People v. Ingram CA4/1

California Court of Appeal · D081166 · 2023-09-18 · Unpublished

Proceeding: appeal from a judgment
Trial court: Superior Court of San Diego County · No. SCD282331
Trial judge: Peter C. Deddeh
Outcome: reversed in part — Reversed in part and remanded with directions.
Area: criminal
Panel: Michele M. Castillo (author), Richard D. Huffman, Sr., Judith D. McConnell

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T04:29Z · confidence high

The trial court convicted the defendant of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated and two lesser included driving offenses, sentencing her to 15 years to life. The Court of Appeal reversed the convictions for the two lesser included offenses, holding they could not stand simultaneously with the greater offense under Penal Code section 654, and remanded for dismissal.

Ruling reviewed	Standard	The court	The model
Convictions for counts 3 (driving under the influence causing bodily injury) and 4 (driving with BAC 0.08+ causing bodily injury) as lesser included offenses of count 2 (gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated). “We thus conclude counts 3 (driving under the influence of alcohol causing bodily injury) and 4 (driving with a blood alcohol level of 0.08 percent or more causing bodily injury) are lesser necessarily included offenses of count 2 (gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated) that cannot stand.”	de novo	error	agree with court agree with court
Claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to raise the lesser included offense argument at trial. “Given this conclusion, we need not address Ingram’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.”	unclear	not reached	agree with court agree with court

Authorities

relied: Rutledge v. United States (1996) 517 U.S. 292 — A conviction of a greater offense and one or more lesser included offenses cannot stand simultaneously.
relied: People v. Lopez (1998) 19 Cal.4th 282 — A crime is a lesser included offense of a greater offense if one cannot commit the greater offense without also necessarily committing the lesser offense.
relied: People v. Miranda (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1464 — One person who injures a person while driving under the influence commits a violation of Vehicle Code section 23153; and if that person dies from that injury, a violation of Penal Code section 191.5 has occurred.

The appellate opinion: sound — sound

How this analysis was made · dispute it

unusual disposition

A model's reading — claude-fable-5-1, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T04:30Z · confidence low

A San Diego jury convicted Ingram of murder, gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated (Pen. Code, § 191.5), two counts of DUI causing injury (Veh. Code, § 23153), and hit and run, and the trial court entered judgment on all counts, sentencing her to 15 years to life on the murder count and staying the remaining terms. On appeal, with the Attorney General conceding, the Court of Appeal held the two Vehicle Code section 23153 convictions were lesser necessarily included offenses of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated, reversed those two convictions, remanded with directions to dismiss them and amend the abstract of judgment, declined to reach the ineffective-assistance claim, and otherwise affirmed.

Ruling reviewed	Standard	The court	The model
Entry of judgment of conviction on counts 3 and 4 (Veh. Code, § 23153 DUI causing injury and 0.08 BAC causing injury) in addition to count 2 (Pen. Code, § 191.5 gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated) involving the same victim. “We thus conclude counts 3 (driving under the influence of alcohol causing bodily injury) and 4 (driving with a blood alcohol level of 0.08 percent or more causing bodily injury) are lesser necessarily included offenses of count 2 (gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated) that cannot stand.”	de novo	error (law misapplied)	agree with court Whether one offense is necessarily included in another is a pure question of law, and the court decided it independently although it did not articulate a standard. Penal Code section 191.5 by its terms requires driving in violation of Vehicle Code section 23153 (or 23152/23140), and People v. Miranda treats section 23153 as the predicate for section 191.5, so the result is consistent with existing authority and the Attorney General's concession. The court's doctrinal framing is imprecise: it grounds the bar on multiple convictions in Penal Code section 654, which governs multiple punishment, when the rule against convicting of both a greater and a necessarily included offense is a judicially created exception to section 954 (People v. Pearson; People v. Reed), and it cites a federal double jeopardy case (Rutledge) rather than California's governing cases. The court also notes the offenses involve 'the same victim,' which edges toward the accusatory pleading test that Reed says does not apply to multiple-conviction questions; nonetheless the outcome is correct under the statutory elements analysis as applied in Miranda.
Ingram's claim that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to conviction on counts 3 and 4 as lesser included offenses. “Given this conclusion, we need not address Ingram’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.”	unclear	not reached	agree with court Because the court granted the full relief sought on the lesser-included-offense ground, the ineffective assistance claim became moot; declining to reach it was appropriate and the multiple-conviction error is cognizable on appeal without objection in any event.

