Washington v. Horvath CA4/1

California Court of Appeal · D061068 · 2013-06-27 · Unpublished

Proceeding: appeal from a judgment
Trial court: Superior Court of San Diego County · No. 37-2009-00070679-CU-HR-EC
Trial judge: Retired
Outcome: dismissed — Dismissed.
Area: civil
Panel: O'Rourke (author), Judith D. McConnell, McINTYRE

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T06:53Z · confidence high

The trial court denied the defendant's motions to set aside or terminate a restraining order, ruling that no new evidence or change in law justified modification. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal because the order was not appealable and had expired, rendering the issue moot.

Ruling reviewed	Standard	The court	The model
Denial of motion to modify/terminate restraining order “The trial court denied the motions, ruling the parties had presented no argument that the law upon which the restraining order was granted had changed, and no basis existed for setting aside the restraining order because Horvath had not proved there was new evidence which she could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the hearing.”	unclear	not reached	unsure The appellate court did not review the merits of the trial court's denial because it dismissed the appeal on procedural grounds (non-appealability and mootness). Therefore, the correctness of the trial court's substantive application of the law was not evaluated.
Appealability of the order “Under the authority of our previous cases, we dismiss this appeal on grounds the court's denial of the motion for reconsideration is not an appealable order. (§§ 1008, subd. (b), 533; Annette F. v. Sharon S. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1448, 1458-1459; Tate v. Wilburn (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 150, 156; 160.)”	de novo	correct	agree with court The court correctly identified that orders denying motions to set aside or modify restraining orders under CCP 533 are generally not appealable until the underlying order expires or is modified, citing established case law.
Mootness due to expiration “An alternative ground for dismissing Horvath's appeal regarding the court's December 9, 2009 restraining order is that it expired on December 8, 2012. Accordingly, this court cannot provide effective relief from that expired order. (Santa Monica Baykeeper v. City of Malibu (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1538, 1547.)”	de novo	correct	agree with court The court correctly applied the mootness doctrine, noting that the restraining order had expired before the appeal was resolved, and that the appellant failed to demonstrate any of the discretionary exceptions to the mootness rule.

Authorities

relied: Annette F. v. Sharon S. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1448 — Denials of motions to modify or set aside restraining orders are not appealable.
relied: Tate v. Wilburn (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 150 — Orders denying motions to set aside restraining orders are not appealable.
relied: Santa Monica Baykeeper v. City of Malibu (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1538 — Courts have discretionary authority to decide moot issues under specific exceptions, which were not met here.

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is procedurally sound as it correctly identifies the lack of jurisdiction due to the non-appealable nature of the order and the mootness resulting from its expiration. It relies on standard California authorities for these procedural dismissals.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

unusual disposition

A model's reading — claude-fable-5-1, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T04:31Z · confidence low

The trial court denied Helen Horvath's renewed motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 1008, subdivision (b) and her motion under section 533 to set aside or terminate a civil harassment restraining order issued against her in December 2009, finding no change in law and no new evidence she could not have discovered earlier. The Court of Appeal dismissed her appeal, holding the denial of a reconsideration motion is not appealable and, alternatively, that the appeal was moot because the restraining order expired on December 8, 2012 and no discretionary exception to mootness applied.

Ruling reviewed	Standard	The court	The model
Denial of Horvath's renewed motion under section 1008, subdivision (b) to set aside the December 9, 2009 civil harassment restraining order “Under the authority of our previous cases, we dismiss this appeal on grounds the court's denial of the motion for reconsideration is not an appealable order.”	de novo	not reached	agree with court Appealability is a jurisdictional question of law; Annette F. and Tate v. Wilburn both hold that an order denying a motion for reconsideration or a renewed motion under section 1008 is not independently appealable, and the underlying restraining order had already been the subject of a dismissed appeal. Dismissal on this ground is consistent with the cited authority.
Denial of Horvath's motion under section 533 to terminate or modify the restraining order “Accordingly, this court cannot provide effective relief from that expired order.”	unclear	not reached	unsure The opinion folds the section 533 motion into the nonappealable reconsideration motion without addressing section 904.1, subdivision (a)(6), which makes an order refusing to dissolve an injunction appealable, as this same division recognized in Loeffler v. Medina. The alternative mootness ground nonetheless supports dismissal because the order expired by its terms and Horvath did not invoke any exception, so the ultimate result is defensible even if the appealability analysis is incomplete.

