In re T.G. CA4/1
- Proceeding
- appeal from orders
- Trial court
- Superior Court of San Diego County · No. EJ4648CD
- Trial judge
- Mark T. Cumba
- Outcome
- affirmed — Affirmed.
- Area
- dependency
- Panel
- Judith D. McConnell (author), Truc T. Do, Michele M. Castillo
Analysis
The juvenile court terminated L.B.'s parental rights to T.G. and J.G. at a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing, implicitly finding the Agency's ICWA inquiry adequate. On appeal, Mother argued only that the Agency failed to ask 11 paternal 'potential relatives' about Indian ancestry; the Court of Appeal affirmed in a memorandum opinion because Mother did not show any of those persons qualified as 'extended family members' under 25 U.S.C. § 1903(2) and the Agency's letters to them went unanswered.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Implied finding that the Agency satisfied its ICWA/section 224.2 initial inquiry duty despite not interviewing 11 paternal 'potential relatives' listed in the Jurisdiction/Disposition Report“Here, Mother fails to establish a qualifying relationship for any of the individuals she identifies. Moreover, although the Agency sent contact letters to these relatives, none responded.” | unclear | correct | agree with court The court did not state a standard of review but treated the issue as whether Mother carried her appellate burden of demonstrating error. Its reading of section 224.2, subdivision (b) is textually sound: the expanded inquiry duty runs to 'extended family members' as defined in 25 U.S.C. § 1903(2) and section 224.1, subdivision (c), and the record showed only that the 11 individuals shared Father's surname and were labeled 'Relative.' The court correctly distinguished In re J.C. and In re Darian R., where the agency had actual contact with identified grandparents and an aunt. The additional facts that the Agency mailed letters to all 11 without response, and that the one responding paternal aunt denied Indian heritage and said no one else in the family had more information, further support the conclusion. The court did not grapple with the counterargument that the Agency's 'affirmative and continuing duty' might require it to clarify the relationships of people it itself identified, but on this record the result is defensible. |
Orders terminating parental rights under section 366.26“Because this is Mother’s sole argument on appeal, Mother has not shown any error in the juvenile court’s orders.” | unclear | correct | agree with court Mother raised no challenge to the termination orders other than the ICWA inquiry claim. Once that claim failed, affirmance of the orders followed; the court's disposition is consistent with the scope of the appeal as described. |
Authorities
- relied: In re J.C. (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 70 — ICWA inquiry inadequate where the social worker was in regular contact with one grandmother and had spoken to the other grandmother's husband but asked neither grandmother about Indian heritage; distinguished because specific qualifying extended family members were identified and reachable.
- relied: In re Darian R. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 502 — ICWA inquiry inadequate where the social worker interviewed a maternal aunt and had contact with the maternal grandfather but did not ask them about Indian heritage; distinguished because the relatives were identified extended family members with whom the agency actually had contact.
- relied: In re Ja.O. (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 672 — Cited (review granted) for the split of authority on whether the expanded section 224.2, subdivision (b) inquiry duty applies only to children taken into temporary custody without a warrant under sections 306 or 307; the court did not resolve the question.
- relied: In re Robert F. (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 492 — Cited (review granted) as holding the expanded initial inquiry duty applies only to children taken into temporary custody under sections 306 or 307; the court noted the split but assumed without deciding that the expanded duty applied given the Agency's implicit concession.
- relied: In re Delila D. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 953 — Cited for the contrary view in the split that the expanded extended-family inquiry duty applies regardless of how the child was taken into custody; noted but not decided.
The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The opinion correctly reads section 224.2, subdivision (b) and 25 U.S.C. § 1903(2) to limit the mandatory inquiry to defined extended family members, properly distinguishes J.C. and Darian R., and rests on record facts (unanswered letters, aunt's denial) that support the result. It does not, however, identify a standard of review or address whether the Agency's affirmative and continuing duty obligated it to clarify the relationships of persons it had itself identified as 'potential relatives,' leaving a gap in an otherwise defensible analysis.
