent with Zackery, Harrison, Contreras and Price. The appellate court did not expressly state a standard of review, which is understandable for a clerical/pronouncement conflict reviewed as a question on the face of the record.

Authorities

relied: People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380 — The oral pronouncement of sentence generally controls when it conflicts with the written record.
relied: People v. Harrison (2005) 35 Cal.4th 208 — Conflicting records should be harmonized if possible.
relied: People v. Contreras (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 868 — Where records cannot be harmonized, the circumstances of the case determine which prevails.
relied: People v. Price (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 224 — Where the trial court's intention is ambiguous, the appellate court does not substitute its judgment for the trial court's.
relied: People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847 — Appropriate matters may be resolved by memorandum opinion.

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion applies the correct line of authority on conflicts between oral pronouncements and written orders, and reasonably concludes that the ambiguity about term 10 should be resolved by the trial court on limited remand rather than by appellate correction. It is brief and does not discuss a standard of review or the Attorney General's concession in depth, but nothing material is skipped given the narrow, conceded issue.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

Filed 2/2/24 P. v. Ross CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D081673

Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. SCE406629)

MARIEESE ANTOINE ROSS,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Frank L. Birchak, Judge. Remanded with directions and affirmed in all other respects. Matthew A. Lopas, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Vincent LaPietra and Daniel Rogers, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. MEMORANDUM OPINION Marieese Antoine Ross appeals from the criminal protective order entered against him, claiming one of its terms is inconsistent with the trial court’s oral pronouncement of his sentence. Ross requests we correct the error or alternatively remand for the limited purpose of correcting it. The Attorney General concedes the ambiguity but claims it should be redressed on limited remand. We find this matter appropriately resolved by memorandum opinion (see generally People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847) and remand solely to clarify whether term number 10 of the criminal protective order applies to Ross. We agree with the parties that there is an ambiguity between the criminal protective order, issued on Judicial Council Form CR-160, and the trial court’s oral pronouncement at Ross’ sentencing. Term numbers 7 through 10 presumptively apply. However, term number 10, which restricts a defendant from obtaining “the addresses or locations of protected persons or their family members,” does not apply if a checkbox is marked showing the court finds “good cause” not to impose it.

At Ross’ sentencing, the trial court orally read term numbers 7 through 9 into the record. The court did not read term number 10 into the record, 2 suggesting it did not intend to impose it; however, as shown above, the checkbox for term number 10 on the issued criminal protective order is unmarked. Thus, the oral pronouncement and the protective order appear to conflict. Generally, the oral pronouncement of a sentence controls when it conflicts with the written record. (People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385.) Conflicting records should be harmonized if possible (People v. Harrison (2005) 35 Cal.4th 208, 226), but if they cannot be, the circumstances of the case determine which prevails. (People v. Contreras (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 868, 880.) Here, the trial court was aware that Ross and the protected person were living together, recently engaged, and raising four children. Thus, imposing term number 10 appears inconsistent with the circumstances known to the court at sentencing. We decline, however, Ross’ invitation to directly correct this apparent discrepancy. On this record, we cannot definitively determine the court’s intention as to term number 10. In matters where the trial court’s intention is ambiguous, we do not substitute our judgment for the trial court’s. (See People v. Price (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 224, 243). Accordingly, whether term number 10 applies to Ross is best decided by the trial court on remand.

3 DISPOSITION We remand this matter for the limited purpose of clarifying whether term number 10 of the Judicial Council Form CR-160 criminal protective order, executed on February 3, 2023, applies to Ross. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment.

CASTILLO, J.

WE CONCUR:

IRION, Acting P. J.

DO, J.

Cites, in this corpus

People v. Contreras H040903 · 2015-06-16
People v. Zackery C051431 · 2007-02-01
People v. Harrison S035367 · 2005-03-03
People v. Price A101668, A104440 · 2004-06-30
People v. Garcia F034831 · 2002-04-17