People v. Allen CA4/1
- Proceeding
- appeal from an order
- Trial court
- Superior Court of San Diego County · No. SCD216913
- Trial judge
- Jeffrey F. Fraser
- Outcome
- reversed — Reversed and remanded.
- Area
- criminal
- Panel
- William S. Dato (author), Truc T. Do, Julia C. Kelety
Analysis
The trial court summarily denied Allen's petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, finding him ineligible as a matter of law based on a conspiracy to commit murder charge. The Court of Appeal reversed, accepting the Attorney General's concession that the record did not establish ineligibility, and remanded for an evidentiary hearing.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Summary denial of petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6 at the prima facie stage“The trial court relied upon the charging document, specifically count 5, to conclude that Allen was ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law.” | de novo | error | agree with court The trial court incorrectly relied on a charge (conspiracy to commit murder) to which the defendant was not convicted to determine ineligibility. The appellate court correctly applied the standard from People v. Lewis, noting that the record did not demonstrate the petitioner was ineligible as a matter of law because the plea deal did not specify the theory of murder avoided. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952 — Establishes the prima facie standard for section 1172.6 petitions, requiring the court to accept allegations as true and prohibiting factfinding at this stage.
- relied: People v. Ervin (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 90 — States that a decision to deny a resentencing petition at the prima facie stage is reviewed de novo and is appropriate only if the record demonstrates ineligibility as a matter of law.
- relied: People v. Contreras (2013) 58 Cal.4th 123 — Holds that an information need not specify the theory of murder on which the prosecution relies at trial.
- relied: People v. Drayton (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 965 — Supports the proposition that a court may not engage in factfinding and weighing credibility at the prima facie stage of petition review.
The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly applies the legal standard from People v. Lewis and People v. Ervin to the specific facts of the record. It accurately identifies that the trial court erred by relying on a non-convicted charge to determine ineligibility, a conclusion supported by the Attorney General's concession.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
unusual dispositionThe San Diego Superior Court summarily denied Michael Allen's Penal Code section 1172.6 petition at the prima facie stage, reasoning that because he had been charged with conspiracy to commit murder (count 5) his 2010 voluntary manslaughter plea could not have rested on felony murder or natural and probable consequences theories. The Court of Appeal accepted the Attorney General's concession of error, reversed, and remanded with directions to issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing under section 1172.6, subdivision (d).
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Summary denial of the section 1172.6 resentencing petition at the prima facie stage, without issuing an order to show cause, on the ground that the conspiracy-to-commit-murder charge rendered Allen ineligible as a matter of law.“It found that, because Allen was charged with conspiracy to commit murder, he was facially ineligible for resentencing because his conviction did not arise from either the natural and probable consequences doctrine or a felony murder theory.” | de novo | error (law misapplied) | agree with court Under Lewis, a court at the prima facie stage must accept the petition's allegations as true and may deny only if the record of conviction shows ineligibility as a matter of law, without factfinding. Allen was never convicted of conspiracy; he pled to voluntary manslaughter. A charge in the information does not establish the theory the prosecution would have pursued at trial, because under Contreras the information need not specify the murder theory, and the amended information here specified none. The trial court therefore drew an inference from an uncharged-at-conviction count rather than from a record showing legal ineligibility, which is precisely what Lewis forbids. The appellate court's conclusion, bolstered by the People's concession, follows directly from those authorities. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952 — At the prima facie stage of a section 1172.6 petition the court accepts the allegations as true, may consult the record of conviction to see whether they are rebutted, but may not engage in factfinding or credibility weighing; denial is proper only if the petitioner is ineligible as a matter of law.
- relied: People v. Ervin (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 90 — Denial at the prima facie stage is appropriate only if the record of conviction demonstrates ineligibility as a matter of law, a purely legal conclusion reviewed de novo.
- relied: People v. Contreras (2013) 58 Cal.4th 123 — The information need not specify the theory of murder on which the prosecution relies at trial, so a generic murder charge leaves open felony murder and natural and probable consequences theories.
- relied: People v. Drayton (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 965 — The trial court may not engage in factfinding or weigh credibility when assessing a prima facie showing under the resentencing statute.
The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion correctly applies Lewis and Ervin to hold that a mere conspiracy charge, as opposed to a conviction, cannot establish ineligibility as a matter of law where the information did not specify the murder theory and the petitioner pled to voluntary manslaughter. The analysis is brief and rests on a concession, but it addresses the single dispositive question with the controlling authorities and orders the statutorily required remedy.