Opinion
Filed 9/29/23 In re T.G. CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
In re T.G. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. D082163 SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, (Super. Ct. No. EJ4648CD)
Plaintiff and Respondent, v. L.B., Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Mark T. Cumba, Judge. Affirmed. William Hook, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Claudia G. Silva, County Counsel, Lisa M. Maldonado, Chief Deputy County Counsel, and Natasha C. Edwards, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. MEMORANDUM OPINION1 L.B. (Mother) appeals from orders terminating parental rights to her children, T.G. and J.G. (Children), after a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.262 hearing. Mother contends that the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) did not comply with its inquiry duties under the federal Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) (ICWA) and section 224.2. However, Mother has not shown that the Agency failed to inquire of any persons who qualify as “extended family member[s]” for purposes of ICWA. Section 224.2 imposes an “affirmative and continuing duty” upon the Agency and the juvenile court to inquire whether a child subject to juvenile dependency may be an Indian child. (§ 224.2, subd. (a).) Subdivision (b) of section 224.2 creates an expanded duty of initial inquiry that requires the Agency to ask “extended family member[s]” whether the child may be an Indian child. ICWA defines “ ‘extended family member’ ” by “the law or custom of the Indian child’s tribe” or, absent such law or custom, as “a person who has reached the age of eighteen and who is the Indian child’s grandparent, aunt or uncle, brother or sister, brother-in-law or sister-in-law, niece or nephew, first or second cousin, or stepparent.” (25 U.S.C. § 1903(2); § 224.1, subd. (c) [“ ‘extended family member’ . . . defined as provided in [§] 1903” of ICWA].) There is currently a split in authority as to whether this duty only applies to a child who has been taken into temporary custody without a 1 We resolve this case by memorandum opinion because it “raise[s] no substantial issues of law or fact.” (Cal. Stds. Jud. Admin., § 8.1.)
2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. 2 warrant pursuant to sections 306 or 307, and the Supreme Court has granted review to decide the question. (See In re Ja.O. (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 672, 678, review granted July 26, 2023, S280572; In re Robert F. (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 492, 500-504, review granted July 26, 2023, S279743; In re Delila D. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 953, 962.) Although Mother does not contend that Children were taken into temporary custody under sections 306 or 307, both parties assume that the expanded duty of inquiry applies. In light of the Agency’s implicit concession, we do not decide this issue. Mother contends the Agency “failed to conduct an adequate initial inquiry as to whether [Children] were Indian children” because it “never inquired of the various available paternal ‘extended family members’ about the children’s possible Indian heritage.” Mother points to 11 individuals listed in the Agency’s Jurisdiction/Disposition Report who have the same last name as the Children’s father.3 The Jurisdiction/Disposition Report explains that the Agency had identified “potential relatives” and describes each individual’s relationship to Children simply as “Relative.” Although Mother assumes that these individuals are actual “extended family member[s],” she fails to explain how they are related to the Children or to point to evidence in the record that would enable us to conclude that any one of them is a “grandparent, aunt or uncle, brother or sister, brother-in-law or sister-in-law, niece or nephew, first or second cousin, or stepparent.” (25 U.S.C. § 1903(2); § 224.1, subd. (c).) Mother cites In re J.C. (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 70, and In re Darian R. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 502, in support of her position. In each case, however, 3 Although the Agency argues that J.G. was only an “alleged” father, multiple Agency reports list J.G. as the “Father,” and the juvenile court ultimately found that he was the father of both Children. 3 the parent identified specific individuals who qualified as extended family members and with whom the Agency could or did speak. (See In re J.C., supra, at pp. 79, 82, 84 [ICWA inquiry was insufficient where social worker was in regular contact with one grandmother and had spoken to the other grandmother’s husband but had not asked either grandmother about Indian heritage]; In re Darian R., supra, at pp. 505, 509 [ICWA inquiry was insufficient where “social worker interviewed maternal aunt and had contact with maternal grandfather” but had not asked either about Indian heritage].) Here, Mother fails to establish a qualifying relationship for any of the individuals she identifies. Moreover, although the Agency sent contact letters to these relatives, none responded.4 Therefore, we cannot say the Agency was statutorily required to conduct inquiries with the “potential relatives” identified in the Jurisdiction/Disposition Report. Because this is Mother’s sole argument on appeal, Mother has not shown any error in the juvenile court’s orders.
4 Children’s aunt, the one paternal family member who responded to the Agency’s letter, denied Indian heritage. The Agency asked this paternal aunt, “Is there anyone in your family who may have more information about the child’s Native American, Alaska Native, or American Indian heritage?” She responded “No.” 4 DISPOSITION The orders are affirmed.
McCONNELL, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
DO, J.
CASTILLO, J.