Authorities

relied: Rutledge v. United States (1996) 517 U.S. 292 — A defendant may not stand convicted of both a greater offense and a lesser included offense; cited for the principle that such convictions cannot stand simultaneously.
relied: People v. Lopez (1998) 19 Cal.4th 282 — An offense is a lesser included offense if the greater offense cannot be committed without necessarily committing the lesser.
relied: People v. Miranda (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1464 — Injuring a person while driving under the influence violates Vehicle Code section 23153, and if the victim dies from that injury a violation of Penal Code section 191.5 has occurred.
missed: People v. Reed (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1224 — Penal Code section 954 permits multiple convictions for the same act, subject to a judicially created exception barring conviction of both a greater and a necessarily included offense; only the statutory elements test, not the accusatory pleading test, applies in deciding whether multiple convictions are permitted.
missed: People v. Pearson (1986) 42 Cal.3d 351 — A defendant may be convicted of multiple offenses based on a single act, but may not be convicted of both a greater offense and a necessarily included offense; the remedy is to vacate the lesser conviction.

The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The result is correct and the Attorney General conceded it, but the court grounds the multiple-conviction bar in Penal Code section 654 (a multiple-punishment statute) and a federal double jeopardy case rather than in the California rule derived from section 954 and articulated in People v. Pearson and People v. Reed, and it does not state a standard of review. The analysis also refers to the offenses involving 'the same victim,' a factual matter that Reed says should not drive the elements-based inquiry, though it does not change the outcome here.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

Filed 9/18/23 P. v. Ingram CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D081166

Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD282331)

LATISHA CHERMIE INGRAM,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Peter C. Deddeh, Judge. Reversed in part and remanded with directions. Randall Conner, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Robin Urbanski, Laura G. Baggett, and Namita Patel, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. MEMORANDUM OPINION A jury convicted Latisha Chermie Ingram of murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a); count 1); gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated (Pen. Code, § 191.5, subd. (a); count 2); driving while under the influence of alcohol causing bodily injury (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (a); count 3); driving with a blood alcohol level of 0.08 percent or more causing bodily injury (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (a); count 4); and hit and run with death or permanent injury (Veh. Code, § 20001, subd. (b)(2); count 5). The jury also found true various enhancements as to counts 2, 3, and 4. The trial court sentenced Ingram to prison for 15 years to life on count 1 and stayed the sentences for the remaining counts. On appeal, Ingram contends that counts 3 and 4 are lesser necessarily included offenses of count 2 that must be reversed. She also contends her counsel provided prejudicially ineffective assistance by failing to raise that argument at trial. Respondent agrees that counts 3 and 4 are lesser included offenses of count 2 and asks that we remand for the trial court to dismiss those counts. We resolve this case by memorandum opinion pursuant to the California Standards for the Appellate Courts, section 8.1. Penal Code section 954 permits an accusatory pleading to charge different statements of the same offense. Penal Code section 654, however, prohibits multiple punishments for more than one conviction for the same criminal act. Thus, a conviction of a greater offense and one or more lesser included offenses cannot stand simultaneously. (Rutledge v. United States (1996) 517 U.S. 292, 307.) A crime is a lesser included offense of a greater offense if one cannot commit the greater offense without also necessarily committing the lesser offense. (People v. Lopez (1998) 19 Cal.4th 282, 288.) Here, the parties concur that gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated (count 2) necessarily includes the offenses of driving under the influence of alcohol causing bodily injury (count 3) and driving with a blood 2 alcohol level of 0.08 percent or more causing bodily injury (count 4) where, as here, each offense involves the same victim. We agree. By its express terms, Penal Code section 191.5 applies “where the driving was in violation of Section . . . 23153 of the Vehicle Code.” (Pen. Code, § 191.5, subds. (a) & (b).) In other words, “[o]ne person who injures a person while driving under the influence commits a violation of Vehicle Code section 23153; and if that person dies from that injury—whether immediately or sometime later—a violation of Penal Code section 191.5 has occurred.” (People v. Miranda (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1464, 1468.) We thus conclude counts 3 (driving under the influence of alcohol causing bodily injury) and 4 (driving with a blood alcohol level of 0.08 percent or more causing bodily injury) are lesser necessarily included offenses of count 2 (gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated) that cannot stand. Given this conclusion, we need not address Ingram’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

3 DISPOSITION We reverse Ingram’s convictions for counts 3 and 4, and remand to the trial court with directions to dismiss the convictions for counts 3 and 4 and issue an amended abstract of judgment consistent with this opinion and forward a copy to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment.

CASTILLO, J. WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

HUFFMAN, J.

Cites, in this corpus

People v. Lopez S064118 · 1998-11-02
People v. Miranda H010461 · 1994-01-18