Authorities

relied: Annette F. v. Sharon S. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1448 — An order denying a motion for reconsideration is not an appealable order.
relied: Tate v. Wilburn (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 150 — Orders denying motions for reconsideration and renewed motions under section 1008 are not appealable, and a party cannot evade that rule by relabeling the motion.
relied: Santa Monica Baykeeper v. City of Malibu (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1538 — An appeal is moot when the court cannot grant effective relief, subject to discretionary exceptions for issues of broad public interest likely to recur, likely recurrence between the parties, or a remaining material question.
missed: Loeffler v. Medina (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1495 — An order denying a motion to dissolve or modify a civil harassment restraining order is appealable under section 904.1, subdivision (a)(6) as an order refusing to dissolve an injunction, and is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The dismissal rests on two independent grounds, and the mootness ground is well supported because the restraining order expired by its own terms during the appeal and Horvath identified no exception. The court, however, treated the section 533 motion to terminate the injunction as a nonappealable reconsideration motion without addressing section 904.1, subdivision (a)(6) or Loeffler v. Medina, leaving a gap in the appealability analysis.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

Filed 6/27/13 Washington v. Horvath CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

CHRISTOPHER WASHINGTON, D061068

Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. 37-2009-00070679- CU-HR-EC) HELEN HORVATH, Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Fredrick Mandabach, Retired, Judge. Dismissed.

Helen Horvath, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant and appellant Helen Horvath, who is self-represented, purports to appeal the superior court's denial of her motion to modify a restraining order enjoining her from harassing plaintiff and respondent Christopher Washington. But that order is not appealable. Further, the record reflects the restraining order, by its terms, has expired. Accordingly, this court cannot provide effective relief from the order, and the appeal is dismissed.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In November 2009, Washington filed a request under Code of Civil Procedure,1 sections 527.6 and 527.9 for a court order to stop Horvath's harassment of himself, his wife and his daughter. Horvath noted that approximately one year earlier the court had denied his previous request for such an order, but admonished Horvath to cease further contact with him. Washington claimed Horvath's subsequent "nearly two year course of harassing conduct, despite being told to stop by [himself] and a judge, and being contacted by law enforcement, has risen to the level of being threatening." The court issued a temporary restraining order and set a hearing for December 9, 2009.

Horvath filed an answer to Washington's request for orders to stop harassment, generally denying Washington's claims, and alleging that, in fact, she had been harassed and endangered by Washington and his wife. Following a hearing, the court issued a restraining order which expired on December 8, 2012.

Horvath unsuccessfully moved to set aside the restraining order She later sought reconsideration of that ruling, which the trial court decided it lacked jurisdiction to address because Horvath had separately filed an appeal in this court.

1 All statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure. 2 In April 2011, Horvath again moved to set aside the restraining order, and in June 2011 she amended her motion, seeking to terminate the restraining order under section 533.

On October 14, 2011, the court responded to Horvath's new motions by first summarizing the procedural history of the case: "Following the issuance of a restraining order . . . [on December 9, 2009, Horvath] filed a motion pursuant to [section] 1008.

That motion was heard and denied . . . . [Horvath] then appealed the denial. This appeal was dismissed by [the Court of Appeal] for failure to timely designate the record. Now this same restraining order is the subject of two new motions" under sections 1008, subdivision (b) and 533. The trial court denied the motions, ruling the parties had presented no argument that the law upon which the restraining order was granted had changed, and no basis existed for setting aside the restraining order because Horvath had not proved there was new evidence which she could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the hearing.

DISCUSSION

Horvath contends "the trial court erred on multiple levels during multiple hearings over the life of the [restraining order]." Washington did not file a reply brief in this appeal.

Under the authority of our previous cases, we dismiss this appeal on grounds the court's denial of the motion for reconsideration is not an appealable order. (§§ 1008, subd. (b), 533; Annette F. v. Sharon S. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1448, 1458-1459; Tate v. Wilburn (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 150, 156; 160.)

3 An alternative ground for dismissing Horvath's appeal regarding the court's December 9, 2009 restraining order is that it expired on December 8, 2012. Accordingly, this court cannot provide effective relief from that expired order. (Santa Monica Baykeeper v. City of Malibu (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1538, 1547.) A court has discretionary authority to decide moot issues: "(1) when the case presents an issue of broad public interest that is likely to recur [citation]; (2) when there may be a recurrence of the controversy between the parties [citation]; and (3) when a material question remains for the court's determination." (Id. at p. 1548.) Horvath has not shown that this case falls within these discretionary exceptions.

DISPOSITION

The appeal is dismissed. No costs are awarded on appeal.

O'ROURKE, J.

WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

McINTYRE, J.

Cites, in this corpus

Santa Monica Baykeeper v. City of Malibu No. B222776 · 2011-04-05
Tate v. Wilburn D054609 · 2010-04-28
Annette F. v. Sharon S. D043723 · 2005-07-12