Opinion
Filed 10/27/23 P. v. Allen CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D081588
Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD216913)
MICHAEL ANTHONY ALLEN,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Jeffrey F. Fraser, Judge. Reversed and remanded. Arielle Bases, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Melissa Mandel and Elana Miller, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. Defendant Michael Allen appeals after the trial court summarily denied his petition under Penal Code section 1172.6 (formerly section 1170.95) without an evidentiary hearing. We accept the Attorney General’s concession of error and reverse. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND The People charged Allen with murder (Pen. Code,1 § 187, subd. (a)), attempted murder (§§ 664 & 187, subd. (a)), conspiracy to commit murder (§ 182, subd.(a)(1)), shooting at an occupied structure (§ 246), and the unlawful taking and driving of a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)). In 2010, he pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (a)) and evading an officer with reckless driving (Veh. Code, § 2800.2).2 Twelve years later, in March 2022, Allen filed a petition under section 1172.63 requesting that his voluntary manslaughter and reckless evasion convictions be vacated and he be resentenced. His supporting declaration consisted of a preprinted form where he checked boxes that stated: (1) a complaint, information, or indictment was filed against him that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder, murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime, or attempted murder under the natural and probable causes doctrine; (2) he was convicted of murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter following a trial, or accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which he could have been 1 Further section references are to the Penal Code unless noted otherwise.
2 We note that the guilty plea form indicates Allen pled to “[Penal Code section] 2800.2.” This is clearly a clerical error and is listed as “[Vehicle Code section] 2800.2” elsewhere in the record.
3 Assembly Bill No. 200 (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10) renumbered section 1170.95 to 1172.6, effective June 30, 2022. 2 convicted of murder or attempted murder; and (3) he could not presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder because of changes made to sections 188 and 189, effective January 1, 2019. The People opposed Allen’s petition. The trial court summarily denied the petition without issuing an order to show cause. DISCUSSION When a trial court reviews a petition for resentencing under section 1172.6, it first determines if the petitioner has shown a prima facie case for relief under the statute. (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 971 (Lewis).) The court accepts the allegations as true and evaluates whether the petitioner would be entitled to relief if he or she proves the allegations. (Ibid.) The court may review the record of conviction, including to a limited extent any prior appellate opinion, to determine if the petitioner’s allegations are rebutted by the record. (Id. at p. 972.) But the court may not engage in factfinding and weighing credibility at the prima facie stage of petition review. (Id. at p. 971, citing People v. Drayton (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 965, 979–980.) A court’s decision to deny a resentencing petition at the prima facie stage “ ‘is appropriate only if the record of conviction demonstrates that “the petitioner is ineligible for relief as a matter of law.” [Citations.] This is a purely legal conclusion, which we review de novo.’ ” (People v. Ervin (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 90, 101.) In this case, the trial court relied upon the charging document, specifically count 5, to conclude that Allen was ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law. It found that, because Allen was charged with conspiracy to commit murder, he was facially ineligible for resentencing because his conviction did not arise from either the natural and probable consequences 3 doctrine or a felony murder theory. But Allen was not convicted of conspiracy to commit murder. Rather, he pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter, thereby avoiding convictions for both murder and conspiracy to commit murder. And had he not accepted a plea deal, it would have been permissible for the prosecutor to argue any theory of murder, including felony murder and murder based on the natural and probable consequences doctrine because “[t]he information . . . need not specify the theory of murder on which the prosecution relies at trial.” (People v. Contreras (2013) 58 Cal.4th 123, 147.) The amended information, in fact, did not identify the theory of murder the People would pursue at trial. On this record, it is unclear which theory or theories of murder Allen avoided by accepting the plea offer. It is on this basis that Allen asserts the trial court erred by finding him ineligible for relief at the prima facie stage under section 1172.6, subdivision (c). The Attorney General agrees with Allen. The People concede that “there was nothing in the record of conviction establishing that appellant was ineligible for relief as a matter of law.” We accept the concession and remand the matter for an evidentiary hearing under section 1172.6, subdivision (d). We express no opinion on the outcome of that hearing.
4 DISPOSITION We reverse the trial court’s order denying the petition. On remand, the trial court is directed to issue an order to show cause pursuant to section 1172.6, subdivisions (b)(3) and (c), and to conduct an evidentiary hearing pursuant to subdivision (d).
DATO, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
DO, J.
KELETY, J.
Cites, in this corpus
- People v. Lewis S260598 · 2021-07-26
- People v. Contreras S058019 · 2013-12-12